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PREFACE 
In the fall of 1932 the condition of a,griculture became acute. 
The price of farm products fell to di astrou ly low levels. On 
Iowa farms, hog declined to $3.00 a hundred pound , and 
le s; corn fell to 10 or 12 cents a bushel; and every indication 
was that price would continue at those ruinously low levels 
for some time to come. 
Payment of debts, taxes and running expenses became almost 
impossible. A ri ing tide of farm mortgage foreclosures, tax 
delinquencies and banlt failures spread o'rer the country and 
left disaster and demoralization in it. wake. The ordinary 
problems of farm operation l1ra11k to i11:ig·nificance b)r compari-
son "~ith the 0\,.er,,,helming problem of hri,Teled farm income. 
Accordinuly mo~ ,t of the ao-riclilttlral economic~ r earch 
staff at Iowa State ollege su pended work on their ordinary 
current r esearch project~ , and turned to a special tudy of 
the emergency problems forced upon agriculttlre by the world 
depre sion. 
The re ult of the. e special tudi s vvere publi hed cur-
rently in a erie of circ11lars dealing in ~ imple language with 
the omewhat complex economic situation. The foreword to 
the first circular tated: 
''The first nece ity is to clarify the it11ation with a clear 
statement of the facts. Even with all of the facts before us, 
even if we could lay them out like checker men on a board 
so that we could ee them all and the relations of each to all 
of the others, we might not all be able to agree on measures 
that should be talr n. But we hould urely be able to weed 
out many of the poor ideas and concentrate on some of the 
good ones. Many sol11tions have been proposed. All of them 
should be examined, and their po sibilities considered.'' 
The first circt1lar stated the po ition of agriculture a it 
stood in December, 1932. This p11blication 'vas follo,ved by 
another setting forth the causes of the emergency. Then came · 
a circular dealing with the dome tic allotment plan. Other 
circulars, timed in so far as po ible to appear when public 
intere t was high, then dealt succe sively with the mortgage it-
nation, the prOSJ)ect for monetary inflation, the tax situation, 
and the effect of tariff upon agriculture in the Middle West. 
v 
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They were written by members of the Agricultural Economics 
sta-ff and published as Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 
circulars. 
In all. ten circulars were printed. They were given news-
paper and radio publicity and, being timely and easily read, 
met with wide popular approval. Fifteen thousand copies of 
each circular were printed. Nearly all of these have been dis-
tributed, mostly in response to requests. Favorable comments 
were received from all quarters, especially from the schools. 
Time pas ed. By early ummer of 1933, many remedial meas-
ure for rescuing the country had been pa sed. Recovery set 
in. Many aspects of the situation changed. The circulars, which 
were written during the trough of the depression, began to 
appear on superficial inspection to be passing out o.f date. This 
of course was natural, and was expected when the circulars 
were written. 
On closer inspection, however, an unexpected feature of the 
circulars emerged. The principles laid down in the circulars 
retained their validity and pertinence, even though the immed-
iate ituation had changed. The circulars po sessed a more 
durable value than had been anticipated. 
The original supply of circulars, however, was rapidly be-
coming exhausted. It seemed highly advisable to put them 
up in some permanent form commensurate with their more 
permanent usefulne s. Accordingly it wa decided to bring them 
together and publish them as one volume. The present volume 
is the result. 
In this volume the circulars have been left substantially un-
changed, in their original form. Some minor errors and omis-
sion have been rectified, and in a few cases, introductions have 
been modified so that the material in the circulars would read 
ea ily as connected chapters in a book. Except for these changes, 
the circulars remain the same as they were in their original 
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CHAPTER ONE NOVEMBER, 1932 
The Crisis in the Fall of 1932 
BY A. G. BLAOK 
The State of Iowa thi fall i harvesting the largest crop 
of corn in her hi tory. There is imminent danger that , he 
'vill also harve t the big(7est crop of farm mort~age foreclo ures, 
lost equities, and ruined farmers that the state has ever known . 
• 
Nature has never treated the farm r more generously, yet 
Otlr economic y tern could hardly treat him wor e. flog. 
no'v (November, 1932) are selling for $3.00 per hundred· beef 
cattle, $5.00; corn, 10 cents a bushel; oat , 7 cents; butterfat, 
20 cents a pound. The things that farmer produce are all 
lling at one-half or one-third of their 1922-1.929 average price . 
On the other hand, although some of the goods farmers buy 
have come down in price, most of the thing~ they have to pay 
out money for have come down relatively little. Intere t and 
principal on old debt remain the arne. The average farm mort-
ga(7e for mortgaged farms till run at $65.00 an acre.1 Tax s 
average $1.50 an acre2 do,vn a little. Freight rate are prac-
tically unchanged . lightly lo,ver in orne ca es, slightly higher 
in others. The index of machinery price tancl at 154 (the 1910-
1914 average 100) 8 , and so on down the lit. 
The official :figures of the United States Department o·f 
Agriculture show that the index of the prices of farm product 
has declined from 138 in 1929 to 56 in October, 1932.4 The 
index of the thin(7' farmers buy declined from 155 to 107. 
That is, the purcha 'ing power of the farmer's producu now 
i only 52 percent of pre-war; the farrn r 's capacity to pay 
has been cut in half. When he talres a load of hog or corn 
to town and sells it to meet his running expenses, the money 
he receives for the load " rill go only half as far as it used to go. 
But these figure. under tate the situation. The index of 
the things farmer bt1y includes the goocls 11 ed in living and 
in production, but does not include r nts, in 'Urance, taxe or 
payments on land or other debts. Th se all remain clo e to 
150 percent of the pre-war, the same as th y were a few years 
ago. With these things included, the average farmer's pur-
[1] 
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chasing power, instead of being reduced 
duced to 40 or 45 percent of pre-war. 
Low Prices and Low Incomes 
• 
to 52, actually is re-
• 
The decline in the prices of farm products is shown in table 
I.~ The average farm prices of Iowa's principal agricultural 
products for the first 10 months of 1932 are compared with 
the average prices for 1927, 1928 and 1929. During these 
three years, as the table show~, the indexes of the prices of 
Iowa farm products ranged between 140 and 147. Since then 
the index has fallen to less than 50 ; the index number for 
October, 1932, is 49, only three points above the previous low 
reached in 1896. 
The effect of these low prices is shown in the financial reports 
of a group of 650 farmers who have been keeping records of 
their incomes and expenses for seYeral years, in cooperation 
with the Agricultural Economics Department of Iowa S'tate 
College. The average net income for this group in 1929 was 
$2,7746 (part of this income represents income on the owner-
capital invested in the farm; the rest is the owner's wages for 
his year's work) . For 1930, the average income figure had 
fallen to $763. 7 The 1931 figure fell below zero; it was $818. 
The operator got less than nothing for his labor and money 
invested in the farm. The 1932 income figure will probably be 
lower than the 1931 figure. 
TABLE I. AVERAGE IOWA PRICES OF PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS AT THE FARM 
Products 1927 
Hogs ............. .......................... .. .. ................ $ 9.49 
nttle ........................ .. ... .... ....................... 8.92 
She p ..... ............................................. . ......... 6.57 
Corn ..................... .. ................ ..................... .. 7 4 
Oat ........................... .. ............ ... ..................... .41 
Witeat ..... ........ ....... ..... ................................. 1.22 
Flay .... .... ............................................................. 13.69 
Butter .... ------- ............ -------- _ .... _ ........ __ _ _ _ . 44 
Eggs ......... _____ -----·---------- ........... __ .. .. . 2 3 
P oul try ... ___ ........... _. __ ....... _ ... ____ .. . .... .18 
Index number ----- --------·-·-----·-----·· · 140 
1928 
$ 8.77 
10.93 
7.06 
.82 
.45 
1.14 
12.07 
.47 
.28 
.195 
145 
1929 
$ 9.50 
10 .81 
6.72 
. 78 
.39 
1.04 
11.63 
.46 
.30 
.205 
147 
1932 (First 
10 months) 
$ 3.37 
5.07 
2.11 
.25 
.17 
.39 
8.09 
.20 
.12 
.105 
57 
The e low incomes have had a disastrous effect on land 
values. The value of Io~ farm land has been declini,ng 
steadily ever since 1920, but the decline was slowly being ar-
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re~ted a few years baclr ; it looked then as if Iowa land values 
were going to stabilize at about $14~ a.n acre.8 Since that time, 
land value. ha,Te declined further. From 1931 to 1932 th y 
went through the mo. t rapid decline in history. The average 
figure on 1\farch 1, 1932 \Va $92 an acre. This is only 80 
percent of the pre-wa.r values. Many fa.rm would now sell for · 
le s than the mortgage on them. In many cases the decline 
in their values has exceeded all the payment made since the 
farm was purcha ed. 
The crreat redt1ction in farm incomes and farm land valu s 
ancl the general decline in the 'ralue of oth r bank a et ha 
lind rmined the financial ~ tructure of country bank to an 
alarming extent. The nttmber of bank . 11 p n ion during the 
po t-"rar depre ion 10 year. ago 'V'a~ ' high, but the numb r 
dttring the pre nt I pr ion is mt1ch higher. The numb r 
in 1930 was one-third higher than the pr viou record, cstab-
li hed in 1926; the number in 1931 wa.s more than twice a~ 
high a the 1926 figtlr .9 Iov.ra led the nation in bank u~ 11 n-
. ion~ for the period from 1921 to 1929 with a total of 457.10 
In 1931, Illinoi tool{ fir t place with a total of 23 , Iowa 
rttnning econd wi h a total of 208. During th present y ar, 
the ituation ha di inctly improved. Th peak in bank w-
pen. ions seem to have been passed. Only four Iowa bank 
clo ed their door in ptember, and only three in October.11 
A great deal of this improvement can be attributed to the ac-
tivitie of the Recon truction Finance orpora.tion, which ha 
brought a new el m nt of trength into the banking situation. 
Nationwide Problem 
Bu ·ine in general i . ympathetic with agriculture, but many 
btl ·ine s men tal{e the viewpoint that after all, the farmer', 
trouble are the farmer' troubles, not theirs. The farm it-
llation, they say, i the farmer's worry, not the bu iness man's; 
he l1a~ plenty of hi~ own. 
It i the bu in \ ma.n' worry, ho,vever, a well a th 
farmer's. When the farm r' income i cut in half, aft r h 
ha paid his taxe~ and int re t, he has very little left to p nd 
for goods. The gro farm income for the United States has 
fallen from 12 billion dollars in 1929 to 6.9 billion in 1931; 
4 A. G. BLACK 
the estimate for 1932 is 5 billion.12 After allowances are made 
for the lower value of goods raised and consumed on the farm, 
farmers spent about 6.5 billion dollars less in 1932 than they 
did in 1929. The market for several billion dollars in goods 
has di appeared. 
Coming closer home, we find that the gross farm income 
of the State of Iowa, which averaged 700 million dollars from 
1924 to 1928, in 1931 fell to 400 million dollars.U Iowa farmers 
thus spent about 250 million dollars less in 1931 than formerly. 
The 1932 income will be only about 270 million dollars ;14 Iowa 
farmers will spend about 350 million less in 1932 than in 1929. 
These declines in the purchasing power of farmers are one 
reason why the business man has his worries, and it is a rea on 
why anything that he does to help the farmer will indirectly 
help himself. 
How long are the present low prices for farm products likely 
to last? Nobody can speak with certainty, but stati ticians 
do not expect material improvement in livestock prices during 
the next 12 months. The present low price of corn is due partly 
to the large United States corn crop this year; but if the corn 
crop were no larger than average, the Iowa price per bushel 
would be only between 5 and 10 cents higher than it is at pres-
ent.15 Recovery in the prices of farm products is waiting on 
business recovery, and even after that takes place, the prices of 
agricultural products are not expected to improve immediately. 
It takes some time for agriculture to recover from the effects of 
a full fledged bu iness depression. 
High Fixed Charges 
Low incomes are only a part of the farmer's troubles. If 
the farmer had to meet only current running expenses, he could 
cut them to the bone and manage somehow. Unfortunately, 
the situation is not so simple; most farmers have fixed charges 
a well as current expen es to meet. It is the e fixed charges 
that are causing mo t of the trouble. 
Price have been low before. Thirty-six years ago, in Decem-
ber, 1896, the average farm price of corn in Story County was 
13 cents a bushel. For hogs, it was $2.98 a hundred.16 These 
prices are nearly the same as they are at the present time. 
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But the debt situation was vastly different then. The average 
mortgage debt per mortgaged acre in Story County in 1896 was 
$15.99 ·17 last December it stood at $86.50. The debt now is 
fi,,e times as large a it was in 1896. The dollar has increased 
in value during the la t t'vo~ years and prices have fallen gen-
erally, but this ha no effect on debt out tanding. They remain 
the ~ ame size as before. The price of farm products may fall 
to one-half or one-third, but the principal and interest on mort-
gages and other debts remain unchanged. The stream of in-
co~me flowing into the farmer's hands is redt1ced 60 percent, 
bt1t the outflow of his heaviest cash expense remains as large 
a e\"er. 
Obviously thi i an impossible situation. In many case 
the result is that the fa.rmer lo es not only hi farm and home 
btlt the lifetime saving he has already ptlt into it. In six 
repre entative Iowa counties, a total of 257 farms were sold at 
foreclosure sale in the fir 't nine months of 1932.18 This represents 
a large increase over 1930 when only 90 farms were thus sold. 
In Story County, the number of farm mortgages foreclo ed 
dtlring the first nine month of 1932 wa~ three times as high as 
the highe t number of foreclo ures in any previous comparable 
period during the la t 80 years. 
In ordinary times, the farmers whose mortgages are fore-
closed are generally men who have failed because of personal 
rea~ ons because of laclr of capital, inaptitude for farming, 
poor managerial ability, insufficient training or experience, 
poor health, and o forth. In mo t ca e they are ''marginal 
farmer . '' But the pre~ ent tide of mortgage foreclosure is 
different; in its imper onal sweep, it i tal{ing all clas e of 
farmer , good, bad and indifferent, and for reasons beyond 
their control. Many of tl1e farmers who are being foreclosed 
now are numbered among our most efficient farm o·perators. 
They are men of initiative and enterprise, who ~every excellence 
ha. brought them to their downfall. They are the men who e 
good qualities have enabled them to climb up the agricultural 
ladder to the top rung of farm ownership ; and now they are 
much worse off than they would have been if they had never 
attempted to own a farm of their own. 
• 
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The situation affects nearly three-fifths of total farm popula-
tion of Iowa, for 58 percent of Iowa's farms are mortgaged.19 
It ha a demoralizing effect on renters as well. Many renters 
now are signing leases calling for rental payments of $6 or $7 
an acre, 20 knowing full well that there is no prospect of their 
being able to pay it at the end of the year. Why should they 
argue about the rent ? They cannot pay it in any case, they 
say ; and after all, the landlord can not do any more than take 
all that there is left after the renter has kept his family together 
and maintained his livestock through the year. 
The standard of living of owtners and renter alike is being 
reduced. State medical conventions report the alarming extent 
to which dental and other medical work is being neglected to 
the detriment of the present and future health of farm familie . 
Country churches are becoming involved in financial difficul-
ties, and social and humanizing activities of all kinds are being 
severely curtailed. 
What Can Be Done? 
The situation as it tands is desperate. At existing price , 
the majority of farmer cannot pay capital and interest charge 
on their debts. Positive action is necessary, or thousand of 
farmers are going to be swept over the edge into foreclosure 
and financial ruin. 
But what can be done to meet the situation? So many 
different solutions are being offered that they darken coun el. 
Some would have us put on higher tariffs and protect the home 
market; others would have us lower tariffs and revive inter-
national trade. Some recommend inflation to increase prices 
and give us an ''hone t dollar''; others claim that only by 
avoiding inflation can we preserve the integrity of our mone-
tary and financial tructure and save ourselves from utter 
chaos. And some hold that the economic forces at work are 
so blind and uncontrollable that we can do nothing; they say 
that we cannot defy immutable economic laws, and that the 
only thing to do i to l t things run their course. 
Thi last point of view is out of harmony with every tenet 
of human progress. 'fhis is not an age when men stand help-
less before natural forces, howe-ver blind or immutable. We 
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do not bow down before plague and pestilence and ''let nature 
tal\e its course''; in tead we build anitary water supply and 
draina.ge syst ms clean tlp area., of infection and tamp 011t 
the di ea e. We do not ~ tand idly by and let the floods of the 
lower 1\fi is ippi ruin the surrounding farmino- cot1ntry ; we 
build levees to hold th river bacl{. We do not freeze '\Vh n 
inclement weath r 'trilr ll , sayino- that tho. e who cannot 
tlr,rive are unfit and hould peri h; vve ma.nufacture clothing 
and build comfortable homes to protect otlr elves. We do 110t 
grow native varietie of corn on our farm.' ; we breed up n w 
high producino- vari ti , ''rhich va tly outyield the old. The 
march of cience i the tory of m n overco1ning natural fore . 
-not defyino- tl1 m but pittino- oth r natural force ~ llcc -
ft1lly again t th m to make them worl{ for the benefit of man-
l{ind. 
imilarly in th r alm of economic . Economic force are 
no more '' immutabl '' than natural force are; they can not 
b defied, but they can be met and controlled by proper appli-
cation of other economic force . The only difference i, tl1at 
economic phenomena ar more diffictllt to u11der ta11d and con-
trol than natural phenomena ar ; th ir cau e are num rotl. ~, 
ramifying into p ycholoo-y as \vell al into natural cience; and 
they work in and throtlgh a tangle of complex interr lation-
ship . 
The difficulty of economic probl m, hinder but it . hould 
not preclude workin~ through to their olution. The imme li-
ate problem in the pr . · nt upheaval i fir t to di cern cl a.rly 
the de tructive economic force that are at work, a.nd th n to 
worlr out effective m a ures to combat them. This requir,_..s 
that we try to di cover the trong and 'veak point of remedi 
that have been propo d, -vvork out new olution whenever 
necessary, map out a program of action and then put it into 
effect. 
8 A. G. Bro\CK 
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CHAPTER TWO DECEMBER, 1932 
The Causes of the Emergency 
BY GEOFFREY SHEPiiERD 
• 
What are the cau es of the present emergency in agricultt1re? 
We need to know, because a clear realization of the way we got 
into this trouble should help us to plan the way out. Thi~ de-
pression is not a catastrophe of nature, lilre an earthquake or a 
tornado. It is a man-made affair, the result of our own actions 
and policies. We did not do it intentionally, but somehow in 
fumbling with our economic machinery we pulled the wrong 
levers and got our elves into trouble. If " re can go back and 
di cover what we did that was wronO', 've will be in a better 
po ition to get the machinery going again. The 'vay into trot1ble 
should give us some idea of the way out. 
If the cause wa ~ overproduction, we ought to know it. If it 
\vas Wall Street, we ought to know that. If it 'vas an un table 
monetary and banking y tern, we should get our ideas cl ar 
as to the defect in that ystem and prepare to remedy th m. 
If it was becatl e we got involved in European financial diffi-
culties, or if there ha been something wrong with our trade 
policie whatever the reason or rea ons, the sooner we chart 
the obscure paths through which we got into this depre ~ ion, 
the onner shall we find the way o·ut. 
The Great Decline in the General Commodity Price Level 
The immediate cause of the agricultural emergency i the 
deva tating decline in the general commodity price level that 
has taken place during the last three y ar . Measured from 1925 
to 1929 average levels, the general level of '"hole ale commod-
ity prices in the United States has fallen 34 percent, or one-
third.1 Simila.r decline have taken place in the other countries 
of the world. 
A reduction in the general price level of this magnitllde bears 
down with especial force upon agriculture, for two rea ons. 
[9] 
• 
• 
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Costs of Distribution Lag 
The first reason is that the costs of distribution from pro-
ducer to consumer do not decline as rapidly as wholesale com-
modity prices. Manufacturers', processors' and retailers' wages 
and rent always fall more slowly than commodity prices; freight 
rates change very slowly (they have remained practically un-
changed since the present depression began). Changes in the 
cost of distribution lag so much behind changes in commodity 
prices that the heaviest part of the burden of a decline in the 
general price level is passed back to the producer. 
A simple illustration of this is the way declines in hog prices 
at the central markets are passed back to the producer. It costs 
about 75 cents a hundred pounds (freight and handling 
charges) to ship hogs from central Iowa to Chicago. When the 
price at Chicago declines from $4.00 a hundred to $3.00, the 
farm price in Iowa declines by the same amount, from $3.25 to 
$2.25. The reduction in the Chicago price is one-fourth, while 
the reduction in the Iowa farm price is nearly one-third. In 
thi ca e the full burden of the price decline is pas ed back to 
the producer. 
Agricultural Production Continues at Full Capacity 
There is a second reason why a major decline in the general 
commodity price level hits agriculture hard. A great price 
d cline generally bring on a business depres ion, and during 
a bu ine s depression the general demand for goods and services 
diminishe . 
Many indu tries react promptly to thi ituation; they cut 
down their production, in line with the reduction in demand. 
The steel industry, for example, has reduced its present output 
t-o about 20 percent of its full capacity. In the automobile 
indu try production has been cut to about one-third. 2 Indus-
trial production for the United States as a whole has been cut 
more than a third. Manufacturers who follow thi policy gen-
erally have to accept somewhat lower price , and their net 
income u ually decline still more than their prices. But by 
reducing production they avert a large part of the effect of 
reduced demand, pa sing a major portion of it on to the shoul-
ders of the employees that they discharge. 
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This policy is very effective in well organized industries. 
The clearest example is the steel indu try, which, by cutting its 
production schedule h avily, has been able to maintain it~ price 
schedule almo t intact. The price of teel rail ha been $43 
a ton for year ; it ha remained unchanged all through the 
pre nt depre ion llntil two month ago, when it wa reduced 
to $40. It i ea~ y to imagine ho"r lo'v t el prices would have 
fallen had the teel indtl. try kept operating at full capacity! 
But that is exactly what agriclllture ha done. During the 
year 1926-1932 the total output of farm products in the Unit d 
State has remain d pl,.actically con tant, at a level a.bout 15 
perc nt higher tl1an (lurino- the year 1919-1921.3 In the face 
of a reduction in l man] agriculture ha continued to operate 
it plant at full capacity. This i the , cond rea on " rhy agri-
cultural price have d clined o h avily during the pa t thr e 
years. 
Changes Within Agriculture 
There is a fur h r on ideration thot1gh it i not conn ct d 
"rith the depre ion. hange ha,Te b n tal\:ing plac in tl1e 
t chnique of acrrictllt11ral production, and the e chang " ha 
b en . lowly alteri11g th Olltline of th agricultt1ral pictur . 
orne of the e thing. have helped the nit d State farm r, 
orne of them have hurt him. The increa~ ed use of tractor , 
trucks, combine. a.nd other large cale machinery has help d 
to the extent that it l1a reduced th ro t of production on th 
far1n. Yet the. ra tor. and trtlcl< ha'r di placed man)r 
hor. e and mul . · and a a re ult, a good- ized por io11 of th 
marl\: t for corn, oa . . , and other f l grain ha di app ar l. 
Thi has corre pon Jingly weakened th pric · of the. e grai11 . 
\\Thatever their net effect may be, the,1e cl1ange work lowly, 
and they are of mall moment compared with the terrific d clin 
in agricultural pric that has taken plac during the pa t three 
year . This decline b ar down with gr at 'C\rerity upon far1n 
op rators, becau e the co t of running a farm debt and int r-
e t charges, taxe , machinery co t and th multitude of .,mall 
running expen e hav 110t come do\\"11 in any corre ponding 
measure with the pric s of farm prodt1ct.. The farmer' ·inco~me 
has been reduced 60 percent, but his expe1t es l1ave been raduc d 
• 
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only about 20 percent.4 The farmer is ground between the 
upper millstone of descending prices and the unyielding lower 
mill tone of comparatively fixed costs. 
WHY HAS THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL DECLINED? 
It is easy to say that the immediate cause of the present agri-
cultural emergency is the great decline that has taken place in 
the general price level during the past three years. But that 
only raises another and more difficult question. What was it 
that made the general price level decline? 
The answer to this question is full of controversial points, 
but the broad outlines can be blocked out in a few pages. 
The root causes of the present depression and deflation of 
prices trace back to the World War. 
Before the war, monetary conditions were comparatively 
stable, both within each nation and between the nations. The 
leading nations played the parts for which they were fitted, 
and these parts dovetailed with one another to make a well 
balanced whole. 
The United States, for example, was the world's greatest 
debtor nation. That is, she paid huge amounts annually to 
other nations for interest on borrowed money, for tourist expen-
ditures and for immigrant remittances abroad. She was also 
a great net exporter of goods. These two policies, her financial 
policy and her trade policy, fitted in well with each other, for 
her payments abroad were made in the form of her exports of 
goods. 6 
Great Britain, on the other hand, was the world's chief 
banker and creditor nation. Other nations paid her large 
amounts every year for interest on borrowed money and for 
shipping charges. Furthermore, she was a free-trade nation 
and received large net imports of good . Here was another 
example of harmonious financial and trade policies. 
Between the nations, equilibrium was maintained through 
the action of "the ilutomatic gold flow mechanism." If one 
nation, for example, developed an export surplus of goods, 
services and loans abroad, this excess would cause that nation's 
exchange rates to ri e, and gold would flow in until the ex-
changes were corrected. This inflow of gold would raise prices 
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in tha.t nation and make it harder for her to sell her goods and 
services abroad and easier for other nations to sell to her. This 
would reduce her export to a point where they wo·uld again 
be balanced by her imports. Gold flowed wherever needed to 
redre s balance~ , and in flowing rai ed or lowered prices so 
that equilibrium was maintained. 
Beneath the surface of this apparently smoothly working 
'vorld, however, politico-economic forces population growth, 
the ambitions of the different nations for control of the world's 
markets and prodt1ctive re ources, etc. were exerting terriffic 
expansi,re pre ure. The V\'Orld " ra like a moothly running 
steam engine, btlt the boiler pre ure was o high that the 
machine was likely to blow up at any time. When the explo-
sion finally tool{ place in 1914, it thre\v the different parts of 
the machine out of relation with ach other, and set up oppos-
ing forces whicl1 ha,re le l to a brealrdown during the last three 
years. 
The Effects of the War 
Let us try to get a cl ar grasp of the nature of these oppo ing 
forces, set again, t each other a a re ult of the war explo ion. 
The belligerent nation could have financed the war either 
by monetary inflation or by heavy taxation. Disregarding the 
advice of economists, the United tates, along with the other 
nation. , chose inflation, and ther by sowed the seeds of our 
pre ent trouble. 
A. a result of thi policy of inflation, price~' during the '\\"ar 
roughly doubled. For four year , from 1917 to 1920, the gen-
eral level of commodity prices at '''hole ale in the United tate 
ranged between 175 and 225 percent of pre-waJ.·. 
When peace was declared in 1919, our heavy expenditures 
fo1· war purposes declined, but they were replaced for a time 
by heavy purcha es by foreign nations who were recuperating 
from the destructive eff ct of the war. The \Var-time scale of 
production a.nd price continued for more than a year after the 
war had ended. 
Then, in 1920, the war and post-war boom came to an end. 
Foreign nations cea~ ed buying fro·m abroad a.nd began to build 
up their own indu 1tries; governments ceased floating their war 
• 
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bond , and the policy of cheap money was ended. Prices 
crashed, and a severe depression ensued. 
The depression was severe, but it was comparative-ly brief. 
Within a year or two the country began to recover. Industry 
truggled to its feet again, and began to proceed, haltingly at 
fir t. Most of the price and debt maladjustments carrying over 
from the war inflation period were reduced, some by the expira-
tion of contracts, others by default, others by voluntary agree-
ment, and others by the gradual action of competition. But 
many maladjustments remained, and although industry was able 
to overcome her obstacles within a year or two, recovery in 
agriculture was slow. 
The United States Changes from Debtor to Creditor 
Prosperity returned to industry by 1923. The United States 
greatly improved the technique of mass production, thereby 
reducing the costs of industrial production, and embarked upon 
an aggressive policy of expanding its exports. Overriding the 
prote t of economists, it also decided to raise its tariffs and 
keep out foreign manufactured goods. We were not alone in 
this; the movement wa , with the exception of England, world-
wide. But we were one of the worst sinners in this respect, for 
we were a large nation and had large world responsibilities. 
rrhen, from 1924 on, a strange new influence began to make 
itself felt in the world. During the war, the European nations 
had borrowed enormous sums of money from the United State 
to finance their fighting forces. These foreign borrowings were 
o great that they reversed the debtor position of the United 
State . When the war was over, the United States emerged, 
not as the world's largest debtor, but as one of the world's 
leading creditors. 
' his change in the world position of the United States meant 
that she would be receiving huge payments every year instead 
of making them. These payments to the United States would 
have to be made in govd or services, or el e in gold. Our tar-
iff, raised higher in 1922~ made it difficult for goods to enter. 
So gold flowed in inst ad. It flowed in so rapidly that the 
tock of gold in this country increased from roughly 2 billion 
dollars in 1914 to 4 billion in 1923.6 
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It then became clear that the United States' new role as 
banker conflicted with her traditional role as a large exporter 
of goods. Her new financial policy ran counter to her e tab ... 
lished trade policy. For a a banker, he r quired huge pay-
ment to be made to her each year nearly 200 million dollar 
annually in governmental war debt alon .7 At fir t the, e 
payments could be macle in gold. But there is only a limited 
upply of gold in tl1e world, and sooner or later good wot1ld 
have to flow in instead. The United tates would have to be-
come a net importer of goods. But that ran directly cot1ntcr 
to her trade and tariff policy, which aimed to make the nit d 
tate a large net xporter of goods. 
Europe Pays Her Debts by Borrowing More 
There was the ituation, and it wot1ld quickly have bro11gl1t 
about a deadlocl\: in " 'orld affairs had not a new element u l-
denly entered the picture. European nation began to float 
l1ufYe i ues of curiti tock and bond~ in the nit ] 
tates. In other word , we in the nit d tat tarted to lend 
' ra t urn abroacl. \V d manded that th European cotlntrie 
pay their debt a11d pay them in gold, not O'Ood . And \Vh n 
they could not pay u any longer, we loa11 d them the mon y to 
do it. We loaned th m o much money that they were abl to 
pay their debts ancl buy large quantities of goods from us a 
vvell. The amount are ~ 'ho"rn in table II. 
TABLE II. AMERICAN EXPORTS. IMPORT AND FOREIGN LO 
In million s of dollars 
New foreign 
Exports 
1922 
··-· · · ·· · ······-····-·· ··· 
$3,832 
1923 ·-- ~- - --· · ··· & ·-····-··· ·· 4 , 16 
1924 
· ·······-· · · ·· -· · ·- ·---··· 
4,591 
1925 
·······-----·-----·------· 
4 ,910 
1926 
· ······ ·· ·-- ·-- --········· 
4 , 0 
1927 
···-······--·-----·· -- ···· 
4, 8 65 
1928 
-·-·· ··-···-·· ----------·· 
5 ,128 
1929 
····· · ·· -· ·-··-- ········· · 
5,241 
1930 
··· · ·· ··· ·--------··· ·-··· 
3 ,843 
1931 
·······-· ·· ---· --····-----
2,424 
1932** 
··-·-·····-·-········ · 
1,189 
*I.e., new foreign loans. 
**First nine months. 
Imports 
$3,113 
3, 792 
3,610 
4 ,227 
4 ,4 31 
4 ,18 5 
4, 091 
4 ,399 
3 ,0 61 
2,091 
1,0 15 
Exce of securities 
exports sold in U . • * 
• 
$ 719 $ 63 0 
376 267 
9 1 1, 0 47 
6 83 1,07 
377 1,145 
6 0 1,562 
1 ,03 7 1,319 
42 759 
7 2 1,0 10 
3 33 255 
174 0 
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Our foreign loans were not part of the financial policy of the 
1 nited States. They were independent transactions, made by 
busine s men and bankers as part of their ordinary investment 
activities. Foreign corporations sold bond to finance their 
bu ine , and we bought them in huge amounts. It was obvious 
that these loans could not continue indefinitely. But while they 
lasted they balanced the international books and financed a 
period of insecure but very exuberant prosperity in the United 
States. 
rrhe huge stocks of gold in this country would have given us 
a very high price level had not a good deal of the gold been 
''sterilized,'' sunk in the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank , 
so that it could not exert its full effect on prices. This prevented 
the ''gold flow mechanism'' from working properly. Had we 
and France left it free to work, it would have redistributed the 
gold where it was needed in other countries. As it was, the 
majority of the world's gold piled up in the United States and 
France. Our price level evened out at about 50 percent higher 
than pre-war. 
Similar price levels prevailed abroad, but for a different rea-
son. Their stocks of gold were small; but this did not depress 
their prices, because their gold stocks were so small that the 
countries were forced to remain off the gold standard. Fur-
thermore, our loans abroad helped to sustain foreign purchas-
ing power and foreign price levels. 
The Period of Prosperity 
Gradually, industrial pro. perity in the 1 nited States devel-
oped into a boom. Our indexes of indu trial production ro e 
above 1923-1925 level by 8 percent, 12 percent and finally 19 
percent. Installment buying became wide-spread, and specula-
tion in the security markets developed on an amazing scale. 
Throughout this period the commodity price level remained 
fairly even. After 1925, however, points of weakness began to 
develop. Gold stock in the United States and France contin-
ued to grow. Economic nationalism ran rampant, not only 
among the leading nations of the world but also among the 
small new European nations set up by the Versailles peace 
treaty. Expenditures for competitive armaments mounted rap-
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idly. Partly to restore sound mo·netary conditions, but also 
partly to build up a war chest of gold, nation after nation re-
turned to the gold ~ tandard. Germany went on the gold ba is 
in the fall of 1924; England and the Netherlands in April, 1925; 
Belgium, in October, 1926; Italy, December, 1927; and France, 
June, 1928.9 
The return of these nations to the gold ba i increased the 
demand for gold. Thi increase in the demand for gold began 
to increase the value of the yellow metal. An ''increase in the 
value of gold'' i. the same thing as ''a dec rea~ e in the (gold) 
val11e o.f goods;'' that i , it is the arne thing as a decline in 
price . In the fo11r-jrear period from early 1925 to early 1929, 
the level of price abroad, in the countrie that take the bulk of 
our farrn-product export , declined about 12 p rcent.10 
Be ides the general scramble for gold, there was an almost 
univer al move in the direction of higher tariffs. Nations 
fought to protect their own producer from foreign competition 
by raising tariff barriers again t imports. And many a national 
government, hard pre ed to balance the budget, levied addi .. 
tiona! import clutie in an attempt to increa e its income. 
Trouble was brewing in agriculture particularly. Wheat pro-
duction \vas expanding rapidly in Canada and Argentina. Ex-
pan ion in these countries subjected our wheat grower to the 
same ruthle s competition that we gave European wheat grow-
er two or three generation ago. After 1924, too, Rus ia loomed 
on the horizon \vith threat of further addition to the world', 
wheat supply. 
Uncet'tainty Develops 
Gra.dually, theL e shifts in prodtlction, combined with the 
changes being made in financial and trade policies, began to have 
their effect upon the marlcets of the world. Rising tariff barriers 
cut down the demand for good . Our foreign loan began to 
slacken. Reduced demand led to a piling tlp of stock. of raw 
materials. The e large stocks bega.n to bear down on prices. 
These falling price in turn, led to more restrictive import poli-
cies and to further r duction in dema.nd. 
''By the end of 1928, motinting supplies of industrial goods in 
relation to limited monetary and credit facilities were endanger-
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ing commodity price levels, and in 1929 that danger was made 
even more real as the tremendous absorption of more and more 
fund in the American speculative markets reduced our lending 
abroad, and as the lure of speculative profits dragged even for-
eign funds into the American stock markets. At that juncture, 
the end of 1928 and the beginning of 1929, European industrial 
conditions became vulnerable to the subsequent crash in world-
w:ide peculation and the unsettling influences that the crash let 
loose. r'10 
It W!as not until 1929 that the truth eemed to become appar-
ent. Only then did the world seem to grasp the fact that nations 
cannot sell without buying, nor repay loans indefinitely by sim-
ply borrowing more. The large stocks of goods began to cause con-
cern, and industrial production began to slacken. This was a 
disturbing sign. Confidence gave way to caution. Previou. ly, 
domestic demand had been overexpanded by installment buy-
ing, now it contracted as people turned from buying to saving. 
This contraction of demand caused production to contract still 
further. The stock market wavered and then crashed, feverish 
optimism turned into uncertainty and then into pessimism, and 
the depre ion began. 
The Depression Begins 
When depression begins, it feeds on itself to breed more de-
• pre s1on. 
''The interrelated development , once the depression began, 
can be more clearly traced, and their influence on agriculture 
more clearly visualized. It is generally agreed that sin~e the 
decline in 1929 there have been three distinct pha e in the de-
pression: The first embraced the two years up to the spring of 
1931; it brought on a series of monetary eli turbances which 
characterized the second period, from the middle of 1931 to the 
spring of 1932; the third is the current period characterized by 
the measures adopted to stem the financial debacle. 
''The downward cour e of the depression during 1930 and 1931 
led to a financial crisis. Debtor countries found it difficult to 
maintain satisfactory trade balances to meet their foreign obliga-
tions and to secure new loans upon w:hich they had been de-
pendent for several years. To protect their currencies in relation 
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to gold, these countries "rere forced to adopt exchange regulations 
to restrict gold exports. Doubt then arose as to the financial 
oundne of creditor countries, followed by rlins on money mar-
kets. Great Britain, in eptember 1931, wa forced to abandon 
the gold tandard. In quick uccession other countrie , covering 
about half the globe, follo",.ed its example. Creditor countrie , 
chiefly the United tate and France, unwilling either te loan 
more money or to import goods, attracted large quantities of gold 
from the rest of the world, bringing about a still greater 'mal-
distribution' of the world' gold supply. 
''In the United States ba.nk failure reached enormous propor-
tion and led to hoardincr by the frightened public. In,re tors 
al o lo t confidence in practically all form~ of securitie the 
prices of which fell to unh ard of level , ancl the flotation of new 
ec11rities practically ceasecl. Bank depo, it were drawn down. 
Banlt , fearing more run~, re tricted credit, a.nd commodity 
prices contint1ed to fall. At the end of 1931, commodity prices 
at whole ale had returned to the pre-war lev l. 
''The nited tat , in it ffort to t m the tide of depr -
ion, by the summer of 1932 had made fundamental change in 
banlcing, had legi lated into exi tence n w credit in titution 
,.~;ith va t financial r L ottrc . and through th Federal R erve 
y tern had supplied op n market credit in very large volume. 
In the international field, the leacling countries of the world were 
endeavoring to find a ba. ' i~ for cooperation in political and eco-
nomic affairs, that would h lJ) stabilize financial condition and 
r tore the flow of trade. 
'The development of the pa t three year have re ulted in a 
dra tic decline in th demand for the prodtict of our farm both 
in this cot1ntry and in foreign countries, but prodtlction, in the 
aggr gate, has not b en materially reduced. In some line pro-
dtlction ha continued to be heavier than the market will ab orb 
even at rt1inou ly lovv price , and burd n orne upplies have ac-
cumtilated. Although the continua.nce of production at the pr -
depre ion level ha con ribut d to the great depth to hich 
agricultural prices l1ave fallen, the force~ primarily re pon ible 
for the agricultural depr ion are found out ide of the agricul-
tural indu try. 
''In summary, the principal cause of the depression as it 
affects American agriculture may be li ted as: (a) Monetary a.nd 
20 GEOFFREY SHEPBF:&D 
credit policies during and after the World War, including the 
increased demand for the world's limited supply of gold as many 
nations strove to return to gold as the basi for their currency 
after 1924; (b) over-expansion of production and productive 
capacity in many industries, with an accompanying increase in 
the volume of indebtedness; (c) the unparalleled orgy of specu-
lation in securities; (d) the trend toward economic self-suffi-
ciency, especially among European nations, which resulted in 
considerable degree from obligations to pay war debts and repa-
rations, and from efforts to escape the effects of falling prices 
and which was manifested in trade barriers and import restric-
• 
tions that retarded international trade and curtailed the foreign 
demand for our agricultural products.' '11 
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CHAPTER THREE FEBRUARY, 1933 
The Iowa Tax Situation 
BY JOHN A. HOPKINS, Jit. 
IOWA'S INCREASED TAX BURDEN 
Since the present bu~ ines depression began in 1929 the tax 
bill of the Iowa farmer has become heavier each year. It is 
true that this increase in burden has been caused by a shrink-
age in the farmer's income rather than by actually increasing 
tax bill . The added difficulty of paying taxes, however, has 
been as real as though the income had r mained the same and 
the annual taxes had increa. ed to far a.bove the 1929 levies. 
Why have taxes not fallen along with price of crops the farmer 
ell 1 I-I ow did they get to be so high in the first place? How 
far and how quicl{ly can tl1ey be reduced 1 The e qt1estions are 
cliscu ~~ed by thousands of farmers and other in Iowa every day. 
Since the founding of the state the total tax bill has grown at 
a rate greater than its population and in recent years at a rate 
greater than its wealth. The principal rea on for thi ha been 
that from year to year n w function , new, ervice ha,re been 
a ign d to the variou governmental agencie . Each of these 
ha involved a new outlay of public funds. These new services 
have rather generally be n de1nanded by the citizens and have 
promoted the public welfare by providing better roads, better 
chools, the safeguarding of the public healtl1 and care of un-
fortunates. 
Per ons intere ted in the reduction of taxes frequently point 
to the year to year increase in public exp nditures as evidence 
of lavi h spending. Thi is often highly mi leading. Suppose 
we tal{e, for example, the xp nses for the primary road ystem 
of Iowa. The first expenditures were made in 1919, according 
to the report of the tate !Iighway Commi sion, and amounted 
to $7 41,000. In 1931 approximately $28,000,000 was spent for 
constrt1ction of primary road , $3,362 000 for maintenance, 
$3,753,000 for interest on bond and $1,600,000 for redemption 
of bonds. In con idering this increase of approximately $35 000,-
000 it should be remembered that mo t of the construction 
expense is of the nature of a new capital investment. It should 
[21] 
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al o be remembered that before the development of the primary 
road system there was undoubtedly an even greater toll, per 
unit of traffic, paid to mud roads in the form of lost time, greater 
power expense and oTeater depreciation on vehicles. 
Three Different Ways of Reducing Taxes 
There appear to be three principal way in which the public 
expendjtures might be reduced. The first of these wtould be by 
discontinuing, or reducing, some of the services of government 
now performed. Suggestions for saving by this method should 
indicate specific services to discontinue, and should evaluate the 
services lost as well as the taxes saved. Such proposals hould 
also consider the probable co t of reestablishing the same serv-
ices, if that should be de ired, after the emergency has pa ed. 
In some cases it might cost much more to ree tablish a project 
than is saved by its temporary suspension. 
The curtailing of road building or of the erection of new public 
building comes under the heading of reduction of services. In 
thi case, however, the reduction takes place in future rather 
than present services. Pronounced reduction in the personnel 
of public offices al o generally implies some reduction in services 
performed by the e offices. 
A second possible means of reducing public expenditures is 
by lowering salaries of public officials in accordance with the 
decline in the cost of living. There is a decided lag between 
wages and the prices of commodities. It would be de irable for 
wages to be adjusted more promptly than in the past, but this 
hould be done when prices rise as well as when they fall. 
A third way is by the elimination of waste and inefficiency. 
Some of this may come from the dropping of inefficient em-
ployees, but it is likely that even more might come from a reor-
ganization of governmental machinery so that each necessary 
service may be performed at a minimum cost. 
Under this same heading may be included the elimination of 
unneces ary duplication of effort. Economy can also be pro-
moted by adjusting budget promptly during period of rapidly 
falling prices such as the present, when some services can be 
performed for less money than was required a year or two ago . 
.. 
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Lil\:ewi e dt1ring p riod of low intere t rates, it may be pos~ ible 
to refl1nd some bond i sues, thereby reducing the interest pay-
ment on them. 
It hot1ld be r m mb r cl that redt1ction of xpenditure~ ~ i~ not 
quit the am a~ r l11ction of tax . . To . om extent it might 
be po. ible to r lt1ce tax by fincling n w ources of income 
other than from ta.. . o1ne public , rvic . mio-ht be cl1arg cl 
for clir ctly, a by th ~ lling of ptlblic do ttment , in. t ad of 
di tribllting the111 O'rati. \ by increa. ing tt1ition paid by Otlt-of-
di.,trict high cl1ool tt1cl 11t , increa ·ing tllition in the 1tate 
coli ~ , obtajnincr lllO\\l1le nt for tlch in titution , tc. 
Government Organization Lags Behind the Times 
The in trt1me11taliti of go,yerntn nt l1a'r a t nd ncy to 
change more ·lo,vly than th clema11Cl~ tha.t ar n1acle upon tl1 m. 
Thi i inevitably trt1e. Tl1e legi lattlr me t only one in t''ro 
years and condition~ may change mat rially in the int rim. 
AI~ o it take a c rtain an10t1nt of tim to ~ ct1re the adO})tiorl of 
any mea ure pro,riding for a n " ' . r .. vic or di contintlino- a 
ervi e that i no lonO' r n ded. 10n qt1 ntly an oc a ~ ~ional 
thorot1gh-going an 1 btl. ·i11e .. like r eoro-anization of go'y rnm ntal 
acr nci hot1ld a compli~·l1 a worth,\llile ,a·vinO'. 
Of COllr e, th r i no laclc of int r e. 't in go'' rnmen al con-
omy. Btlt it mtlst be a l1nitted that some itelllH of pt1blic • J)en-
dittlre ha,re r cei·v d more attention tl1an tl1 ir importance 
m ri t , ''rhile oth r~' of gr a ter magni ttl de are ldom n1 n tio11 d 
at all. It i in trtlcti\T to con id r th gr a amot1nt of a n-
tion gi\'en to th 011nty appropriatio11~, to th 10unty Itnprove-
m nt ~ ociation or farm bureau ,, 'vl1ich a1110t1nt d in tl1 ag-
gr o-at to about $ 4r ,000 in 1931 an l tl1 ' ' r)' ,mall att ~ntion 
gi're11 to the ' Tariotl.' ptlblic debts of tl1 'tat , on \vhich i11t r 't 
in the arne year amotlnted to over $10,000,000 and for wl1ich 
the total co ·ts inclllding payment.· on pri11Ci1)al come to abotlt 
$20,000,000. Tl1i latt r xp nse ",.ill b eli ·cu. . d lat r. 
Comprehensive Figures on Expenditures Difficult to Obtain 
It i a tartling fact tl1at there i ~ no place ''yhere th total 
eXJ) nditures of th variOll admini_,trati,re unit of Io,va can b 
• 
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a certained.* Even further than this, it is not possible to get 
together such information for any particular year because there 
is no common fiscal year for the different administrations. The 
fiscal year for the state runs from July 1 to June 30, that for 
the county from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31. The Hio-hway Commis ion, 
which is under tate jurisdiction, ha a :6. cal year from Dec. 
1 to Nov. 30; the public chool system, which is most clo ely 
related to the county governments, uses the year July 1 to June 
30; and the fiscal year of cities and town runs from April 1 to 
March 31. It must be recognized that there are advantages in 
the present fiscal years to the schools and to the Highway Com-
mis. ion. N everthele s, a common fi cal year is highly de irable 
and would certainly make it much easier to study the public 
expenditures of the state as a whole. 
To this difficulty is added that of cumbersome and ambiguous 
accounting systems. It was not alWtays pos ·ible to r econcile the 
ources and dispositions of funds. For instance, the treasurers 
of different counties placed some item in different accounts, 
either because they interpreted the account headings differently 
or bcause they were not ufficiently acquainted with the ac-
counting sy tem. Generally, if the county treasurer wa in 
doubt, the item went into a catchall called 'l\Iiscellaneou . " 
An example of the difficulty encountered in getting complete 
and accurate data occur with the hare of gasoline tax collec-
tions which is r emitted by the state to the county for use on 
secondary roads. According to the recor ls of the state $11,727,-
559 gasoline tax vva collected during the fiscal year July 1, 
1930, to June 30, 1931. Of this sum $4,114,000 was remit ted to 
*Data concerning the rec il)ts and expenditure of the state departments wer e 
obtained from the office of the Auditor of State. A considerable part of the data in 
table III had already been tabulated by Mrs. E. Mae Swen.ny, statistician for the State 
Board of Assessment and Review. Data concerning the Primar y Road System were 
obtained from the Annual Report of the State Highway Commi!\. ion. Figu1·es con· 
cerning county receipts and expencUtures were obtained from the Office of the Auditor 
of tate, excep t the figures on roads which came from the Highway Commission Re· port. 
Information on the finances of the public school sy tem of the state came from the 
r eport of the State Department of Public Instruction. The totals of outstanding in· 
dehtedness came from the Auditor of State. The detail ed information on school and 
county bonds was obtained hy a survey of 10 counties. Thi involved an examination 
of the records of bonds issu d in the county auditors' offices and interviews with school 
superintendents and secretaries. Data on primary road bonds were furni shed by the Highway Commi ssion. 
In compiling the information in this bulletin, valuable assistance was given by 
Fred Porter, acting auditot· of sta te, and R. C. William , in charge of research for the 
tnte Department of Public Instruction, as well as by a large number of other state, county and school officials. 
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the coun i . The cot111tie~ ' fi:cal year, how~'"er, ran from ,Jan. 
1 to Dec. 31, 1931, and for this period county trea ·l1rers reported 
tl1at they had receiv d from the state ga~ ta $3,819,000. Evi-
d ntly orne cotlnty tr a. tlr r had enter d tl1e ga tax in th 
'' lVIi c llaneou. '' or orne other account b catl e, for the cal n-
clar j ear 1931, co1.1nty n ine r in their r port to the tate 
HiO'hway ommi sion r port d that they l1a l r ceived from the 
cot1nty rea urer ga~ aline ta e amounting to $4,505 000. At 
tl1e arne time the ''Motor V hicle Ft1el Ftlnd Ap})Ortionm nt 
C rtificat '' in the record of the tate IIigh"ray ommi ~, ion, 
how that the cotlnti ' hare of ga olin.e tax for he cal n lar 
y ar 1931 amount d to $4,490 000, and aeyr cl v"(tith the $ ,114,-
000 ficrure given abov for the perio l Jt1ly 1930, to Jun , 1931. 
With conflicting figt1r ~ from differ nt ~ otirc and 'vitl1 fi ,cal 
year\1 " rhich do not corr pond, it i~, of cotlr. impo ibl to 
mal{e a trictl)7 acctirat u1nmary for all a l1nini~ 1 rativ 1.1nit 
combined. At time it wa n ece ary to x rei. ·e considerable 
jtld ment in electing figllr "\vhich ·e n1 I mo t re~ ·o11abl 
and mo t con i t nt 'vith tho from oth r .1ot1rce . nd at tim ~ 
it "\Va nece ary to adju. t figur whicl1 'v r ob,riou ly rron -
011~ . 
RECEIPTS OF PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 
It i commonly b li v d that the g n ·ral property tax i. 
almo t the sole source of i11come to the variotl Io,,ra units of 
admini tration. It i trtle that the general prOJJ rty tax i tl1 
principal ource of ptlblic revenue and that it l1a b n yi lding 
arotln l $100,000 000 p r year. But other Ollrc of incom hav 
b n more important in the a gregat han i~ commonly 1 .. al-
iz d. 
Table III sho''T that \Vll n ''re add togeth r th revenue fro1n 
the property tax, tax or1 1noney and cr dit~,, at1to licen 1e fee , 
ga~oline tax, inheritance tax, cigar tte tax, in~ urance tax, fecl-
eral aid to roacl an l cl1ool , income from fine , fee ale , tlli-
tion, etc., the entire r 'r ntle of the \rariou 1 a lmini tration~ of 
·th tate amount d in 19' 1 to approximat ly $145 000 000. Th 
p rc ntag coming fron1 diff r nt ource.· are ho1vn in fib. 1. 
The farmer i mo ,t intere. 't d in th prop rty tax. Th 
amount of thi tax levi d for 1931 was a·pJ)roximately $97,000,-
1000, which is about two-thirds of the total of the I)tlblic revenu 
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shown in table III. This is the tax that is causing the greatest 
distress. Since farm earnings are so greatly reduced, the farm 
property holder is now paying out a disproportionately large 
hare of his income for taxes. 
The tax on motor fuel was the second largest source of public 
revenue. This yielded in 1931-32 about $11,760,000. Auto 
licen e fees were of almost equal importance and yielded $11,-
660,000. The tax on moneys and credits brought in $3,230,000. 
Next in importance came several more specialized taxes: the 
F'czderol Aid +o 12.oads 3 .3% 
Cigorcztte, lnharitonce 
Tax .3.0% 
r-Mone~ t Crcrdit 
To>< Leviu z.z% 
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insurance tax, cigarette tax, 
inheritance tax and poll tax. 
These brought in all together 
about $4,000,000. The state 
rec ived nearly $5,000 000 
from federal aid to primary 
roads and there were many 
miscellaneous sources of in-
come which yielded in the ag-
gregate nearly $10,000,000. 
Thu sources of revenue other 
than the property tax were 
highly 1mportant and yielded, 
as we have just seen, over 
$40,000,000. 
Table III shows that out of F ig. 1. P er centage of publi c funds com-
ing f rom d iffer en t sources, all admintstra- this $145,000,000 about $43,-tive u nits combined. 
000,000 goes to agencies un-
der the administration of the state. Thi includes expenditures 
on the primary road sy tern, which is under the state's juri dic-
tion. The countie r eceived out of the total about $41,000,000 
including funds for use on the secondary road system. '~rhe pub-
lic school system of the state received approximately $46,000,-
000. Slight ly over $14,000,000 went to municipalities. 
I f we combine the county and the tate road systems, we find 
that they received in 1931 approximat ly $42,000,000 in addition 
to funds raised by the sale of bond 1 ue . The educational ys-
tem, if it be taken to include both the public schools and the 
in titutions of higher education, received roughly $55,000,000. 
The $14,323,000 shoWill in table III as going to support cities 
and towns does not represent the entire revenue of these ad-
.. 
-.. - -
out·c of income 
Property tnx leYied (b) 
--········---------· -- ·········· 
~1oneys and cr dit levied (b)------ ·----·-········· 
~\ u to 1 i c Cl n. e.; ( d ) ......................................... . 
To p rimary road fund ............................... . 
'l.,o oth Pr fund ....................... ..... ... .. ............ . 
Gasoline tax(f) ......... ... .... ........................... . 
F(\deTal nid to pritna.ry road (d) ...... .. ....... . 
Insurance t.nx(d) .................... ......... .. ----·-·· 
From co11ntie for cn r of pnhent ~ tc (d) .. 
From ins titut.ions under Board of Con-
trol ( d) ...... ··-··---······················-----· ····· ·· ······ 
igar tto tax (d) ........................................... . 
Inh ritnnce tax ( d) ..................................... . 
Eqnipn1 nt a r tax ( d) ................... .............. . 
I• ederal aid for agricultural vocational 
...,chool. (d) ................. ........ ..... ................... . 
tate aid to ~chools (d) ............................. . 
Iotor vehicle carri r tax (d) ....................... . 
Other trust fund R(g) .................... ........... .... . 
Poll tax (b) ............ .... . .. ... ...................... .. .. . . 
Care of county pntiPnt. (b) --·-····· ·----------------
Fee coli t d. fine . sales. tr .................... . 
From in titut,ions under Board of Edu-
cation (j) ---·· ··· ·-· ·······-··-· ··· ··-··-·················· 
mi-annual apportionment (k) -----·----·········· 
~fiscellnneou ----------·-····--·-···--···---················· 
Total of above it Jn ----·····------·--·-·- ·····-···---
- - - -
Total 
$ 97,015,4 
3,231,855 
11 ,657,14 
···--··········--------·-··-
···· -~··············· ···· · ·· 
11,727,559 
4 .8 14,340 
1 ,653,1 19 
[1,745,072] 
1.135,204 
1,~07.13 
12,555 
47.073 
170.701 
[416,00 ] 
312,372 
443,936 
41 ,6 5 
il90.407 
2,652,650 
3 ,500.000 
1.30 1,357 
4 600.648 
$144,979,217 (1) 
To tnt 
Yr. to June 30, 
1932 
,32 1,920 (c) 
730,265 (c) 
...................... ... ...... .. .. 
10,544,0 3 ( ) 
756.3 7 (e) 
[7 ,645,61 1 (b)] 
7,61 3,559( d ) 
4, 14,340 
1,65:3,119 
( 1,7 45,072] 
1.1ns.2o4 
1,207.13 
1 .... 555 
47,073 
................................... 
·····--······ · · -··-···-····· $ ]14,021 
443,936 
................................ 
··-······ ·············--·-·-·· 
1,R59,5 0 (d) 
3,500,000 
............................... 
····· ·-·----···-······-· ···· 
$43,063,1 0 
To counties(a) 
Yr. to D c. 31 , 
1931 
$30,6 0,530 
620,914 
·---················· ······· (;346,67 ( d)] 
372,993 (b) 
[ 4.114,000 ( d )] 
4,490,000 (b) 
............................... 
-- ---·- ····················· 
----·-······················ 
..... ....... ..... ............ 
. ........................ ... .... 
- ···········-··-----········ 
............................ . . 
. ................ .. .......... 
· -····-····················· 
164,261 (h) 
[19 ,251(d)] 
............. .... .. . .... ... 
418,6 5 
il90.407 
1,293,070 (b) 
--- ·· ····-·············· ·--· 
-················ ······· ·-·· 
2. 797.500 
41,228,360 
To schools 
Yr. to June 30, 
1932 
[ $44, 3 3 0' 3 91 (b) ] 
43,374,911 (h) 
[1,240,843 (b)] 
······-··························· 
·······-----··· · ··········--·-···· 
··········-·······-·······-······· 
·· -·······-· · ··············-······ 
··········--· ·· ···········-······· 
·····-·-···-·········-············ 
········ ···-··················-··-
···---~---···-··-···········-····· 
·····························-···-
··-·-··················- · ········· 
···········-··········-··········· 
170,701 
[416,008] 
··········----···················· 
·-·--~----·······················~ 
.............................. .... . 
······-··---·-··-··········· ·· ···· 
·········--·····-················· 
•..••..• ... .......•.••.••........• 
·········· · ···-··-················ 
~ 1.301,357 
1.517, 12 
$ 46,364,7 1 
To mounicipalities 
Yr. to ~larch 31 
1932 
$13,682,647 
640.24.9 
············-············· 
··············-·· ········-
····-············-···-···· 
·· ·· · ··-············ ······ 
··········-· · ·-· ···· ······ 
·-·-·-···················· 
·····-----·········-······ 
·········-····--·-········ 
··············-· · ······· ·· 
--··············-········· 
·······--·········-·--··· · 
··········-····-------···· 
···········-------·-······ 
······· ···- -·············· 
•.....•..•.. , •.......•..•• 
···············- ·-········ 
·· ············· ·-········· 
···········-·····-········ 
···········-··········-··· 
······---········ ··· ······ 
........................... 
·· ··-·····--·-------····-· 
··· ········---------······ 
$14,322,896 (m) 
(a) inking fund. dome tic animal fund, drainage tax, Qale of school books omitted. It ~Ya ner ary to con1bine in t.hi~ coulmn figure from several 
different .. ourre". It, therefor probably contain a small margin of ~rror ~ Items in parentheses nre not included in the total of the column in 
\\"hich they occur. 
(b) Year beginning .January 1, 1931. 
(c) Amount levi'ld. Th tate actually dre'v $10.268,130 from tate taxes, thereby reducing it balance on hand. 
(d) Year b!lginning July 1, 1931. 
t e) Amount~ collected year beginning July 1, 19il1. The tate actually dre"~ $12,500.000. thereby r ducing its balance. 
(f) oll ctions f or year beginnin~ July 1, 1931, from 141Y1otor Vehicle l'und Apportionment ertificate.'' 
(g) Year b ginning July 1, 1931, omitt.ing $771. 23 motor vehicle u ·pens fund. 
( h) Tax frorn p r p rty and money and cr die· for y ar July , 1931, to .June 301 1932. ~ 
(j) Thi figure approximate. for yenr beginning July 1, 1931. Includ appropriation by Fed ral Gov rnment t.o State College nt .Ames, tuitions and -..:J 
f ee. collect d. priYate gifts, gro . in com from hospitals, dormi torie and dining ser,iceR, ...,ale of product and income from r evolving funds. 
(k) Fines. inter . t on . ·hool fund, plus 1 mil1 county ~ chool tax. 
(1) Th1(\ ts the utn of the four total given to t.he right for r eceipts by tate, counties, schooL and municipaliti s. It should be r emembered that thi 
figure does not repre. ent the receipts of adn1inL trative units for any ingle year, ince th fi cal y ar of tate, county, s<'hool district and muni-
cipa1ity do not coincide. 
(m) Does not repr<'~(lnt the entire incom of Iowa municipalities. Figures on net returns from sale of electric current, water rat "1 , tc., not available. 
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ministrative units. Many of them also have incomes from other 
sources. One of the more common sources of such income is 
electric current, water, etc., sold by municipal plants. In orne 
cases rates for these services are set higher than is neces ary to 
support the municipally owned utilities, and part of the income 
is diverted to the general purposes of the city governments. 
This is, in effect, a tax on these utilities. It is not possible to 
tell what it amounts to for the combined cities of the state. 
If these figures be expressed per capita, we find that the total 
income of the various administrative units which we have been 
discussing amounted to approximately $59 for each man, 
woman and child in 1931. Of this amount approximately $22 
wa spent for educational purpo e and $17 for roads in addi-
tion to city appropriations for streets. 
It should be remembered that the figures just given to show 
the total receipts of the various administrative units of the state 
refer to the gross receipts and not merely the receipts from 
taxes. Anyone interested in seeing what becomes of taxes 
which he pays in his particular taxing district should con ult 
the information on tax levies on the back of his tax receipt. 
Examples of two such tax di tributions are given in the la t 
section of this chapter . .Also the .Agricultural Extension Service 
ha recently worked out and tabulated such information from 
more than 1,500 farms. 
EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
Out of the total income of approximately $145,000,000 the 
state government, or agencies under its administration, pent in 
the year ending June 30, 1932, $46,701,944. In considering the 
figure, however, we should have in mind the functions performed 
by state agencies. 
Table IV shows that $4,747,517 was spent by about 30 agencies 
li ted by the .Auditor of State under the general heading State 
Departments. About half of this amount was spent by five 
departments, the Sti!te Department of Public Instruction, the 
Executive Council, State Department of .Agriculture, District 
Court and State Fair Board. The expenditures under the 
Departments of .Agriculture and Public In truction included 
about $775,000 for tuberculosis eradication, state aid to consoli-
• 
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EXPENDITU2.ES 14GJ 701,000 
Fig . 2. Relative impor t nn · of Ya ri ou ource of in ·otn nnd of p r in cipal expendi-
tures of agen cies under ta t jurisdicti on . 
dated chool ~, etc. Th r lative importanc of the variotl~ 
. Ollrce of income ancl of tl1e principal XJ) nditure · i . ~ho,vn 
. fi 9. lll g. ;.J. 
ft r tl1e tat d part1n nt " 7 e coin to a grotlp of in titll-
tion, . 'llpportecl Ollt of . ·ta ft1nd . mong th l1 tate Ili-
' rer ity r iv d fro1n . fta · ft1nd. $2 4 0 000 an l th ta e 101-
lege at me $2,4. 3 02 . Tl1e t ate T acl1 r at e lar 
FalL· p nt $ 6 ,t~oo. cl1ool for the d eaf a.n cl blind reqllirecl 
$415,21~. Tl1e General I-Io ·pital at Io,va ity 'l)ent $1 019,000 
for car of indig nt 1 a i nt . and the P . y OJ)athic Ho pital r e-
c i'r l $10 000. n a ldition to he. e tllns l in.·tit tl ion. llnd r 
th Board of Edtlca ion . p nt approximat ly $: 00,000 of r -
ceipt~ fron1 tuition, gift , ·al 1 ' r eceii t from lormitorie an l 
lining r'rice ancl ap1 ropria ion from th cl ral o·v rll-
m nt. 
It i, aL'o neces ary to mai11tain certain p nal in tittltion~·, a11d 
ho. 1 pital. for the in.·an , f bl -minded, tt1b rct1lar, etc. The 
penal in~ titution tln l r the tate Board of ontrol co t $2 u90,-
0h2. The tate ho. pi tal ~ for in ane, tc., o $.;../ 3-1 46- , and 
oth r in~ ' tittltion.' t111cl r the Boarcl of ontrol ~·p nt $1,0 2,679. 
'lher are al o ex1)e11d tinder the jt1ri ~ li tion of the .·tate 
certain . ,o-ca llecl ' Trtl. · Fllnd . . '' The ' 'I rtl t Fund ' ' a r 
reventle . . tlch as the ga. 'Olin tax, auto lice11 e f e , :fi ·hing ancl 
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TABLE IV. STATE EXPENDITURES YEAR ENDI G JUNE 30, 1932 
DATA FROM OFFICE OF AUDITOR OF STATE 
EXPENDITURE S FROl\1 GENERAJJ STATE FUND: 
tate D epartments, etc. 
General A d mi11i.stration 
Auditor of tate .................................... .. ................ .... $ 
B oard of A sessment and R evi ew ...... ...................... .. 
Budget Director ............................. ........ .. ................ . 
Executive Council ..................................... ................ . 
ecr e ta ry of Sta te, etc . ............................................ .. 
Treasurer of State, etc. .. ......................................... . 
Governor ........................................... . ...................... .. .... _ ...... .. _ .... ... ........ ........ .. 
Administration of Justice 
A tt.o rn ey Gene1·a1 ......... ..... ...................... ..... .. .. .. .. ......... .... ...... .. .. 
Supreme Court, Clerk and Reporter .. .... .............. .. .. 
Di trict Court .................................... .. ... ... .... .. .. ........ .............. . 
Boards of Control and Parole ................. ... .. ............. . 
158,855 
3, 228 
22,938 
465 ,9 9 
61,001 
109,544 
17,666 $ 
115,100 
119,017 
373 ,998 
133,297 
919,221 
741,412 
-----R egulator-y 
Dep artment of Health ........................ ...................... .. 
Indu tri al Commis ion .................. .. ........................ .. 
Insurance D epartment ...................... ................ ...... .. 
Railroad Commis ion, etc. .. .. .. .............. .. ................. . 
Education 
Board of Education ..................................... .............. . 
D epartment of Agri culture (a) ....... .. ...................... . 
D epartment of Public In struction (b) .................... .. 
State Fair Board ............................... .. .............. .. ..... .. 
State Library ............................ ................................ .. 
Historical Department and Hi torical Society ...... .. 
Vocational Education and Rehabilitation ............ .. .. .. 
Miscellan eous 
Na tion al Guard ... .............................. .... ......... .......... .. 
Camp Dodge .. ___ ...... ____ .. ___ ......... __ ..... ... .. ___ .. _ .. ___ _________ . _ .. 
Printing Board ....................................... .. ................ . 
ta te Parks and Roads .............. ....... ............. .. ........ .. 
Mi cell an eons .. ____ ...... ___ -- ............. ------.. .. . . _. __ ---- .. . ---- ....... . 
Total State D epartments .............. .. .. .............. .. .. .. 
State Educational I nstitutions 
State University of Iowa .................... .. ......... .. .. .......... . 
F Ol' Indigent Pati ents, University Hosiptal ................. . 
Psycopathic Hospital ..................... .. .. .. ... .... .. ................ .. 
oldie rs' Tuition ....................................... - .. ................ . 
Iowa State Coll ege ...................................... ...... ............ .. 
tate T eachers' Coll ege ...................... ............ ............... . 
chool for D eaf and Blind ............ .. ........ .... .. .......... .. .. .. 
147,569 
59,5 03 
10 7 ,702 
1 ,966 
6 ,6 23 
441,961 
739 ,979 
327 ,500 
54.28 1 
8 2 ,791 
53 ,809 
194, 76 
204 , 11 
1 53. 234 
147, 08 
22 0, 471 
2,450,000 
1,018, 12 
10 8 ,000 
.'5 .246 
2 ,433 ,0 29 
8 6 , .'5 00 
415 ,212 
Institutions Un der Board of Oontrol ----
P en a l In titutions ............................ .. ............ .............. .. 
tnt H osp ita Is . _ .... __ ........... _ ..... __ .... ___ ... __ . ___ __ ._ ... ___ . ___ .. ______ _ 
OtheT In titutions .............................. .. .. .. .. .............. .. .. .. 
oldiers' B o 11U8 . . . . . _ ... _ .... _ .. _ ...... ___ . __ ..... _ . ... . . _ . . _ .. ___ . ___ __ . _. ___ ____ . _. _ 
EXPE Dlm FROM "TR UST" F UNDS : 
2 ,290,0 52 
2 ,351,465 
1,0 32,679 
396,74 0 
$ 1, 768,944 
921,200 
$ 4 , 747,517 
7,298,799 ( c) 
$ 5,674.196 
1,63 ,38 
Prima ry Roads ....................... ............... ... . .................... $22, .'573 ,001 H" h C .. tg Way ommlSSlOn ....................... .............. .. ..... .. ........ 2 24,280 $22,797,281 
Motor Carri er Trucks ................................. .. ...... .. .. .. .... . 
Motor Carrier Admini trati on ..................... .................. . 
Motor Vehi cle Administration ....... ... .. .... .... .. ............... . 
B ankin g Department ............................ ..... .. .................. . 
Fish and Game Department .................................... .. .. 
1\.I i cella.neous __ ...... .. .... _ .. ______ ..... _____ .. ______ .. ___ ..... .. .. ... ... ......... .. ... _ ..
Total from "Trust" Funds .................................... .. 
EXPB OED FR OM LOCAL R E EIPT OF INSTITUTIONS 
N D'ER B O.a.RD OF EDUOATION ( c) ...... .... ...... .......... .. .. .. 
Grand T otal State Expenditures .... ........ ................ .. 
61 ,257 
39 6 6 
41 0,5 65 511,50 
9 ,610 
303 ,729 
131,916 
$23,843,044 
3, 500,000 
$46,701,944 
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(a) The Department of Agriculture i~ partly regulatory. Thi~ figure also includes 
Stat 's hare of tuberculo i rndieation expense and subventions to various agricul· 
turnl soc irtics amounting in all to $289,900. 
(b) Including aid to normal training, consolidated schools, standard rural schools, 
mining can1p schools amounting to $484,950. 
(c) ThL fiaure, approximate. Inrlud appropriation by Federal Government to 
tat oll g nt mes, tuitions and f s collected, privat gifts, gro. s income fron1 
ho pi tn 1 . dormitories and dining room , sale of product and income from revolving 
fund . 
ht1nti11g lie en e fe ~, tc., '' l1i h are requir to b pent for 
c rtain . 'l1ecific pt1r110 e. . Tl1 large~ t of tl1e Tru~ t Fund exp n-
littlr .' i~· for the tlpport of tl1e primary roa 1 .·y. t m. Includ-
ing th xpenditt1re of f d ral aid ft1nd.·~, thi amotlnted to 
$2._,57 ,001 plt1s $.;.J24,2 0 for admini tration. 'l,l1 .· expen li-
ttlrr.~ b~' th High,va) omn1i ~ion incltld a laroa amot1nt of 
11 'v on trt1ction a. ,, .. 11 a~ the maint 11anc of tl1e primary 
roac1. alr a l~ T built. In a llition to the amotlnt. ·p nt by tl1 
I-Iig]l,Ya)r 10mmi ._ion Ollt of tl1 ga olin ax an l at1to lie n~ 
f .,' oth r l1are of th ., tax . are r n1i t 1 to countie for 
n1a.int nance or con trt1ctio11 of county roacl~'. 
Th ficrure ju t given for tl1e primary roa l 'yst m compri ~e 
tl1 c11rr nt expen littlr . · for tl1 year Jan. 1 to De . 1, 1931. Th 
fi~ cal ~y ar of the HiO'll'' ay ommi~-~ ion rtln. from Dec. 1 to 
0\'. ~ 0. Dt1ring th la t r p riod for 1. ; 0-, 1 tl1 High,va .. 
111n1is~ ion r port th _ .. I n littlre of $- 14: 06 for con ·trtl -
tion $. · 61,9f 0 for mai11t 11ance, $3,7-3,3-f> for intere t an 
$1,392 -oo for redem1 tio11 of bond . A1)pro"' i111at ly $11,000,000 
of tl1i. ', ho,vever, wa~ rt-liH 1 by the sale of bor1d a11d did not 
co1n~ Otlt of current r v llll . Al ·o d11ring tl1 y ar Decemb r, 
1930, to I o·v mber, 1931 f leral aid amot111t d to $6 631,533. 
To ~·11n1n1arize tl1 .~tat XJ) nditure in r tllll nt1mber it 
ma)r b ail that about $-'-3 000,000 from tlrr 'nt r .. entle ''a 
~ ·p 11t by h tate in th ,. ar n ling Jt1n 30, 19' ~, fo1· the pri-
rnar}' roacl ~ y ·tern iilcltltiin<,. a lmi11i tration b. tl1 tate Hirrh-
''ray ( 1omn1i ion. ix 1nillion dollars l)lll~' loc<:1l receipts Vla • 
. p nt for the upport of ~tat in 1 titt1tion~· of l1igher edt1cation. 
Fi'' an(l a half millio11.' \v·a.~ pent for J) 11al in.·titutions and 
·tat l1o. 'I i tal~, ll ntl r t h ]_)oar l of 10n rol a 11cl 011 111illi n f r 
indi{7 nt patients at tl1e 110.'J1ital at lo\v-a 1 ity. Fi\· million dol-
lar~, 'Ya. ·'11 nt for tl1 .·Lat l l ')l>artment~ ~ a11 l 11 a11l on -half 
1nillio11., for tl1e olcli r , bo11 tl . 
It hot1ld 110t be inferrecl, llo,ve,rer, that tl1 
tion d provide the ntir Stli)pOrt for all th 
'tlms ju t men-
tate in titutions. 
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In the case of state ho ptials there are al o county expenditures 
for the care of patients which amounted to $1,800,000. Included 
in this latter figure are payments by patients or their familie , 
of which about $390 000 was collected by the countie . Other 
urn. were collected by the institutions themselves. In the ca e 
of the state educational in titutions there are also the receipts 
which have been mentioned from tuition fees) federal appro-
priations and from the sale of produce. 
EXPENDITURES OF COUNTY GOVERNMENTS 
As shown in table V the total of the expenditures under 
county government , exclusive of school , amounted in the year 
1931 to about $41,327,000. The relative importance of the dif-
ferent expenditure is shown in fig. 3. The largest element of 
county expenditure is for the const ruction and maintenance of 
roads. This, according to the reports of the county engineers, 
amounted to $20,237 000, of which $8,600,000 was for con truc-
tion and $11,637,000 was for maintenance. Of course, during 
uch period as the pre ent a large part of the construction 
program can be deferred. This ha , in fact, been done in mo t 
counties during 1932 and 1933. 
TABLE V. SUMMARY OF COUNTY EXPENSES, JAN. 1, 1931-DEO. 31, 1931 
(Figures derived from ounty Auditors' r eports to Auditor 
otherwise noted) 
of State, except wh re 
oun ty offices ....................... ___ .. ____ .... __ ..... ___ ___ ........ ______ .... __ .. _ .. . 
Court expenses . _________ .................. _____ ...... ___ ... .... ______ ..... __ .. ___ ...... .. _ ... . 
County homes .......................................................................... $ 1 ,208,710 
Poor out ide county homes .................................................... 3,358,263 
S rt f · . · h · 1 uppo o msane 111 state osp1ta s ......... .............................. . 
Other institutions . ................................................ ................. .. 
Farm aid associations ( farm bureaus) .. ............................... . 
Bounties paid ... . _ ... .. . ____ ......................................... __ ........ ___ ..................... . 
Printing and stationery ......................... .... ........................... . . 
vurthouse expense ....... .................... ...................................... . 
oldier S1 rei i ef _ --·-__ .. ____ _____________ ______ -------- ____ . _____ __ ____ . __ .. ___ .... ___ .. _ 
uppl ies ___ ... __________ .. __ .. _ .... __ ... _ ..... __ .. _. _ ... __ _____ .. __ . _ ... __ . __ .. __ . _________ _ 
Mi scel1 an eo us ............ ___ ..... .. .. __ .... .. __________ .... ___ .____ ..... __ .... _ .. _______ _ 
Interest on bonds and certificates (a) ......... ........................ . 
Reduction in county bond and warrants (b) .. ..................... . 
ounty road construction (c) .................. .. ...................... .... .. 
County road maintenan ce (c ) .............................................. . 
Total __ .... ______ . _______ . ____ ... ___ .. __ .___ . _________ . ____ ____ ________________ . _____ . ___ . _ 
1,307 ,018 
494,479 
157,86 5 
542,768 
613,419 
306,22 
317,108 
2,003,120 
1 ,283 , 776 
1 ,432,3 75 
8 ,599,675 
11,63 7,050 
$ 6,319,759 
1,400, 412 
4 ,456, 973 
1,801 ,497 
345,160 
3 ,940,50 
2, 716,151 
20,236,725 
$41,327,] 85 
(a) Excluding Primary Road bonds, as summarized in County Treasur r s' reports 
to Auditor of State. 
(b) Excluding Primary Road bonds data from office of Auditor of State. 
(c) From engineers' r epor ts a s ummarized in State Highway Commi sion's R port 
fo:r 193 1. 
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It · i , however, pertinent to the business situation that the 
reduction in the amount of road construction has, to some de-
gree, added to the numb r of unemployed. 
After road the large t items of county expen e were for the 
llpport of the COllnty offices, upport of the poor, interest and 
retirement of bond , ~ ·tlpport of patients in state hospital , court 
expen~,eL, upkeep of cotirthotl es, and printjng and stationery, in 
the order named. Th e e-v~en items amotlnted to jt1st under 
$18,000,000. The eighth largest item wa tl1e appropriation to 
Farm Aid A ociation (or farm bureau~ ) , which amounted to 
$34h ,160. 
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Fig. 3. Relative importance of the differ ent expenditures and sources of income 
of county governments. 
TAB I.JE V I . E X PE SES OF CO TNTY OFFI CE S 
(From R ep orts of ount.y Auditor s to the .Au d itor of tate) 
Office 
County superviso rs .. 
heriffs ·---····- -- --··---
Auditors ··· ··--------···-· 
Treasurer s -------······ · 
R ecorder ----··---··-·· --
Clerk s of dis tric t 
courts ------------·-· ·- · Attorn y __ ____ __ . . .... . 
oun t y engineer -·- · 
upt. of sch ools --·-· -
Coroners ..... ____ .. ..... ·-
Ass s~ors ---· -·--· ·-· ·---·· 
~lise . officers ---- ···-- · --
ala ry 
$ 4 05,906 
l 9:l , 77 4 
2 07 ,419 
20 7,89 7 
1 0,899 
2 05.04 2 
1 52,641 
7 23 ,53 1 
2 0 4 ,16 1 
2 3. 7 2 4 
6 8 0 4 6 
160, 75 
Deputies 
and other 
h elp 
$ ------·- ···· --·-
30 7,113 
3 25,29 8 
4 55,919 
144,554 
2 2 7 ,2 78 
1 50,1 7 
------ ---- --------1 05 .5 68 
----- -- -- -- -----·· 
-- -- ----- -----· ·--
·-----------------
l\I il eage 
expen '· 
a r e of 
prtsoners 
$ 225,7:14 
4 78,7 19 
· ··-- ·····-······· 
·······-------·-·· 
-----·-······--·--
-·········-······· 
·- ----------------
·--------········-
····· · ········· · ·· 
· -······-·-······· 
· ·-·········-····· 
-- ----·---·-··----
Misc. 
expen se 
$ 11,877 
16,944 
15,842 
121,38 6 
6,881 
7,4 28 
60,295 
97 .714 
68 4 03 
-- --------- -----·-138, 7 0 4 
Total 
expen e 
$ 643,5 17 
996,550 
548.559 
7 5,..~02 
33 2, 3 ~14 
4 39,74 
3 6 3. 1 :.!3 
82 1,2 45 
37 , 18 2 
2a.1 2 4 
826, 750 
1 60 t 7 5 
Total ----·---- ---···-·-·· $ 3 ,3 5 3, 915 $ 1 ,715,917 $ 704,453 $ 5 45,474 $ 6, 319,7 5 9 
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Table VI shows the expenses of the various county offices. 
The e amounted in the aggregate to $6,630,000. The largest 
outlay was in the office of the sheriff, which includes care of 
prisoner . The next large t expenses were for the offic of 
essors, county engineer, county treasurer, and county super-
vi or . But it should be remembered that the amounts of outlay 
do not necessarily indicate either the amount of service per-
formed or the opportunity for economizing. 
Possible County Economies--Consolidation of Counties 
There is a growing belief that a large opportunity exists for 
saving by the reorganization of county office or consolidation 
of counties. Reorganization in the countie as they now stand 
'\Vould have its chief effect on expenses for county offices. One 
suggestion that ha been made at various times is that all or 
es entially all of the county records be kept in a single office 
and that some of the county officers or deputies be eliminated. 
In this case it would s em that the greatest economy might be 
accomplished by elimination of some of the elective officers. 
It would be well to apply some of the principle followed in 
other lines of bu ine in selecting the per onnel of public offices. 
l\fost of the work of the county office. is of a routine type. It 
might be suggested as an ideal that the persons who are to per-
form such duties be selected from groups specially trained for 
the type of work in que tion, that they be elected by competi-
tive examinations, and that they hold office as long as they per-
form their dutie hone tly and efficiently. 
Undoubtedly a large aving could be made by the reorgani-
zation of office in the present counties. But the maximum sav-
ing can hardly be made without the consolidation of counties 
into a smaller number of perhaps 25 or 30 larger units. This 
should permit a greater saving on the county offices than reor-
ganization within the present counties. It hould also permit 
aving in expen e for county homes, in courthouse exp and 
purcha e of supplies. 
Of course it i not po sible to tell in advance exactly what 
aving is pos ible by county reorganization or con olidation. 
But orne idea may be obtained by a study of the variation in 
particular costs in counties of different sizes. Tables VII and 
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VIII bear on thi qu stion. Table VII sho'\\rs the variation in 
costs of operation of county offices as between three group , each 
of which contain even COlinti . The~ mall counties had an aver-
age poptllation of approximately 13,000. The large countie~ 
a\reraged about 40 000. The co t of the co11nty offices in the 
large counties wa 67 ce11t. per capita le . than in the small one._ 
Thi is about 24 percent le , than in the small counties. 
Expen e for the tlpport of the poor were about the same per 
capita in large and small cotlnties, except that the larger and 
richer countie ometime eemed to be more liberal in provid-
in()t thi care. Th con olidation of the co11nty home of three 
or four countie into one, however, would almo t certainly 
achiev orne economy not indicated by th figure , since the 
ordinary county home i too ~ mall for conomical op ration. 
Table III hows th variation in co t~ of conducting the 
county office as betwe n thr e group. arrangecl with regard to 
the 11umb r of square mile p r county. The exp n.,es for the e 
TABLE VII. VARIATION I CO TS OF OUNTY F F I ES 193 1 
COUNTIE \VITI! MALL AND LARGE P P UL ATI N 
A"" r age co t per capita 
Population, average per county--·-···················· 
Oo11nty 0 Jfices : 
Boards of upervisors ...... ............................... . 
oun ty h riff -- --- ------······· ··-·····-··--·-···--··-····-··--
Co u n t y a u d i tor s .. _ .... .............. _ ..... _ ._ .............•.... 
ounty trea urers ....................................... ...... . 
County record r s ... ............................................ . 
ounty attorney . ........................................... .. 
Cle rk of di trict court ................................... . 
upt.. of hool ----········-····-·······-···· -···-·······--···-
County engineer s ... ......... . ......... . ............. .. 
Farn1 A.id . ..'\. sociation (E,arm Bureau ) ........... . 
Courthouse xpenses ....... .................................. . 
Total capita expenses for above 
7 mall 
counti 
12,88 8 
.32 
.4 0 
.25 
• :3 H 
.19 
.17 
.24 
95 
• OJ 
.2 4 
.23 
t')3 
• w 
county offices .. .................... .......................... $ 2 .85 
Oth er elected Oounty E xpense : 
County home ·· ······ ··ft··· ·····--· ····-···········--····-······· .3 
Poor outside county homes .............................. __ 1.3 8 
~Ii c. court expenses ........................................ .44 
As sor --········-----···········-······· ········-···--·-·····-···· .3 2 
7 1ned . ize 
ounti 
16,649 
$ .4 0 
.3 4 
.27 
.33 
.17 
.13 
.19 
ry3 
.... 
.18 
.1 
t) 
. .. .;J 
$ 2.64 
.54 
1.a6 
.3 5 
.27 
7 large 
counti s 
39, 830 
$ .2 
.3 7 
.2 0 
.R 1 
1 •) • 1.1 
.15 
.16 
.1 5 
.13 
.11 
.20 
$ 2 .18 
.3 
1 .58 
.51 
.30 
The seven mall counties are : \Vorth, Ida, Emmet, \Vinnebago, I:Iumboldt, Wayne 
and Grundy. 
The seven medium sized counties are: Hancock, Palo Alto, Pocahontas Bremer, 
Guthri , Butler and Buena Vi ta. . ' 
The seven large counties are Washington, Craw!ord, Kossuth, Fayette Story Pott.a-
wattamie and Linn. ' .. ' 
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TABLE VIII. VARIATION IN COSTS OF COUNTY OFFICES 1931 
COUNTIES WITH SMALL AND LARGE AREAS 
Average cost per square mile 
6 mall 7 med. • 6 large SIZe 
ounties counties countie 
Average number square mile -~---······· ······ ······ 414 548 693 
Ooun ty 0 f!ic es : $11.35 Boards of • $ 10.44 $10.76 supervtsors 
·······················----- ---- ------
County sheriffs 
------------------------------------ ··--- -------
12.08 12.03 10.92 
County auditors 
······ ···················· ···· ----- --- --- -------
8 .53 7.47 7.28 
County treasurers 
-------·-- -- -------- -------······ --- ---- ----
10.16 10.02 9.90 
County recorders 
·· ·············--·---------------- --- -- ------· 
6.30 5.12 4 .44 
County attorneys 
·······------------------------- ------ -- ·--· 
6 .11 4 .11 4.03 
Clerks of district courts 
------- ------·----- ----- -- ----
7.71 5.97 4.99 
Supt. of schools 
------------------------------ ------ --- -------
8 .04 6.85 6 .21 
County • 16 .98 13.20 12.33 engmeers 
--------------------------·····--- -- -------· Farm bureau 
--------------·········-----···········- -- ----------
8 .0 1 5 .28 4 . 3 
Courthou se expense 
-----···------·····-·-·------·--· ·------
6.72 7.33 6 .89 
Total expen se for county offices 
per square mile 
--------········- ·············· ······· 
$101.08 $88.14 83.17 
The six small countiefj are: Emmet, Winnebago, Worth, Ida, Humboldt and 
Bremer . 
The seven medium sized counties are: Grandy, Wayne, Washington, Palo Alto, 
Story, Hancock and Buena Vista. 
The six large counties are: Pocahontas, Butler, Guthrie, Crawford, Fay tte and 
Kossuth. 
offices declined from $101 to $83 per square mile as the averaO'e 
area increased from 414 to 693 square miles per county, a decline 
of around 17 percent. 
It is not possible to tell how much further these expenses 
would be reduced if the counties were increased, for instance, to 
four times their present size. This would require a county 
approximately 48 miles in each direction instead of 24 mile as 
at present, and with a population in the neighborhood of 75,000. 
It is not likely that the expense per capita would continue to 
decline at as rapid a rate, but some further saving might well 
be expected.* 
On the other hand, in some directions expenses would be in-
creased rather than diminished by the consolidation of counties. 
Thus in a larger county it would be necessary to maintain only 
*The Sta te Constitution pro -ides that "no law changing the boundary lines of an) 
county shall have effect until , upon being submitted to the people of the countie af· 
fected by the change at a general election, it shall be approved by a majority of the 
votes in each county for and against it." Thus it would be necessary for the people 
in any county to vote on the question whether that county should become a part of a 
n w a nd larger county unit. Apparently, it would not be necessary for each and 
every countJ: in su ch new unit to approve such a plan before the consolidation of any 
of the counties concern ed. That is, a pair of counties could consolidate and later this 
pair could be joined by a third, as long as these were all within the boundaries of the 
new county unit defined by the legislature. 
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one courthotlse btlt in many cases witnesses wotilcl have to travel 
farther to court than in the . mailer county. 
There is a third alternative in the reorganization of county x-
p ndit11re , a a compromi e between reorO'a11iztaion within the 
pre~ 1ent cot1ntie on tl1 one l1and ancl cotlnty con olidation on 
the otl1 r. It wotll] b po ~ ible to reorganize mo t of the cot1nty 
offi e. "rithin the frame,vork of the pr ~ ent counties. At the 
a me time such in ti1tltions as the COllnty l1omes and po . ·ibly 
di trict courts cotlld be combined for grotlp ~ of countie in order 
to obtain the maxim11m of economy with th .,e institution . 
Variation Within the County 
Tl1 r i a ""i l \7ariation in the tax 1 vie, " rithin the cot1ntv. 
n r a. on i tl1at l1 rat of a· e . m nt liffer more or I . 
''Titl1 ach town ·hip or to"\"\~n a e or. A .. econd i. that, a b -
t''"e n tvvo di trict · r qlliring the arne total tlms to . 11pport 
cl1ooL,, road., tc., tl1e one may have lower J)roperty valllation 
from poorer oil or for otl1er reason.\ A hird reason i. that 
l1 }) 1blic er,ric ~ p rformecl vary '' id ly. One taxing li~ trict 
n1a~r ha,re a one-room ~ 1choolhotl e ""hile an a ljacent on l1a ~ a 
f11lly qt1ipped con. oliclat d chool, gi·vino- a b tter quali of 
. r ·vi btlt al o \vith tl1 n ce ity of provi ling tran portati 11 
for J)llpit. Nat11rall, to\vn have higher ta rate than rt1ral 
cli~ 1trict. beca11 e of a gr ater nu1nber of , ervices performed 
ancl oft n becatl.~e of a lo"rer }Jroperty valtlation in proportion 
to th income of tl1 p O])le and to th pt1blic ~ l)enditur .1 • 
Taxe-· are coll ct 1 on th ba i. of a millag lev}r. Thi i 
ba.· 1 tlpon the ta>.:alJl ,·aluation of prO}) r t}r. The Io,,.,.a. la'v 
pr . crib A that thi: . ·hall be one-fotlrth of tl1 actt1al or ~~al ~ 
'
1 altl ,. 'fhe millaa l ' 1} 7 i. determin l by fin li11g· the ratio b -
t\\yr. n the total amount of money levietl f r a fp ci:fied item and 
th taxable value of tl1e property upon which tl1e levy i · made. 
A~~ an exampl of th J)re,railing variation, the levie. in tl1 · 
rtlral eli~ ·trict of 011 cotlnt)r rang·ed fro1n 60.4 mill to 13....~. 
1nill . In the ci in. · nn l to\,711. · in tl1e . an1 lint r the ,~aria ion 
~ 
,, .. a , from 76. to 17' .9 n1ill . In all th s ]i:trict · the 1 'r for 
• 
'tat purpo e '''ra · 9 n1ilL'. In the tO\Vll.' tl1 levy for c tln y 
ptlrJ o. ' wa 2 . 1nill ~. In the rural clistri ·t · the cotln t, r levy 
\Ya, 42.6 mill becallsc of higher le,ries for road ·. Thus tl1 total 
• 
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state and county levy in towns was 37.8 mills, and in the rural 
districts 51.6 mills. All of the other variations were in the 
levies for local purposes. 
The variation in local levies in town was from 39 mills to 
136.2 mills. In the rural district the one with the lowe t levy 
raised only 8.8 mill for local purpo e while that with the high-
est raised 101.2 mills for local purposes. 
The distribution of the tax dollar will also vary from one dis-
trict to another in the same county. Nine mills were for tate 
purposes in all districts of this particular county. But because 
of variation in the total, the percentage represented by thi 9 
mills varied from 5.9 to 14.9 percent in the rural districts, and 
from 5.2 to 11.7 percent in the town . Likewise the county levy 
varied from 27.9 to 70.6 percent of the total in the rural dis-
tricts and from 16 5 to 37.5 percent in the towns. To complete 
the picture, the local levies varied fro·m 14.5 to 66.2 percent in 
the rural and from 50.3 to 78.3 percent in the town districts. 
When one considers these figure it i ea y to see why widely 
differing di tribution of the tax dollar are frequently quoted. 
Before quoting uch figure at all, one hould state to ju 't what 
kind of districts the figures refer. An illu tration of the differ-
ence in distribution between two farms in the same county is 
given in the last section of this chapter. 
The Reduction of County Levies 
During recent months several counties have taken more or 
le drastic tep to reduce their tax levi s. The fir t w eping 
move in this direction was accompli hed by means of the Elliott 
Bill which required a reduction in all levie of 5 percent. This 
started a state-wide movement towards tax reduction even 
though it was not possible to put its provisions into effect in 
every county. 
The next step wa · in the paring down of county budgets and 
the reduction of levie by supervisor in a large numb r of 
counties. One favorite method wa by ignoring the provi ions 
of the law which r quire mandatory levies for the maintenance 
and construction of roads. In some ca es it may be possible to 
discontinue some of these levies permanently without seriously 
injuring the county road systems. In many ca es, however, 
IowA TAX SITUATION 39 
thL relief is likely to prove temporary. Neglect of present 
maintenance may be followed by heavier future requirements. 
\Veb. ter County i one of those which has accompli hed the 
lar(J'e t tax redt1ction, at lea t for the pre nt. It i intere ting 
to ob, r're how thi \Va don . Table IX hows that tax levi s 
for cot1nty purpo ''J re redt1ced from $437,627 for 1931 to 
$2 1 75 for 1932. F,ir~ t, there wa~ a redt1ction of 26 percent 
in the le'ry for general cotlnty exp n . , and a r duction of 34 
percent in the levy for cot1rt xpense. Th poor ftlnd, state an l 
cot111ty in~ ane, and oldier ' relief levi s were left at nearly the 
arne fi(J'ures a in 1931. Th county school I vy of one mill 'va.1 
lroppecl. chool xp n~' e~ 'vere being r lt1ce l anyho'v an(l 
thi obtained part of tl1 cr dit for the count)' . The levy for 
bo~vine ttlb rculo~' i 'va~ omitt l ince ther ,,ra ~ ~ ·orne balanc in 
the ft1ncl a.nd requirem nt \V re not xp ct d to be large. The 
I vy for the bond ft111d ,,~a cut in half. Tl1is \Va po ible be-
catl ·e of funds on han l. Btlt ince intere ·t on bond mtl ,t be 
J)aid, the redt1ction i. temporary. 
The largest r dt1ction 'va accompli heel bj" n glecting two of 
the four mandatory road l vie . The road 1 ·vi . made amount cl 
to 71/2 mill a ~ again~ ,t 17 in the pr c ding y ar. Thi p rmi : 
practically no road con.,truction dtlrin()t th pr ent y ar and 
r dtlce, the ft1ncl available for maintena11c to approximately 
one-l1alf. It may be r marlrecl, ho'v -v r, tl1at \Veb ter 10unty 
ha · already gravelled a rath r high p rcentage of its secondary 
roads. 
TABLE IX. TAX LEVIE , vVEBSTER co NTY. 193 1 AND 1932 
( Data from offi e of ount.y Auditor , \Vebst r ounty ) 
General county .. .. .... .... .. ..................................................... . 
Court expen se .. ............. .............................. ... .. ............ ....... . 
Poor fund .... ...... ....... ................ ..................................... -..................... . 
tate insane .... __ .. .. ... ... _ ..... ... .................................... -...................... .. . 
Co u 11 t y i n sa n e . ____ . _ ........ _ .... _ ._ .... _ ....... .. ........ __ .. ........ ................. . 
ou n t )~ s c h o o 1 ...... _ ... _ ......... _ .................. ...... _ .............. ..... _ ........... ... -...... .. 
oldier ' r eli f ·· ··· --·--··- -- -- ---- ... .................................................. . 
Bovine tub rculosis radication ... ........ .................... . ....... . 
Bond fund ... ... ......... ................ ... ......................... . ..... ...................... . 
Road con struction or maint n a n e ( 2 % mills) ............... . 
R oad construction ( 2 mills , ex pt F ort D odge) ........... . 
Road maintenance ( 5 n1ills . exc pt F ort D odge) .... . .... . 
Road maintenance ( 7 1h mill s, xcept cit.ies and t O'\\rn ) ... . 
~()t(L} ·····-······ ·- ····· ·· -·· ·· · ·········· · ······ · ·······---··--·- -···········-···· 
1931 1932 
$ 9 0, 496 
22, ()24 
4 5,24 8 
15,083 
22,624 
1 5,0 3 
1 5,0 3 
3, 771 
:10, 160 
3 7,7 7 
20,2 19 
5 0. 546 
6 ,9 3 
$437,627 
$ 67 ,2 3 
14,9 51 
44, 56 
14,951 
22,42 8 
............... -
14,951 
. ................ 
14,9 5 1 
37, 3 0 
· ·-·--· ·· ·---· 
50,00 7 
· ·--······--·· 
8281,75 
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Undoubtedly, reduction in most of the items mentioned is 
possible and desirable. It is possible, however, to reduce ex-
penditures for some purposes too much for the people's pre ent 
or future welfare. A radical reduction may be worse than none 
at all. Just what r eduction is mo t desirable will differ from 
county to county and hould be given serious thought before it 
is put into effec t. 
EXPENDITURES FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
As indicated on an earlier page, the expenditures for the 
public school system r equired about $16,265,000 in 1931-32. The 
principal items of expense are shown in table X , and their 
r elative importance is illustrated in fig. 4. The largest is for 
salaries of teachers. This amounted to $28,611,208 for over 
26,000 teachers, principals and superintendents. The next larg-
est item is for fuel, janitor service, etc., and amounted to $5,403,-
659. Interest on school bonds was $2,546,875, and $2,761,146 
was paid on bonds. '£he bonded debt, however, did not decrease 
by this amount because refunding bonds were issued to the 
extent of $351,026 and $518,515 new bonds were sold. After 
these items came apparatus and repairs, transportation for 
pupils, and payments for schoolhouses and sites, each amount-
ing to over $1,000,000. 
TABLE X. SCHOOL EXPENDITURES, STATE AS A WHOLE 
-
E x71end·itures f r om Gene1·al Fund: (a) 
Paid teacher s .................... ................... ............. .................... $28,611,2 08 
ecretary . -- . __ .......................... .... .. _ .. ____ ... ........... _ ..... _ ...... .. _. _. 2 8 9 , 9 9 2 
Libr a r y books ....................................... ...... ... ........................ 132,20 1 
T extbooks and uppli es (net) ...... ...... .. ........................ ...... .. 2 3 ,628 
F uel, r ent, j anitor , etc. ..................... .......... ....... .. ................ 5 ,403 , 659 
R cords, appa r atus, r pair s and insu r ance ........................ 1 ,374 ,0 4 2 
Tran spo r tation ................. ........... .. ... ... .. .. .... .................... .. .. .. 1,9 11,57 7 
For other purpose ..... ................... .... ....... .. ... . .. ............ ...... . 2 , 294 ,4 59 
T otal f rom genera l fu nd ........... .. .... ................ .. ..... .... ... .. . 
Cur r ent E xpenditures f r om Schoolhouse F und: 
F or schoolh ou es an d sites (b) .. ...... ..... ............................. $ 
Paid on school bo nds (c) ............... ...... ... .................. ......... . 
Interest on school bo nds ........... .......................... - ...... ........ . 
Interest on r egi ter ed wa rr ants .. ... ............................. ..... . 
For other purpose .................. .. ...... .. ......................... ......... .. 
T ota l f r om schoolhouse fund ...... .... .. .. ........ .... .. ....... ..... .. 
T otal 
564,3 82 
2 ,41 0 ,1 2 1 
2,5 4 6,8 75 
7 ,31 9 
43 5 ,04 0 
$ 4 0,300 ,7 6 6 
5 ,9 63, 7 3 7 
4 6,264 ,503 
( a ) Does not include tuition paid other sch ools, n or transfer s from gener a l t o s~hoolhouse f_und . IJ?- the case of di bursemen ts for textbooks, the net purchase is 
given . That 1s, the d1sbu r s men ts minus the sale of book s. 
(b) Total paid for schoolhouses and sites w as $ 1,082,897, but $518,515 of thi s was 
covered by bonds sold an d did not come out of current r evenue. 
(c) T otal p aymen ts on bonds of $ 2 ,'761,146, less r efunding bonds. of $351,0 25. 
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Fig. 4. Relative importance of the different items of e .. pense for the public ch ool 
system. 
The cl1ool expenditllr s are re pon ible for the largest part 
of tl1e variation in the total tax bills of different di tricts. Table 
XI give. a good idea of the wide spread in the school levie in 
10 counties in v.rhich a special tudy \\•as made. In the 62 town 
for which data w re obtained the mo t co1nmon levies for the 
gen ral ·chool f11nd ,,. r from 50 to 80 mill . In tl1e 65 con ali-
dated chool di trict the typical levy " ra bet,veen 40 and 60 
TABLE XI. VARIATION IN GENERAL PROPERTY LEVIES ~"'OR SCHOOL 
TEN COUNTIE' (a ) 
No. di trict ..... . 
Mills per dollar 
() ······-····· 
1- 10 .............. .. 
11- 2() ....... .. .. . 
21- 30 
······-····-
31- 40 ............. . 
41 - 50 
······ ··--·· 
51· 60 ---······· ·· 
61· 70 ........... . 
71- 80 ············ 
81- 90 ········----
91-100 ·······--··· 
101-110 ........... . 
111-120 ----·······-
121-130 ··-····---~ -
City 
and 
tO\VD 
62 
. ............... 
1 
1 
4 
4 
2 
11 
11 
12 
9 
2 
2 
2 
1 
n cral sch ool fund 
on soli-
dated 
di .-- t ri ct 
65 
········ ···-·····-
·············--··· 
..... ...... -·-···· 
3 
8 
26 
25 
3 
•.•••.••..•....... 
................... 
....... ............ 
-- -------·----···· 
-···-- -········--· 
···········--··· 
I ural, In· 
d pendent 
and school 
to,vnships 
467 
1 
22 
135 
192 
87 
23 
4 
2 
1 
--··-·· · -··-- · ···· 
····--·----·----·· 
·······-----····--
................... 
---------······ ··· 
Citv 
• 
and 
tO\\rll 
' 
62 
15 
12 
24 
8 
1 
-----·-·-········· 
................... 
----···-········-· 
·--···-··-·· ·· ···· 
····--·-··--···-·-
--~-·-············ 
··--····-----·----
-···-······· · ····· 
choolhouse fund 
on soli-
dated 
di~tricts 
65 1 
Rural, In-
dependent 
and sch ool 
t.O\\'"ll hips 
467 
6 412 
24 42 
31 11 
4 2 
--·-·····--------- -············-···· 
--····------------ -····-··--------·· 
............ ,..... -----··-~----····· 
··------·--------- ---- -- ·-- ······---
···········----·-· ···-·-------------
·-·-·-·----·------ ---------------··· 
-------·---~- -·--- ···········•··•• ·• 
--····-····-----·· . ................. . 
-·--······----···- ··-······----·-··· 
--·············--· ··----·-------·---
(a) The counties w re Buena Vista. Fayette, Grundy, Guthrie, Linn, Pottawattamie, 
tory, Wnrren, Washington and Worth. 
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mills, and in the rural independent and school townships it was 
from 20 to 30. The levies for the schoolhouse fund were most 
often between 5 and 20 mill , both in towns and in the consoli-
dated districts. Out of 467 rural independent and school town-
ships only 55 had levies for choolhouse fund ince the inve t-
ment involved in the one-room schoolhou es is too small to in-
volve a long period of financing. In the e districts the mo t 
common schoolhouse levies were from 5 to 10 mills. 
Because the expenses for schools amount to nearly 30 percent 
of the total public expenditures of the state, it is well worth 
while to give careful attention to any means of economizing 
the e funds a long as such methods do not affect adver ely the 
quality of the education. Iowa has taken pride in its school 
sy t m a.nd each specific measure for the r duction in school 
taxes should be considered in the light of its effe-ct on education.* 
::J\~Iost of the more obvious means of school economy have 
already been put into effect by the school board . The first of 
the e to be adopted "idely has been the reduction of the al-
ari of teacher . Thi has accomplished some relief, particu-
larly in rural district . Often the larger reductions have worked 
more hardship to teacher and pupils than relief to the taxpayer 
ince a 10-dollar per month pay cut to a rural teacher means 
on an average a 6-dollar per year tax reduction per farm. The 
rural districts have generally adopted more drastic salary cuts 
than the town school . If thi policy is continued it will be to 
the di advantage of the country children ince it has the effect 
of driving the more capable teachers to the towns. The country 
child is already under a erious educational di advantage and 
dra tic reductions in the salaries of teacher· are not calculated 
to improve this condition. 
School authoritie., recommend that a larger proportion of the 
school expenses should b borne by a uniform state tax to replace 
part of the local tax. This would be an important step toward 
qual educational opportunitie at equal co t for the different 
type of di t ricts. 
*''<?ur nat_ion faces t~e acute r esponsibility of providing a right of way for ftb e 
Amenca~. ch1ld. In sp1te of our economic, social and governmental difficulties, our 
future mt1zens must b built up now. We may delay other problems but we cannot 
delay th~ day-to~day care _a_n d instruction of our children." From speech of President 
Hoover m openmg the 1t1zens' Confer nee on the Crisi in Education. 
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I-Iowever, there are, in many districts~ opportunities of reduc-
ing school expenditure witl1out adverse effects. One of these 
i by clo~ ing the school~ \Vith only a small number of pupils 
(probably tho e with I , than 10) and mal{ing arrangements 
for th n ded edllca.tional facilities in adjac nt districts. A 
econd i for clo ing tl1 l1i<7h ~ chools having a \mall attendance, 
p rhap\ tl1o e 'vith f ''1i r than 50 pupil . The clo ing of small 
scl1ool often rtln contrary to community pricl , bllt the econ-
omy may be considerable. There are, for in 1tance, cases in 
which mall town 'vithin 1 or 2 miles of each other maintain 
compl te, indepencl nt . chool y tern . oop ration, in uch 
ca ~' at lea t to the xt nt of a joint higl1 chool, \VOllld re ult 
in a mat rial ~ a''ino-. It ''TOlllcl ~ eem that th concept of the 
commt1nity might profitably b nlargecl, or that inter-commllD-
ity cooperation migl1t ,,,. ll b made a matt r of pride. 
There are also in ·om choot some cour s wl1ich may be 
r egar·ded a non-e ~ 1ential duri11g the emergency and there are 
so1n xtra-curricular activitie which might b discontint1ed 
t mporarily. 
In a ~ood many f th con~~oliclated and to,,~n ~ hool , a 'vortll-
''rhil OJ)l10rtunitv to r organize the bond cl i11d btedne ~ i 
lik ly to le,yelop i11 th n ar fllture. Thi \vill be tal{en up at 
O'rea t r length in the next ~ ection. 
Eacl1 school present om thing of a problem in it elf and 
relativ ly few sugg stio11~· can be macle of a blanket type. 
chool . uperintendent~ 1 and m mber of scl1ool board who ar 
int r .'ted in keeping th ir xp n~ e. to a n1ini1num (a all 
hot1ld b ) hould checlr O"'l r th ir financ · car fully. Valuabl 
t1gg . ·tion and advice n1ay be obtain l from l1 tat Depart-
m nt of Public In truction, \vhich has pr par cl a check li t of 
financial conomie for a local chool di. 1 trict. 
THE PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS OF lOW A 
In the many recent di~·cu \ ~ion of public xp 11cliture in this 
tat very little ha b n aid concerning l1 1)ublic debt. In 
fact th interest on the \7ariou public bond i ~tl . compris 
on of the largest of the pllblic outlays. Tabl I 'how that the 
intere 't payment for th mo ·t recent year for \vhich :figure are 
availabl amounted to abotlt $10,500,000. In addition to this 
there are the payments 011 principal to be con ,idered. These 
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TABLE XII. INDEBTEDNESS OF IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 
Data from Office of Auditor of State (Compiled by Mrs. E. Mae Sweany) 
County bonds, Jan. 1 
Gen eral county bonds.... $ 
Bridge bonds ............... . 
Courthouse bonds ......... . 
County road bonds ....... . 
Total county bonds ... . 
County warrants ............. . 
Primary road bonds., Dec. 1 
Primary road certificates, 
D ec. 1 ··~-· - ··-------- -· · - ··--···· 
Primary road district 
fund warrants ............. . 
St-condary road district 
fund warrants ............... . 
Drainage bonds, Jan . L .. 
Drainage warrants ....... . 
City and town indebt· 
edne s, April 1 ...... .. .... .. 
School bonds, June 30 .... .. 
School warrants .............. .. 
State soldiers' bonus ...... .. 
1932 1931 Change Interest paid 
15 ,955 ,388 
33 ,109,417 
1 ,275 .000 
4 ,412 .625 
24.752.43 0 
1, 711 .900 
96,445,500 
44 .059 
108.531 
2 .643 
5 ,165,893 
1,104,802 
$ 1 .1 72 , 34 -$ 
33 ,03 3 ,9 99 + 
1.4 83 .000 -
3,747 ,600 + 
26,437,433 -
1 ,459,275 + 
85,117,500 + 
571 ,3 0 4 -
169,71 8 -
2 919 -
6 .5 5 ,271 -
1, 301 ,9 6 -
• m y ear 
2,217,446 1 
75 ,418 
20 ,000 
665,025 
1 ,685.003 
252,628 
11,328,000 
123,245 
61,187 
276 
1,419 ,378 
197,184 
$1,283,776 
3 , 753,355 
(a)23 ,000 
48,091,654 50,832,311 - 2.740,657 (a)2,165,000 
54,231,098 57,236,455 - 3,005,357 
1,289,445 807 6 0 4 + 481,841 
11 ,000 ,000 12,100 ,0 0 0 - 1 ,100,000 
2,546,875 
(a)7,319 
538 ,3 8 
Total .. .... ............ ........ $244,351,958 $ 2 42,621 ,776 +s 1,730,182 $10,532,713 
(a) Approximate. 
bring the total payments on public debts to around $20,000,000. 
The largest element of the Iowa public debt, as shown in 
table XII, is comprised of $96,000,000 of primary road bonds. 
School bonds amount to $54,000,000, the indebtedness of citie 
and towns is $48,000,000, and county bonds are nearly $25,000,-
000. In addition to the e there are smaller is ues of state bond 
for the soldiers' bonus, drainage district bonds, etc. 
The Primary Road Bonds 
The primary road bonds are worth studying both because of 
their large amount and also because they have been handled in 
the most busine slike fa hion of any of the elements of debt 
mentioned. The la1.·ge and relatively con tant income from the 
ga oline tax and auto license fees, and strongly centralized con-
trol by the Highway Commission greatly facilitate an effective 
financial policy. 
In general, the primary road bonds are scheduled for retire-
ment in equal installments for each individual issue over a period 
• 
Year 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
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• TABLE XIII. PRIMARY ROAD BOND 
Scheduled ~{nturities and IntereRt P ay1nents 
(Data !rom State High,vay Commission) 
· · ··· · ··· ··· ·········· · ······ · ·· · · · · ·· ·· ······-···· · 
· ·· · · ··- ·· ·· ·· --- ····- - ······ ·····-··· · ~·- · ··-· · ···· 
· ···· · ·······-··· ····--··· --·· ···--·- · ···· ···-······ 
··· ··· · · ··· ····· -· · · ·· · ·- -· ····· ·· -- ···· ··········· · 
-··-·· ·· ··- · -· ~-- - ·-···· ·· · ·- · ······· ·· ······· ·· ···· 
··· ···· ·········· -········· ······ · --·· ······ ·· · ·· · ·· 
······ · ··· · ····--·-·· -·· ········ ···· ··· ············· 
········-·· · ·· ········---- · · · ·--·-·· ···· · ···- · ······ 
····· · ···· · · ··········· · ··- ---···· ·· ··· ····-········ 
• 
····· - · ·· ·· ·· - ·--~- - - ·······- · ·- ··· ······ ··· - · ··-··· 
···· · · · ·· ·· ··- · · · ------ -· · -· · · ······ · · --·-·····--·-· 
·· ······· ---·------····-···- -· -- · · ·- -- ---· · · · ······· 
· · · · ····· · · · ·· ---- · --- ·-·· · · ·· ···· · ·····--·-·-·-···· 
··········---- -----····------- ·· ·· · ··· ···········-·-
· · ··· · ···· -· ·-----·- ·-· ····· ·· ·· ···-- · -----· ········ 
. 
.. 
Amount 
maturing 
$ 2,822,500 
4 .036,500 
6.583.500 
8.891,500 
9 .551 ,000 
9 .906,000 
9,550,000 
8,875,000 
8,71R,OOO 
8. 425.000 
7.337,000 
6 ,364.000 
3 ,909,000 
990,000 
1 09,000 
• 
• 
Int. r est 
r equirem nt 
I · 
4,351,961 
4.257,490 
4,069.007 
3,762,4 65 
3,350,003 
2,916,675 
2,460,121 
2,024.455 
1 .6 17.589 
1, 220,075 
843, 136 
507,491 
212 931 
41 ,7 60 
2.903 
To ta 1 ..... __ ... ...... .. ... _ ..... .... ... ..... -....... -. $96,063,000 $31,638,062 I 
45 
• 
• 
Total 
r equir ment 
. 
• $ 7 ,174,461 
8 ,293 990 
10.652 ,507 
12.653.965 
12.901,003 
12,822,675 
12,010,121 
10,899,455 
1 0,330,589 
9. 645 .07 5 
8 ,1 0, 136 
6 .87 1,4 91 
4 .121.931 
1 ,031, 760 
111 ,903 
. 
$127 t 701.062 
of 10 years. The heavic. t payments for the y. tern as a whole 
were scheduled to occur j11st after the ~,checluled completion of 
the con truction program. The re lllting matt1ritie and inter-
e t payment for th primary road y~ t m a a 'vhole are ho,·~.rn 
in table XIII. It ''~ill b ob:erved that tl1e total scheclt1led re-
quirements ri e to nearly $13,000,000 in 1937 and 1938 th r e-
after decline to $4,000 000 in 1945, ancl nd 'vith $112,000 in 
1947. The primary road bond are all callabl , according to law, 
five year after th y have b en issued. Thi f ature will permit 
the Iliahway Commission to take advantage of any pronotlnced 
decline in the intere t rat on long t ime ct1ritie , and i lil{ely 
to re ult in a con iderable aving before the bond are all 
retired. 
County Bonds 
Table XII shovvs that th re were Otlt tan cling on Jan. 1 1932, 
$24,752,430 of county bonds other than primary road boncls. 
This was $1,685,000 le. than a year previou. ly, the general 
county bonds having b n r educed $2,217,000 and c011nty road 
bond.· having increa. ed $665,000. 
Table XIV sho\vi the sch duled maturitie · of county bonds in 
the 10 countie in which the pecial ., tudy wa made.* The e 
bond represent about one-eighth of the total for the stat . The 
bonds now outstanding., are . cheduled to be retired in the next 
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15 years, except for a few thousand dollars of serial bonds and 
term bonds which wrill need to be refunded. t The latter amount 
to something over $2,500,000. For the state as a whole, about 
$900,000 of county bonds are now callable, and about $200,000 
will become eallable within the next four years. The counties 
which have the e bonds outstanding will probably be able to 
refund them at some saving in interest within the next few 
years. County treasurers should be on the alert for opportuni-
ties to make such savings. 
It is shown in table XVIII (page 51) that there are nearly 
$7,000,000 of county bonds carrying interest rates in exce s of 
5 percent. Five millions carry a rate of 6 percent. The e were 
mostly i sued about 1920 and neglect of the issuing authorities 
· to attach an optional or callable feature will keep some counties 
paying this rate, which is excessive for public funds, for 20 years 
after issuance of the bonds. Boards of supervisors should con-
TABLE XIV. SCHEDULED MATURITIES OF COU NTY BONDS IN TEN 
COUNTIES 
T en counties 
Year T erm bonds 
Serial Term for whole 
bond s bonds state ( a) 
1933 
. ---.--------.. ---.-- ...... -. --.- .. -.- ......... ·- $ 336,500 $ 25,000 $ 110 ,000 
193 4 
-------------------------·----------------------
312,500 
------------------
2 0 ,000 ]935 -~----······------------------------------------ 316 ,500 24,000 64.000 193 6 
-------------------·-·······--·------······ ····· 
296,000 
··-------·------- -
249,000 
193 7 
····-------------···-------·--···········-··----
276,500 
-- --------------- -
79 ,000 
1938 
----------- --------·----------------------------
271,500 
····--·-········· · 
1,000 
1939 
----·-------------------························ 
272 ,0 00 28,000 28, 000 
19 40 
··············--····-----·----------------··----
242, 00 0 
· ---------------- -
3 08,0 00 
1 9 41 
·····-------------·--------····------··-····----
2 39 ,540 94,000 49 ,850 
1942 
·····-------------------·-----·--·-------------· 
147, 00 0 24, 000 39 8 ,500 
1943 
---- ... ---- .. ··-··-·········· .... -------- ------· 8 2 ,000 2 50,00 0 3 18,5 00 
1944 
. -......... --.------ .. -- .. -.- --.- .. -. ----.- .. --. 88,000 82, 000 192,000 
1945 
·····------------·-··········-··········------· · 
79 ,0 00 
···········-------
··-··············· 194 6 
-····-------·-·········-·········-·············· 
6 8, 000 
····--·····------- ·········-·-------1947 
··----------··--·············-······ · ··········· 
5 ,000 
-----------·----- -
·· · ···········----1948 
-------------------·-----------------··········-
5, 000 
------------·---- -
·· ···---- -···-···· 1949 
-------··--····-······--········--·············-
5 ,000 
·······---------· · ········-------··· 1950 
·-·······--------------------··········--------· 
9 ,0 00 
-------·········· · ·-················ 
T otal 
-----······-· · ·······-·················· 
$3,051,040 $ 527,000 $2,697,850 
(a) F r om Moody ' s Manual of Governments. 
*These cou n.ties w er e Buena Vista, Fayette, Grundy, Linn, Pottawatta mie, Story, 
Warren, Washmgton and W orth. 
t T erm bonds a r e tho e i su es of w h ich all bonds run for the same period of time 
and all mature on th e same date, for example $20,000 may be issued May 1 , 1925, a)) 
to mature on May 1, 194 5. Seria ls m a ture, n ot all at the same time, but at intervals, 
in accordance wi th some schedule which will r etire th e whole i ssue a few bonds at a 
time . For instan ce, a $ 20, 000 issu e put out in 1925 may be s~heduled to mature 
$1,000 p e r year from 19 26 to 1945. 
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sider the future interests of their re pective counties as well as 
the immediate demand . 
School Bonds 
lightly over half of the $-4,000 000 of chool bonds outstand-
ing are on town and city ~ chools, and mo t of the rest on con-
solidated school . The bonded indebtedne of rural indepencl-
ent school i r lativ ly trifling. Table XV . hows that the 
interest payments on ·chool bonds for the whole state in 1931 
amounted to approximately $2,500,000 and payment on prin-
cipal to $2,400,000. 
T BLE XV. SCHOOL BONDS, P YMENTS ON I TERE T AND PRINCIPAL 
July 1, 1931 June 30, 1932 
• 
No. districts studied 
Total No. 'vith No. districts 
In wrest Payments No. ~choolhonse in state 
paytnents on principal fund levies ( 1929-30) 
- -
Ten CountiPa 
ities and towns .. .. $ 211,20 8 $ 173.07 4 62 47 652 
Consolidated districts 13 ,699 152.506 65 59 402 
Rural independent 
and chool town-
hips 
······ ···--·-· ···· · ·· · 
4,726 12,734 467 55 3,817 
Total . . . . . . . --. . -. . . . . . 354,o3a 33 ,3 14 
Total state ···-······ $2.546,87 5 $2,410,1211 
1Tota1 bonds retired minus refunding issues . 
Table XV show~ that the combined debt ervice, including 
in re t and payment on principal, for 59 con olidated chool 
av raged $4,936 per chool. For 45 to,vn omitting edar 
Rapid and Council Bltlff , it averaged $5,227. In ach ca~ e the 
a,,.erage debt servic i ap1)roximately eqt1al to the alarie of 
fi\'e teachers in tl1 l mentary gracl .. 
There was a trong ntiment in favor of consolidation abotlt 
the b ginning of the war. A little later the war-time and po t-
\Var inflation encoura.ged further con oliclation . Out of 40~ 
consolidated di~·trict 150 "~ere form cl in th y ar 1914 to 1916, 
an l 12 'vere form d in 1919 and 1920. * 
There ha. al o be n at nd ncy to J)Ut up ne'v bt1ilcling during 
p riod of bu ine activity \vhen the vot I\ f lt favorably di -
*Data derived from a bulletin by H .E. Stone of the tate Department of Public 
Instruction, 1926. 
• 
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posed tow/ards public improvements. It is interesting to note 
that in the 10 counties in which the special study was made, the 
largest numbers of bonds were issued in 1916, 1919, 1923, 1926, 
and 1930. These were all years of active business or of busine s 
recovery except 1930, which was a year ju t following a period 
of business activity. . 
Unfortunately, the primary concern of some of the school 
boards seemed to be to postpone the heavier payments as long 
as possible rather t~an to adopt a plan for prompt payment 
with a minimum ultimate burden. In one case which will serve 
as an example, a consolidated schoolhouse was erected in 1920 
and was paid for by the issuance of $90,000 of bonds. Payment 
on this principal were scheduled to begin in 1936, 16 years later, 
at the rate of $5,000 per year and to continue at this rate until 
1945, When the remaining $45,000 was scheduled to be paid, or 
more likely refunded. ·In this ca e and in a number of others 
like it, the attitude seemed to be to let the future school boards 
do the worrying. 
The law at present requires that a schedule of payments be 
adopted which will retire an issue of bonds in not more than 20 
years. This law is evaded in a large number of cases. The most 
common means of evasion is to make the final installment so 
large that it will be necessary to refund it. Table XVI shows 
that about one-fourth of the school bond issues studied were of 
this type. Another fourth of the school bonds are the still out-
standing term bonds. These are issues which fall due at a 
single date in tead of being distributed over a period of year . 
There are two generally desirable forms of schedules for the 
retirement of bond issues. One of these is by means of equal 
annual payments which will completely extinguish the debt. 
As the years pass, the annual interest payments become smaller 
because of the retirement of bond . Consequently, the total 
annual payments decline by the reduction in interest. Table 
XVI shows that $1,294,000 of the $7,480,000 of bonds examined 
were of this type. 
A more popular type provides that annual payment on prin-
cipal shall increase approximately as fast a the interest pay-
ments decline. The bonds of this type in table XVI amount to 
$1,905,000. Where the school board was intent on postponing 
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payments as long as possible, it was often arranged that prin-
cipal payments should be small at first and should increa. e at 
a rate faster than interest payments declined. Out of the 
$7,480 000 in table XVI $508,000 were of thi type, and an aclded 
$4,.6 000 had rapidly increru ing annual payments and large 
terminal payments as \Vell. 
TABLE XVI. TYPES OF SCHOOL BONDS IN TEN ELECTED COUNTIE 
T r1n bonds ····· ·-· ··--·-·· ··-····· ................................ . .... . .......... .. .. ............... .... .. 
erial bond with annual payn1ents extinguishing th e is u e ; 
Equal annual payments ··-·········---·-·····------ ---------····--·- ·· ···-- ···-· ···-···-·· · 
Pnyment. increa e n int r . t d cline · ----- --··- ····-··-·-·····--··-·--·----·-····· 
Payn1ent incr ea s fa .. ter thnn intere~t declines ............................. . 
Serial bond<3 '\Vith a large final payment: 
Equal annual payment ... .............. .. ·····---··-·······················- ··--··· ··-·· 
Payments increase ns interf's t decline . ··--·-·· ·· ·-·········-·····-·····- ······· 
Payment in crease fa ter th u n in ter e .. t de eli n s .... . ·-·-· ........ ... ........ . 
Total ... ....... __ ___ ........ . __ ............... ·-~-· .......... _ ..... _ ........ .. ... __ ... __ ......................... . 
Bonds 
outstand in g 
$1,975,703 
1 .294 ,050 
1 ,904 800 
50 ,000 
5 74 100 
7 6R .OOO 
4 56 000 
$7,480,65 3 
• 
IIow long may 've xpect the pre ent load of d bt to rtin and 
'viii it become lighter or heavier from .. ' ar to year? Table XVII 
ho'v that the payment~ on erial bond in the 10 cot1ntie\ are 
ch dt1led to increa e om 'vhat for the n xt three y ar. a11d 
thereafter to decline gradually tlntil they are all retired abotit 
1950. The number of i \ 1 ues of term bonds ·tticlicd was too mall 
to o-ive any d finite tr nd. Btlt it i cl ar that they 'vill b 
matt1ri11f7 from time to time llntil 1946. f cotlrse, ~orne of 
the. e i~ ue will be paid off at least in part. Other will ha'' 
to be r funded for a further period. 
The above statem nt is trtle for the chool ystems of the 10 
cotlntie, as a whole. Btlt each district i a problem in it elf. 
Some are already 011t of debt. Others ar carrying extremely 
heavy loads, wthicl1 it will take 20 or more years to get rid of. 
Can the Public Debt Burden Be Reduced? 
The 11ltimate reduction in an annual debt erv·ice is, of cour e, 
accompli hed by paying it off. But \vhen the d bt concerned is 
as large as the quart r billion dollar O\\red by the variou 
governmental unit of Io,,ra, this reqt1ir a p riod of y ar . 
The qu stion in the meantime is how rapidly the debts can be 
• 
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TABLE XVII. SCHEDULED MATURITIES OF SCHOOL BONDS IN TEN 
COUNTIES 
Yc11r Serial bonds T erm bond s ( a) 
1933 
··-----·------------ ---· --· ------------ ------------· ·· ······ --------
$ 297, 5 $ 12,90 3 
1934 
--------- ----·------- -------······ ·· ·· ·--- ---------- ----··-· ··· ····· 
313 ,510 1 0 ,000 
19 35 
···--······------------·-··------------- -- --------------------------
355 , 60 242,000 
1936 
-- ---------- ··- -- ---·- ·· ···· ···-·········· ·· ····-······· --····-··-·· 
337.260 337 ,500 
1937 
---.- ... ------ ... ---- .. --- ... --- ........... -.... -- ........ ---·.--- .. 324,060 95 ,600 
1938 
-----·-···------------ -·····························------ -- --······ 
3 10,060 103,000 
1939 
·· ···· ·· --·· · ···-················ ·· ······················--- -· -····· 
285,060 264,500 
1940 
·······-··--· --····-··-· ·· ·············-·· ··· ····················· --
291,710 607,000 
1941 
· · ··· ··· ---- ····· ····---------------················· ··-----··· -·· ·· 
271,210 15,000 
] 942 
·········· ··································----·· · ················-
293 ,310 313 ,700 
1943 
··········-··········· · ···············-················ ·-· ········ · -
234,260 4 80, 100 
1944 
·······················-····················----·········· ·· ·····-·· 
212,035 227.250 
1945 
························································----------- -
177,910 26 ,000 
1946 
------ --- -···· ·························---------············· ···· · ·· 
106,410 1 2,900 
1947 
······ ············ · ·························-·····---------- -- ------
83,110 
·--- ------·----··· ] 94 
································--·-······················-········· 
70.610 
-----············· 
1949 
·····-····· · · · ···- ·· ------------·- ---- ------·········· ·· · ····· ····· · 
62, 110 
·················· 
1950 
--------------------············------------------------------------
45 ,110 
------------------1951 
········-·· ·· ··································-············ ··-- --- -
110 .................. 
Total (b) ••••••••••• • •• ••••••••••••••••••••• •• • •••• • ••••••••••••••• $4,071,590 $ 3,257 ,453 
(a) Term bond maturities plus fin a l instartmeut on serial bonds where the final 
installment is greatly in excess of earli er payments. 
(b) These totals do not quite equa l the total school bond for the 10 counties as 
given in tables XVI and XVIII, since it was not pos ible to get the schedul e of 
maturities for every is ue. 
reduced without current payments requiring excessive sacri-
fice on the part of the taxpayers. In periods of economic emer-
gency as at pre ent, it is even desirable to refund some obliga-
tions in the expectation that smaller social sacrifices will be 
involved in paying them later. This policy should be followed 
·with considerable caution, however, because it makes the future 
burden heavier a well a reducing the pre ent one. 
A econd possible way to lighten th debt burden is by getting 
the most favorable interest rates pos ib1e. Table XVIII how 
that 41j2 percent is the mo t common rate of interest on primary 
road bonds and al ·o on school bonds, while 5 percent is the mo t 
common on county bonds. In the case of the county debt, how-
ever, there is also a large volume of 6 percent bonds. In the case 
of the school debt there are about four-fifth as many bonds 
paying 5 percent as 41j2 percent. 
To the ca. ual r eader these may sound like favorable intere t 
rate . But it should be remembered that these are public and 
not private debts and that the bonds are tax free. These are, 
however, similar to rates on debts incurred in the same years in 
other states. 
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TABLE XVIII. VARIATION IN INTEREST RATES 
Rate 
Amount.s outstanding 
Whole tate 
Prima ry r oad County 
bond bond ( a) 
T en countie 
County 
bonds 
chool 
bond 
---------l------1-------+------ ,t--- -- .. 
~ ~0 ·· · ··· · · ·-· ··· · ·--· -- ······· · ··· 
4% % ............ .. ... ......... ... .... . 
4 ~ ~ ···· ····· ······ ······· ·· ···· 
~ ~ ~0 ··· · ·· · ······ · -· ·· · ·· · ·- · · ·· 
5% ........... ..... .. ·········· ····· 
5% % ............. .............. . 
5 '1h % ........ ....................... . 
5 ~ ~0 ··· · · - ·· · ·· ·- ······ ·-·-- · - · · 
6 ~0 · ··· · ·· · ·······- -· ·· · · ·· ········ 
$ 5 ,749,000 $ 1 ,449 ,000 $ 7 0 ,000 $ 
460,000 
1,20 5,50 0 
8 22 ,00 0 
521,500 
59,0 00 
1 ,193, 500 
2, 7 3 6,2 00 
1 ,435 ,800 
2 ,056,153 
24,724,500 3, 7 21 ,000 
32,0 78,000 3 ,6 15,000 
14,03 2 ,000 1, 2 54,000 
19,479,50 0 7,829 ,000 
.. ......• •.... . ...... . 
·· · · · · ···· · ······ -··- · 
·············-··- · ··· · 
·······--·····--······ 
1 52 ,00 0 
1,358,0 00 
3 44,000 
5 ,03 1,000 
····· · ··· · ···-· · ···· ·· -··· · ······ ····· ··-· · · 
··· · ·········-···· ··· · · ·· ··· · · ······ --· · ·· · · 
·········-·····-· ····· ·-- --· · · ··· · ···-···· · · 
609 ,540 
--- -· ··· ·· ·· ·· · · · ·- --· 
Total ........ .. ...... ....... ... $ 96,063,000 $ 24,753,000 3,688, 540 $ 7 ,4 80, 6 5 3 
(a) Approximate figures adju ted from Moody' s Manual of Governments. 
Iowa has enjoyed a r lat ively favorabl credit rating which 
ha made it rather a. ~y to obtain fund~ for public use at rea-
onable rate of int rc t. It may not be ami s to r emarl{ here 
that thi high credit rating can be maintain d only by m ting 
obligations promptly. A f w defatilts would be likely to prove 
highly xpen ive in futtire inter e t rate to tl1e di trict con-
cerned and to other~· a ~ well. 
A\ uming that the fa,rorable creclit rating can b maintain cl, 
it will probably pro,re po ,ible to redtice t he pr nt rate on 
bond. that can be called or r efund d. At the end of a bu. ine s 
d pre ion such a th pre. , n t ther e i. g n rally a period of lo'v 
int re t rates. Little n \V capital i cl mand d b cau e exi ting 
indtl trial and oth~r plant are more than tiffici nt for pre nt 
ne d . At the am time the avi11g of n \V ca1 ital contintl 
b call e people are 1nore than ordinarily fr11gal during and aft r 
a eriotl depre ion. 
It ha already been aid that relatively f ew ~ chool or county 
bond are callable, btit that all primary road bond are of this 
type. The importance of thi feature in th near ft1ture may b 
r alized when it i aid that, if it pro\red po 1 1ible to r eftlnd th 
primary road bond at 4 percent, thi \V01lld m an a aving to 
th tate of approximat ly a half million dollar per year. And 
if th y could be ref11nded at 334 percent it 'votild sa,'e anoth r 
q11arter of a million. 
Of course it i not possible to change the terms of bonds 
already i sued. Btlt all public official concerned with the pa,y-
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ments of public debts should familiarize themselves thoroughly 
with the provisions of bonds of their respective administrative 
units so that they will be prepared to take advantage of any 
optional or other similar features. 
Now that the primary road bonds have proved salable with an 
optional feature, it would be highly desirable for this provision 
of the law to be extended to the other public bonds of Iowa. 
It would be very desirable for most counties or school districts 
to obtain the advice of experienced and competent persons in 
addition to the representatives of the bond houses before a con-
tract is let for the is uance of bonds. It would be possible for 
some one of the existing state offices to provide such advice and 
for the law to require that the issue meet the approval of such 
an authority before it is sold. 
It is possible that lower rates might be obtained on new school 
bonds if a guarantee fund were created by the state and the 
issuing districts were required to contribute a small percentage 
of the sums involved to insure the payment of such issues. 
The public debt is an important item in the cost of govern-
ment, and public official and taxpayers can well afford to con-
cern themselves over the question when to follow a "pay a 
you go" policy. When it is decided to borrow, careful attention 
should be given to the terms under which a debt is incurred. 
APPENDIX 
Tax Information in the Fanner's Tax Receipt 
The farmer's tax rec ipt merits more tudy than it is often 
given. It contains valuable information regarding the burden 
which the various governmental functions place on real estate 
and personal property. This burden and the cost of carrying it 
may be better understood if the farmer will determine for him-
self the approximate proportion of his total property tax which 
will be used by each branch of the government, state, county 
and local, and if be can see the uses which will be made of the 
fund allotted to each branch. 
As an example, we give below a statement drawn from the 
tax receipts of two farmers living in the same Iowa county but 
in different taxing districts, on farms of nearly the same size. 
It will be noted that the share paid to the state government 
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ranged from 15 percent on farm A to 9 percent on farm B. In 
the arne \,~ay the f11nd going to the county were 48 percent on 
farm A and only 29 percent on farm B. On farm A there was 
no payment for choolhou e while on B thi amoltnted to $46. 
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Fig. 5. Farms A and B are almost. of equa l size and a r e locat d in the ._a rne county, 
but in different taxing d i.. tricts. Th p er centage of their t nxe goin g for differ ent 
purpo es varies considerably. 
:F'n1·n1 Farm B 
T otal T otal 
l\11 llage taxPs P er - Mill ag taxes p r · 
p a id cent p a id cent 
tate gen eral ............ 8.0 $ 2 3.20 14.82 8.0 $ 2 0.53 8 .8 
oldier • bonus 1 0 2 91 1 .86 1 .0 2 .5 7 1 .1 .......... 
' neral county 6 .0 1 7.37 11 .1 6.0 15 .40 6 .6 ........ 
Poor ....... ... ................ .. 3.0 .77 5.6 3 .0 7. 70 3.3 
County and tate 
• 1 .0 2 .91 1 .86 1 .0 2.57 1.1 1n san 
···· ·· ···--····· 
ountv 
• 
ch ool ....... 1 .0 2 .9 1 1 . 6 1.0 2.57 1.1 
ounty bond 
------·-
........... .... ... ..... .. 
··--------
------ -···---·-··· ····--·-
oldi r s ' r elief 
--··· · 
..... ........ .............. -
------·-·-
... ---
-·· 
. ........... 
--·····-
Court exp 'l n se 
--- ---
1 .5 4.38 2. 1 .5 3.9 6 1 .7 
ounty ho pi tal. ..... ........ .... ... .............. -.- .--,. .. ... 
·-- ---
-.... -. .. --.-. .. . ... . .. 
T. B. eradi cation .... ....... •• -.. .. .... .. p •• ... 
··-··· -·-- ·- ·-- -
...... -. . 
Roads (Total) 
·- ----
1 :3.5 39 .1 3 25.0 13.5 34.76 14.9 
choolhouse 
---- -·-····-
............ -.. 
··-· ·····--· 
. -.. -. . . 17.8 45 .7 2 19 6 
chool s 
.... --------------
17 .4 5 .56 32.3 36.4 9 3.54 4 0.1 
.1\.fi ~cellaneous 
-------· 
1.5 4 .38 2.8 1.5 3.96 1.7 
T otal per farm .... 53. 9 $ 1 56.5 2 1 00.0 90.7 233.2 I 1 00.0 
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OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE DEBT 
Debt Burden Increases 
The ease with which the farm mortgage debt was increa ed 
with ri ing prices for farm products, and the difficulty which was 
experienced in reducing the debt with falling prices, constitute 
the outstanding characteristics of the last 18 years. This is pic-
tured in fig. 7, showing the index of prices of farm products and 
the index of mortgage debt. 
The price index and the debt index went up rapidly in the 
y ars 1915-1919. In 1920, prices started to decline but the debt 
continued to increa P, in fact the debt ro e more in this year than 
in any of the preceding years. lVIuch of this debt increase wa 
contracted in late 1919 when price were high, but was not re-
corded until ~1arch, 1920. (March is the common month for 
transfer of land and the recording of mortgages connected with 
land purchases.) According to table XIX, a total of over 400 
million dollars in mortgage debt was added to the outstanding 
total in 1920. Thi addition is almost as large an amount as the 
out tanding total in 1914. 
TABLE XIX. ESTIMATED FARM MORTGAGE DEBT IN IOWA AND 
PERCENTAGE OF 1914 TOTAL, 1914·19323 
Year as of 
Dec. 31 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
192 5 
1926 
19 2 7 
1928 
1929 
1930 
193 1 
----------- ------ --- ---- --- --- -- ------ -- -------- ----- ---------
------- --- ----- ---- --- --- ----- -- ---- -- ---- -----· ···· ·· ···--··· 
--- ----------- ------ --- ------- ------ -------------- ---- --------
··--···-···-···------ ----------- -- -- ------------------- ----·--
----- -·· · -- --------- ··· ·····-- ·····----- -------- -- ---- --------
---------·-- ---- --------·-··-- ··---- -- ----------·--------- ----
··------------ ----·- ···-······ ·--------········--·-·-·-- ------
···· · --- -- --- ··· -··· ···· ········ ·· ·----···-·-- -------··- -·- ·· -
···-------··- ·· ··· -- --- ---- --- -- ----·-· ---······ ·· ··· ··· ······ 
19 3 2 * * ·····--·-····· -· ·--------- -- -- .. --............ ......... ... . 
State total* 
570 ,396,000 
685 ,114,000 
760, 961 ,0 0 0 
865 ,190,000 
961,071 ,0 00 
1 ,069,541,000 
1,499 ,577,000 
1 , 609 ,7 44,000 
1,597 ,390,000 
1,618,477,000 
1 ,604,907 ,000 
1,531,192,000 
1,470.511,000 
1 ,394,246,000 
1,348 4 0 ,000 
1,310,631 ,0 0 0 
1,265 ,456,000 
1,197,074,000 
1 ,082,882,000 
Percentage 
of 1914 
100 
120 
133 
152 
168 
1 8 
263 
282 
280 
284 
281 
268 
258 
244 
236 
230 
222 
210 
190 
• 
*Ratio, value of farm land in 13 townships to value of farm land of state 1:111. 
**Oct. 15, 1932. 
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F ig. 7. Indexes of outstanding farm mortgage debt and prices of farm products. 
After 1920, clebt continlled to increa e 'vhile prices of farm 
products declined. A good many creditors found them lve · 
holding unsecured note~ and to protect th msel,res the e cr eli-
tor obtained econd or third mortgag . The increa e in th 
debt brought abotlt by uch mortgages more than offset the d -
crea e cau ed by foreclo 'ures and other forced sales in the years 
1921-1923. 
Debt Decline Begins 
The increa e in th price 1 vel of farm product price in 1 ~5 
wa in ·ufficient toke 1 tl1 huge far1n mortgage debt of that year 
intact. Q,vners of farm~ hal been U ing llJJ re OUrCes Ollt i le the 
farm to keep taxes ancl intere t paid. Furth rmor , pre. tire \va.' 
placed on the land to malce it produce more i11 order that tl1e 
fixed charge 1 could be m t. Both of th se sources of 1·e erve 
COllld not last indefinitely. Hence, foreclosur , a ·signm nt of 
the land to the mortgage holder, or a cali11g do'vn of the clebt 
occurred. 
Debt reduction proceeded gradually from 1925 through 19, 0. 
The liquidation that did talce place 'va , carri d out in individual 
ca e · without attracting mt1ch attention. A slight improv m nt 
in pr ices kept the major·ity of mortgages in good standing. 
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The precipitous drop in prices in 1931 and 1932 brings the 
debt issue to a critical stage. Cash reserves have been depleted. 
Banks have failed in many in~tances, tying up deposits and call-
ing for payment of as sments by stockholders. The land has 
been farmed intensively with a larger acreage in corn than a 
soil maintenance program would ju. tify. To keep a mortgage 
debt almo t twice that of 1914 in good standing is the difficult 
task that many farm owners are facing as the year 1933 begins. 
To what extent have changes in the outstanding debt arisen 
from mortgaging more or less land, or from borrowing more or 
less dollars per acre ~ Evidence on this is presented in table XX. 
TABLE XX. MORTGAGE DATA FOR 13 TOWNSHIPS AND DEBT PER AORE 
E TIMATED FOR THE STATE 1915-193 23 
13-township data 
Year P ercent D ebt per 
a s of Total of land ac re of 
D ec . 31 debt mortgaged land mtg. 
1915 
-----------· ·· · --- ------ · ·----
$ 6,1 72 ,200 38 $ 56 
1916 
-- -------- -- ------------------
6 .855 .500 39 60 
1917 
------------·· ····-····-------
7 . 794.500 42 65 
1918 
-····------------------- --- ---
8, 65 .300 42 70 
1919 
------------------------------
9 ,635 ,500 4 2 8 0 
1920 
------- ----- -------·--- --·--- -
1 3, 509 ,70 0 47 100 
1921 ' 14,502,2 00 48 104 
··----- ----- -- ------·---------1922 
------ -· ···· · ···--·- ----------
14,390 ,90 0 49 102 
1923 
-----------······- -- -----· -·--
] 4 ,58 0,600 50 100 
1924 
···-·· ·····---- ----·- · ······--
14,45 8 .624 51 98 
1925 
------··--·-- ----- -- ----------
13 ,794,524 50 95 
1926 
······------------ ------·---- -
1 3,247 ,8 45 50 91 
1927 
------------- · ----------- -----
12 ,560.771 49 89 
1928 
------------------- -----------
12 ,148, 470 49 8 5 
1929 
------------------------------
11 ,807 ,488 49 84 
1 930 
---- --------------------- --- --
11 ,4 00 ,5 08 4 81 
193 1 
·- ---------- ----------·-·---- -
10, 7 8 4,453 4 8 7 
193 2 ** 
------- ----- ------ --------
9 ,755,696 45 74 
*Ratio, average debt in 13 townships to State av era ge, 116:111. 
**October 15, 1932. 
E stimated 
debt per acr e 
of land 
mortgaged 
in state* 
54 
57 
62 
67 
77 
96 
100 
98 
96 
94 
91 
87 
5 
1 
80 
78 
75 
71 
What portion of the mortgage debt is owed by owner-operators 
and what portion by non-operating owner· is not accurately 
known. In the 13-town. hip investigation a 50-50 division of the 
debt between owner-operated and tenant-operated land is indi-
cated. Although les of the tenant-operated land was mortgaged, 
that which was mortgaged carried a heavier debt per acre. 
PERCENTAGE OF LAND MORTGAGED 
In 1914 the land mortgag d constitt1ted 38 percent of all farm 
land· in 1920, 47 p rc nt. lthough th placing of mortgag . on 
9 p rc nt of the lancl J)r ·viotl~ l~r clear in r a~ e I the debt, the in-
crea. 'e from thi factor wa · ~n1all. Lil{ lvi. tl1 l crease in Ian 1 
mortoaaged from 51 perc nt in 1924 to 4- in 19.- 2 although . ig-
nificant in itL elf, i. not important in accot1nting for the redllCtion 
of debt that occurred . 
Tl1e e figures sho,ving the percentage of land mortgaged in the 
13 to\\"n~ hip "rere fo11ncl to b repre ·entati,,e of the state a\reraoa 
an l hence can be lll 1 a . a r liable incl x of cl1ang in the p r-
c ntage of land mortga~ d in Iowa d11ring h 1 -year period. 
Th fact that o·ver on -half the land i ~ cl ar of mortgage d bt 
m rit empha is. In di. tl.'.,iOil of mortga.g diffictlltie~, th t ncl-
ency i to forget tl1e itt1ation on farm., withot1t mortgage . Thi. · 
i particularly 11nwi: b catl. e it leaves th majority of far111 
o'vner~ out of the pictur . When con ideration turn to owner-
011 rator~ only, ho'v v r a. lightly differ nt ·itllation i fac 1. 
In thi. ca. e the maj rit~y· ha' mortgage on ·h ir land. Accor l-
ing to tl1e Federal n u. of 1930, 5 p rc n of the owner-op r-
ator had mortgag Otlt~ tancling on their lancl. 
DEBT PER ACRE OF MORTGAGED LAND 
Th clebt load on mortgaged farms fluctt1ated more than th 
perc ntage of lancl cov r cl by mortgag .,. (Table XX.) 
In tl1e 13 t0\\7)1 hip l1 average clebt in 1914 \Ya $56 an acr 
an l i11 1919, $ 0. In th :rear 1920, th d bt jtlmp d to $100 a11 
acr a change t'' i a. lar a in any oth ,. 'r ar. The de li11 
'vl1i h et in aft r 1921, thot1gh it ha. · be 11 ·lo,v, ha be n Il-
tinttou~ , bringing th d bt per acre do\\"ll to $74 an acre in 1932. 
Despite this decrea · ~ l1ow :)ver, the debt is still heavier than at 
the 11cl of 1918, '\Vh ·n it vva.t $70 an acre. 
tate e timate of 1 bt p r acre, a~ ' .·ho,v11 i11 table X are 
lightly below th to\Vl1.,llii figllre . Thi 1 follo,v.~ from the lo,ver 
\'altl of land ancl bt1ilding 1 in the ·tate a~ a \vhole. 
DEBT PER ACRE ON INDIVIDUAL FARMS 
A r ecord of lancl mortgag cl and debt per acr fa.il to indicat 
the di tribution of d bt on individual farms. Ilow repre entativ0 
60 WILLIAM G. MURRAY AND RONALD C. BENTLEY 
i the average debt of $104 an acre in 1921 and $7 4 in 1932? Th 
evidence I resented in fig. 8 and table XXI i designed to answer 
thi. qu tion pecifically. 
In 1921 the average d bt of $104 wa not a typical condition 
on mortgaged farm . A mortgage of $51 to $75 an acre wa 
more representative. Of ignificance wa the group of 98 farm 
with a debt of over $200 an acre. 
An entirely different situation appears in 1932. At this time 
th average of $7 4 comes close to being the typical case. More-
over, in contrast with 1921, the high debt ca es have been elimi-
nated and the majority of ca e come in the group , $26 to $100. 
This i a direct re ult of the decline in junior mortgages. Wh n 
a second mortgage was foreclosed, the second mortgage holder 
taking title, the fir t m01·tO'age continued in good standing, hence 
a reduction in debt per acre resulted but the acreage mortgaged 
remained the same. 
TABLE XXI. CLAS IFICATION OF FARMS BY DEBT PER ACRE OF LA D 
MORTGAGED IN 13 TOWNSHIPS 
Number of farm I Percent Debt per 
I acre D c. 31, 1921 Oct. 15, 1932 1921 1932 
$ 0-$ 25 51 85 4 .8 8.3 
26- 50 169 234 15.9 22.9 
51- 75 224 269 21.1 26.3 
76- 100 1 80 280 16.9 27.4 
101- 125 111 68 10.4 6.7 
126- 150 111 53 10.4 5.2 
151- 175 76 13 7.1 1.3 
176- 200 44 5 4.1 .5 
201- 225 40 7 3.8 .7 
226- 250 23 2 2.2 .2 
251 or more 35 5 3.3 .5 
Total 1,0 64 1 ,021 100% 100 o/o 
The small number of farms with a mortgage debt of 0 to $25 
is ~triking. Since half the land was clear of mortgage both in 
1921 and 1932, it seems strange that the majority of farms that 
ar mortgaged should be mortgaged for more than $26 per acre. 
Even in 1932, 69 percent of the farms were mortgaged for more 
than $50 an acre. 
An explanation of thi i uation is to be found in the large 
numb r of land purcha e mortgages contracted during the years 
1915-1920. 
low A F AR~r MoRTGAGE PROBLEM 61 
~0~------------------------------------------------~ 
V') J9Z I 
2 
oJ. 2.5 
<! 
~ l9~Z 
a 
w zo 
\j 
<( 
t9 
~ 
Ql 15 
0 
2 
LL.. 
0 10 
~ 
z 
w 
u s 02 
w 
0. 
0- ZS Z~·SO Sl-75 7··100 I ZG•ISO t7~ ·ZOO tZ<O-Z50 l51 + 
101-12.5 f51·175 tOI·Z~ 
OEe>T (IN DOLLA~S PER. AC~E.) 
Fig. 8. Cln~ ification of farms by debt p~r acre on Dec. 31, 1921, and Oct. 15, 1932. 
FIRST AND JUNIOR MORTGAGE DEBT 
l hotl h mark d l1an(Y : have been 110t l i11 tl1 total d bt, 
~till '"i l r fluctt1ations ar uncoverecl "~h ln tl1 total d 1 t i 
divil cl into first anl jt1nior mortgage (table II ) . In thi 
ca jt1nior mortgag ·how the most activity. Jt1nior mortgages 
inclt1l ~ ·econd, third an 1 fot1rth mortgage.· ; in oth r V\70rd , all 
mort()'a . t not fir t mortga o-e. . In the y ar, t 191;) to 1921, the 
jt111ior 1110r o-age total in r a~~, d almo t fourf ll 'vhil fir t lnort-
gao- ''' re doubling. 11 th ~,t1cceeding y ar\ jlinior mortgag ~ 
(lecli11 l to a figtlre only ~ ligl1tl abo,re th< t f 19 ; , while fir t 
mort ag ~ clecli11ecl onl., r a r0lati,rely mall a111011n . Ho'v ~mall 
thi · clrop in fir t mortgage .. l1a been can b en by comparing 
th increa~,e in 1920 ~rith tJ1 ~ redt1ction since 1923. The net ri~:e 
in the on year 19.;.JO i. 1 al1110. 1 t qual to th total r dt1ction talring 
lac in th nine year f llo,,ri11g 1923. In . ·1 it of thi nine )Tear 
r ] tlction, the fir mort~ao- l bt on Oct. 1- 19t 2 a . till 
bigl1 r than in 1919. J llnior mortgage in l bt ln in 193.;.J on 
th oth r hand, \Ya al)IJroximat ly one-half of tl1at in 1919. 
Jllnior mortgage~·, mo. ·t of which are econ(1Inortgag , gain d 
groun l over fir t mortgages in the early year.· only to lo e all 
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TABLE XXII. OUTSTANDING DEBT CLASSIFIED BY NATURE OF LIEN FOR 
THE 13 TOWNSHIPS, 1915-1932 
Year 
n of 
Dec. 31 
1915 
···--·----·· 
1916 
------------1917 
--------- -- · 
1918 
---- -- ·-----
1919 
--- -- -------
1920 
···-·-----·-
1921 
------------
1922 
---------··-1923 ---~-------
1924 
------------1925 
------------
1926 
-------- -- --1927 
------------1928 
-- -----·--- -1929 
------------
1930 
------- -· ---
1931 
------------1932* 
----------
*Oct. 15, 1932. 
$ 
First 
mortgage 
5 ,476, 00 
5 ,977,000 
6, 789,600 
7 ,5 34,3 00 
8,142 ,400 
11 ,141,700 
11,793 ,200 
11,8 65 , 00 
12,201,900 
12,155,700 
11,900,600 
11 ,530,964 
11,087,914 
10 ,859,619 
10,71 3.467 
10,357,400 
9 ,864,0 01 
8, 982 ,452 
fortgage debt 
Junior 
mortgage 
695,400 
878,500 
1,00 4 ,900 
1,124,000 
1,493 ,100 
2,368,000 
2, 709,000 
2.525 .100 
2,37 8, 700 
2,302, 924 
1, 93,924 
1 ,716,88 1 
1 ,4 72,85 7 
1,288.851 
1 ,094,021 
1,043,108 
920 ,452 
773 ,2 44 
Tota l 
$ 6,172,200 
6,855,500 
7, 794,500 
8 ,658,300 
9,635,500 
13,509, 700 
14,502,200 
14,390, 9 00 
14,580,600 
14,45 ,624 
13,794,52 4 
13,247, 45 
12,560,771 
12,148.470 
11,807.488 
11,400,508 
10,78 4,453 
9,755,696 
Percentage of 1915 
First 
mt' g. 
100 % 
109 
124 
138 
149 
203 
215 
217 
223 
222 
217 
211 
202 
19 
196 
189 
180 
164 
Junior 
mt'g. 
100 % 
126 
145 
162 
215 
341 
390 
363 
342 
331 
272 
247 
212 
1 5 
157 
150 
132 
111 
that was gained and more in the years that followed. In 1915 
junior loans comprised 11 percent of all loans. By 1921, the per-
c ntage had risen to 19. When it is considered that second mort-
gages are generally smaller in amount than fir. t mortgages, it is 
evident that in 1920 second mortgage financing had assumed an 
important place a a means of obtaining credit on land. In 1932, 
however, the tables were reversed. At this time, junior mortgage 
could claim scarcely percent of the total outstanding. fore-
over, at the rate the junior loans were being reduced, their di -
appearance would only be a matter of 6 or 7 years. 
Transition to· First Mortgage Liquidation 
While the decade, 1921-1930, was the period of junior mortgage 
liquidation the decade starting with 1931 appears to be headed 
toward a liquidation of first mortgage debt. Evidence of thi i 
furnished by the record of debt reduction in 1932, amounting to 
$ 2,000 of first mortgages in the 13 townships, and an es6mate 
of $98,000,000 of first mortgages for the state. Even at the rate 
of reduction established in 1932, however, four years would be 
required to bring the first mortgage total down to that of 1915. 
low A FAR 1 l\ioRTGAGE PROBLE:ur 6'1 
In acldition to this, it must be rememberecl that the debt of 1915 
'"~a. 11pported by a much higher price l v I than that existing 
in 1932. 
PURPOSE OF LOANS 
Pt1rcha e of land an l r ne~ral of land ptlrcha e loan , account 
for th majority of 111orto-age loan, in all but a few y ear . A i · 
. , t forth in tabl X III land purcha" e wa. th chief r a~ on for 
l)orrowing in the y ars 1915 to 1920. In. the .. ar 1920, O\T r 4 
1nillion lollar of mortgage credit wa borro'' ed lirectly for th 
ptlrcha~ e of land mortga()lecl in the 13 to''Tn 'hip . 
l11 tl1e ~y·ear. follo,vi11o- 1 20, r en \val of the land ptlrcha~ 
1nortgao- originatin in the 1915-20 perio l a 'tlmed th dotni-
nant rol . Thi ~ ''ra. a natt1ral con qu nee of tl1 fact that tl1e 
ro1nmon t erm of 1norto-ao· i.' and wa 5 y ar .. \Vith farm income 
at lo,,r level after 1920, little opportunity exi tecl to pay off a 
mortaao-e in 5 y ear·. A.1 a con equ nee, th majority of tl1e la11cl 
}tlrcha 'e mortgarr · O'i,len in the year 1917-20 \vere r en ''l'ecl or 
xt nd d in the deca le 1921-30. 
T1\ BLE ?XIII. NE 'V L . AN L I F I E D BY P RP E IN 1 3 TO\Y~ I-I I P~, 
Year 
1915 ........ . ........... .... 
1916 
·· ········· · · · ·······-
1917 
·······---------------191 
·· ······· ·· · -·--······ 
1919 
········· · --------·-·· 
1 920 
-------·-··· ·· ------·· 
1 921 
-·-· ··········-·· ·-··· 
1 922 
·········· · ···-· ·· ···· 
192 3 
· ········ ····---······ 
1924 
······-- -- -· ----------192 5 
--- -- ·-········· · ·-··· 
192 6 
· ··········-····· ·--·· 
19 2 7 
-········ · ·· ·- ----···· 
192 
·········----- -·····-· 
1929 
·-····-·····-····· · ··· 
1 930 
------ ----------------
1931 
··-·· ········---······ 
19 32 * 
···-······--· · ·····-
*To Oct .. 15, 193 2. 
$ 
Land 
purchase 
8 4 5, 00 
899 ,4 00 
1 .1 5 .300 
1 ,356, 100 
1,44-1 , :JOO 
4 , 111 ' 00 
69 5.ROO 
2 49 ,000 
4 03,500 
3 4:1 ,7 00 
3 9, 700 
43-1,52 1 
51 3,00 0 
23J :30 0 
1 5:3,050 
1 5 4 ,294 
124,800 
57,970 
1915-1 932 
R en e,val 
land purchase 
$ 364 ,000 
6:~9.900 
8 4 . 600 
366,400 
4 06,600 
683,100 
8 4 ,9 00 
1 ,1 9 7 ,000 
1 ,50 1 ,000 
919,1 00 
1,192, 400 
73 ,771 
466.4 8 7 
7 0 1,250 
38' .41 0 
5 02,200 
3 1 6.005 
146,273 
Miscellan ou s 
55 ,900 
3 3.900 
546.600 
29t..:,100 
317,700 
9 4 .500 
1,002,200 
651 ,200 
83 4 200 
746,52 4 
4 68,000 
6 15,066 
354 ,070 
74 ' 17 7 
5 55,4 65 
52 1.657 
541 ,6 22 
223, 57 6 
Total 
Sl , 7 68~ 700 
1.922.300 
2 ,551,500 
2.020.600 
2, 1 6 ,600 
5 ,6 9, 400 
2 .5 4 6,900 
2,09 7 t 200 
2, 7 3 ,700 
2' 0 0 9' :-1 24 
2 ,050, 100 
1 18,B5 
1 ,:138.557 
1,682, 7'2 7 
1 .09 1.925 
1 ,1 7 . 15 1 
9 2 4 27 
4 2 7 . 19 
• 
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The debt problem of 1933, therefore, can be traced directly to 
th land purchase activity of the 1917-20 period. In these years 
price of farm product ·were moving up rapidly. This, in turn, 
brought increased return from farming be ause co ts did not 
ri e as rapidly a price . Larger profit stimulated a demand for 
land, r e ulting in higher prices for land. Frequent purcha e of 
high priced land led to larger mortgages to complete the tran ac-
t ion . This, in short, wa the cause of the mortgage debt increa e. 
FORCED SALES AND DEBT REDUCTION 
While the purcha e of land accounted for the major portion 
of th debt increa e in the period 1915-20, forced sales and re-
newal mor tgage ar e the chief reasons for payment of mortgaO'e 
in the years of debt d cline, 1922-32 (table XXIV) . Fore d 
sal , including foreclo ure of mortgage and a signment of land 
to mor tgage holders, did not enter the picture until 1922. Even 
then they did not bulk large until1926 and 1927. This may seem 
peculiar becau e price of farm products had r ecovered orne-
what in these later year from the low lev l of 1921-22. Th 
explanation lie in the fact that owners of heavily mortgag d 
TABLE XXIV. LOANS PAID, CLASSI F I E D BY REA ON F OR PAYME NT, 
13 T OWNSHIPS, 1 9 15-1932 
Year R enewal Sale of land For ced sales Mi c. T ota l 
1915 ·········· $ 494,300 $ 83,600 $ 2,400 $154 ,9 00 s 7 35,200 
1916 ·········· 770 ,900 2 1, 00 
---·---------- ~~6 , 300 1 ,239,000 1917 952,100 369,700 2,000 2 10 ,700 1,612,500 
--------191 
-------- 475.400 369,300 800 311, 4 00 1 , 156,9 00 1919 •••••••• 592,900 361,600 3,600 233,300 1,1 91 ,4 00 1920 ------·- 743,100 624,100 
------------·-
4 47,600 1 ,81 4, 00 1921 
-------- 947 ,800 221,300 77 ,1 00 308,200 1 ,5 54 ,4 00 1922 -------- 1,4 65,200 209, 700 33 1,300 202,300 2 ,208, 500 1923 -------- 1 ,6 1 0,800 333, 100 2 28, 700 326, 4 00 2 ,553,000 1924 ......... 1,250,300 314,900 307,200 258,800 2, 13 1,200 1925 ......... 1,546,500 341,800 3 71, 100 4 54,900 2,714,300 1926 
-------· 932.950 113,900 909,064 408, 723 2,364 .63 7 1927 ......... 618 ,67 2 79,552 782,57 1 539 .836 2,020.63 1 1928 -------- 1,253.645 33,344 4 3 1,474 366,3 4 2 2.084, 05 1929 ·······- 729,231 71 ,125 265 ,643 374 ,908 1,44 0,9 7 1930 753 ,453 -------- 97,50 0 358,696 36 7,4 2 1 ,5 77 , 13 1 1931 
......... 619,496 33,670 629,824 315, 492 1,59 ,4 2 
1932* 251,561 ------ 74,000 9 59, 1 35 1 5 7,280 1,4 35, 6 82 
*To Oct. 15, 1932. 
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lancl h ld on as long a they could by u. ing all available r -
ourc s. Btlt vvith the failure of prices to retllrll to the 1919 
I ve], liqllidation throt1gh foreclo tlre or a .. ignm nt was inevit-
abl . a. of thi kind 'ver Otlt of the 'vay in 1928 and 1929 
~ o that with a light impro'r ment in pric , f w forced sal ~ 
w re r gi~ tered. With th price clrop in 19' 1 an l 1932, forced 
ale hot llp again r acl1i11o- in 1932 the larO'e t total on recor l. 
Tl1i rec nt price d cline ha. been so dra tic it ha., tarted to 
affect fir t mortgages. Previotl~ 4 to 1931 forced ~ale were re-
t r icted principally to jt1nior mortgages. 
TABLE ."' V. CLASSIFIC.\..TION OE' FORCED SALES IN 13 TO\VNSHIPS, 
1 92 8 -193 2 
Year Foreclosure 
1928 ·· -· ·· · · · -···· · · ····- ~-· $261 ,4. 2 
1929 . . . .. .. . . •.• •. •... . .. . .. 1 20 ,745 
1930 
··········· · · ··-··-· · ·--
91 ,000 
1931 
··-··· · ·············-··· 
2 34.1 3 6 
1932 
·· · ·-· · ··-·······---···-
4 54 41 
Cancelled by 
for --J o nre of 
pr ior lien 
$74,992 
36,235 
37, 3 96 
6 7 .11 
77 .094 
ssignments 
too n1 ortga ge 
h old er~ 
$ 95 ,000 
1 08, 663 
2 30.:30 0 
:l :J 570 
427,200 
T otal 
$431 ,474 
265 .643 
35 696 
62 9 24 
9 59 ,135 
l\Iortgage~ are cancell d through forced ale g nerally in 
three 'vay . The fir. ,t m thod i by for clo. tlre of th mortgaa 
in qtle tion, the second by a jtlnior mortgage holder failing to 
r ecleem wh n a prior mortgage is foreclosed, and the third by tl1e 
a.~ io-nment of the land to th holder of the morto-age. A cla. 1 i-
fica tion of forced sale. for the la. t 5 year by th tl1ree me tho l . 
. ho,,., foreclo ure an l a~ \ iann1 nt. as of qt1al importance (tab! 
X V). Tl1e total of jtlnior mortgage cancellation throllgh for -
clo. tlre of prior lien i not a large item in a11y on of the 5 year.·, 
althot1gh it does explain a mall part of the l bt r auction. 
DISTRIBU·TION OF DEBT BY L E NDERS 
In any con ideration of l)Olicy r e pecting n1or gag iebt, th 
cliL·tribution of the total among h 'Tarious 1 nd r 1 i · a matt r of 
prime importance. Thi follo'v particular!. b catl~, l nder dif .. 
f r in th ir method of handlinO' clelinquer1t 1 an'. An in urance 
company for in tance, ha~ an ntirely liff rent financial tup 
than that of a depo it banlr · a11d both of the. , in titutions are as 
foreign to the federal lancl bank as they arc to each other. 
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Insurance companies on Oct. 15, 1932, were the large t holders 
of farm mortgages in the state with 42 percent of the total, ac-
cording to the 13-township figures. Thi · percentage represent 
450 million dollar. of the total estimated for the tate (see table 
XIX). On December 31, 1931, the e timated amount on the ba i 
of the 13 town hip was 4 1 million dollar , a close approxima-
tion to the total of 476 million obtained for that date by adding 
together the reports of all insurance companies. 
TABLE XXVI. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSTANDING DEBT BY 
LENDERS, 13 TOWNSHIPS 
Year as of Private Insurance Deposit Mt'g. co. Land 
D ec. 31 investors • banks Mi c. banks Total compantes 
1915 ...... 54 22 20 4 0 100 o/o 
1920 
----- · 
61 20 14 3 2 100 
1925 
------
43 32 15 3 7 100 
1930 -..... 32 39 15 2 12 100 
1932* .... 27 42 1 6 3 12 100 
*To. Oct. 15. 1932. 
Private investor come second to insurance companies with 
27 percent, or approximately 299 million dollars of outstanding 
mortgages on Oct. 15, 1932. Deposit banks, according to the 13-
township study, are third in the li t of lenders with 16 percent 
or 171 million dollar of the outstanding total for 1932. 
Land banks held 12 percent of the loan in the 13 town hips 
as of Oct. 15, 1932. Thi percentage when applied to the tate 
give a total of $132,000 000, an amount probably slightly under 
the actual figure for the tate because the Federal Farm Loan 
Board reported outstanding loans on Dec. 31, 1931, of $157,549,-
444.4 On the same date, the estimate based on the 13 townships 
was $146,043,000. 
The comparatively large amount of mortgages held by private 
investors and depo it banl\: deserves special m ntion becau e lit-
tle has b n known concerning the holding of the e lender . To-
gether the e two groups of lenders at the clo e of 1932 account 
for over 40 percent of the mortgages outstanding in the tate. 
Obviously, therefore, any remedial measure dealing with the 
low A F AR~1 ~'loRTGAGE PROBLEM 
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Fig. 9. Percentage di stribution of debt by lenders for the 13 to,vn hips ( 1915 to., 
Oct. 15, 1932 ) 
mortgage ituation ·hot1ll inclt1de be id ~ th in llrance com-
panie and land banlr.,, th otl1er two important group of 
l nd r . 
A11 indication of th cl1ange in position of I ncl r is furni h d 
bv fig. 9 and table X..t. I. The~ e how forth la.,t 10 y ar a d -
clining percentage of mortgage in the hand.· of private inve tor 
and an increa. ing 1)roportio11 being helcl by in. llranc compani · 
an l la11cl banks. Depo. ~it bani{ ancl 1nortcrag companie ho\v 
little cl1an in the sam }) riod. A fact cl arlJr ... t forth i tha 
privat in\ e:tor furni:l1 l the major portion of th hug in-
cr a in the mortgag cl bt ''Tl1ich tool{ plac in th y ar 1915-
1920. 'Vhen the.1 e original land purcl1a 'e loan~ came due any-
'vher e from 3 to 10 y ar later, insuranc co1npani and Ian l 
banl{ were on the scene to malre the rcnew·al loans. 
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CHAPTER FIVE-~iAR I-I, 1933 
Farm Mortgage Foreclosures 
BY WILLIA f G. MURRAY AND RONAI.D c. BENTLEY .. 
FORECLOSURES COMMON 
A diagno i of the foreclo, ure sit11ation re'' al low prices 
for farm prodllct and a large debt as the ~ali nt facts contrib-
tlting to the present crisis. Tl1is much is clear. Not so clear is 
the long struggle 'vag cl in 1he last 12 y ar.· by farm owner~ 
an l th ir creditor ag-ainst inadequate fa1 .. m incom . 
For clo, ure and l fi i n y jt1dgment. have b n a common 
oc urrence in Io''Ta in 1921. In the la. t 12 year 13 perc nt 
of tl1 farm lancl in Jo,Ya ha. been old bv ·h riff at foreclo tlr 
.. 
al ~ . Thi. i indi ate 1 b, r a study of all for clo. ure in l, 
COllnti ~ . In ~ orne ca. ·e~ tl1e ~·arne farm ha · been old twice or 
even three times in th 12-year period. Wh n a deduction i 
maclr o a to cotlilt h R farm onlv one ther till remains 
.. 
11 1 rc nt of the , tat 'vhich ha be n aff tecl by foreclo tlr , . 
In otl1 r ""ords on Otlt of 'T ry nine far~m., in Io"ra. ha been 
oil on or more time.· by the sheriff in th p riod 19~1-3~. 
Defi i ncy jt1dgm nt. ha.\ b n com1non lil\: 'vi. e; o\rer 52 p r- . 
cent of all foreclo tlr ~ i11c 1920 have re:t1lt d in a defici ncy 
j11l ~Inent against th farm owner. 
l\Iortga {Yes totalin~ , 27 million dollars ha v been cancelled 
by for clo~tlre action in Io,va in the c~l ar. 19.;.Jl-3.o.J. .An amOtlnt 
almo.,'t eq11ally a larg ha, been cut 011t b, T a .. ignm nt of Ian 1 
to mortgage holcl rv an l b}1 tl1e failttr of junior mortgacr 
holler to redeem tl1 lancl after the foreclo ·ur of a prior li n. 
At the end of 1932, ho\V v r, 1 billion dollar. of farm mortgag 
debt i 1 till outstanding on 45 perce11t of th farm land in th 
tate. 
oming as it doe., after 12 years of financial difficul tie , the 
pr ent impas e eo11~ titt1te a cri. is of riou. })roportion . Re-
r,re, ar exhatl t cl an l I rice of farm prodtict are near the 
lo,ve. ·t level of the ·tat , hi tory. 
'-
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First Mortgage Difficulties 
To some the problem is merely one of liquidating second and 
third mortgage orio-inating in the land boom. Careful study, 
however, of the developments since the intense land ale ac-
tivity of 1919-20 1 ads to a different conclu ion. The majority of 
the second and third mortgages contracted during the high 
land value years were cancelled in the period 1921-30. Since 
1930, mortgages in default have been chiefly first liens, held by 
conservative lending institutions. Although many of these loans 
arose out of land purchase transaction in the World War dec-
ad , they were not considered exces. ive during the year 1921-
30. In fact, lendino- agencies competed with each other to make 
first mortgage loan in these years. 
The extent to which conservative investors are involved is 
indicated by the recent increase in first mortgage foreclosures 
by insurance companies and land banks. Insurance companies 
loaned as high as $100 an acre on high-grade land during the 
period 1921-29. These loans were re tricted by the policy of 
the companies and by legal provision to first mortgages rep-
resenting not more than 50 percent of the value of the land. 
Federal and joint tack land banks were similarly re tricted 
and were also lending $100 an acre in the same years on the 
best land land which by these loans was valued at $200. 
Moreover, these agencies were not merely holding a constant 
amount of such mortgages, they were taking on more. Out-
tanding farm mortgage loans of in urance companies and land 
banks in Iowa ro e from $386,000,000 in 1921 to $660,000,000 
in 1929. 
The 90's and 1932-33 Compared 
The distinctive features of the present debt problem are 
brought into full view1 by a comparison of the depression in 
the nineties with that at present. Let us look, therefore, at 
debts and the abilitv of the farmer to me t them in the two 
periods. 
In the depression of the nineties, $14 to $16 was the average 
debt per acre on mortgaged land (see fig. 10). In October, 
1932, the debt stood at $71 an acre on mortgaged land. 
F AR].f foRTGAGE FoRECLo. 1 RES 71 
Witl1 the clebt ·ituation clearly in mind, let tl examine the 
ability of tl1e farn1er to In(let hi~ obligation. . If income figt1rc~ 
'"' r available for the t'vo 1 riocl , no diffic11lty 'vot1ld be 11-
cotlnt r d in cleari11g tlp thi. point. It i \V ll l\:nO\v·n that tax ~~ 
'ver lo'' r in the early 11 riod and that pro ll1ctio11 ,,.a mailer, 
btlt no income figur : ar t o b had. Tl1 r for , it ,,~ill be nee :-
ar to fall back on })ric . 1 of farm prod 11ct. a~ , tl1 be t m an ~ 
of In a~ ·ttring the farm r \ 1 ability to meet fina11cial oblig·ation~ . 
Debt Per Acr~ ----
PrtCft lnd<tx 
0~--~----~--~----~----~--~--~~--~--~~ te9o '95 19oo •os 'to 'ts ·zo - 'zs '30 '35 
0 
Fig. 10. Debt per acre of lan d mortgaged and price indPx of farm products, 1 890 -
1932. ( 189 0-1914, Story ounty dnta ; 1915-1932 dat a for sta te as a v.rhole . ) 
Ilog.1 con~ titt1ted thfl major 011rce of in om i11 both periocl~\ 
A11 a,,. ,ra<Y of $3.95 a ht111lr d 'va r ecei'r d f r hog in central 
lo\Ya for tl1e J'ear 1 0- 9. Tl1e low )r a r. \V r 1 96-97 ,~vi tl1 
av· rage 11rice 1 of $2.9,- an l $; .-0 r e pecti,~ 1~·. Th high )'ear~ 
of th 1 cacle were 1 92-9:3 'vith price at $ . ~ 0 a11cl $5. 0. l11 
193.;J, on the other hancl tl1 average pric of l1og 'va $ .~0. 
For J antlary, 1933 farmers received only $2.40. 'fhis is lo,ver 
than in any month dt1ri11g the ninetie~ . 
attl , next to hoo-, in importance, old lolv r in the nineti 
than in r cent montl1 . ., . Th av rage pri for tl1 ninetie \Va ~ 
$3.15. Tl1i i lo\v comJ ar cl \\rith the av rag of $4.90 in 19, ~. 
E\ril cla)· l1ave finally fall n tlpon cattle J)ric 1 ' llO\V ver, for 
the F br11ary, 1933, pric \Va., only $3.90. 
or11, like hog , h ld a bctt r position in th nineties than at 
pr sent. In the nin tie an average of 26 cents a btl hel wa 
• 
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received for corn. In 1897 the price paid averaged only 15 cents 
and in 1892 an av rage of 42 cents was paid at local shipping 
points. Although the average price was 23 cents during 1932, in 
February, 1933, helled corn bTought only 12 cents a bu hel. 
In the ca e of butter, a imilarity with attle can be ob erved. 
During the nineties butter brought an average of 15 cents a 
pound. The year 1 90 was low with a price of 9 cent , 1892 
and 1894 were the high years with butter at 18 cents a pound. 
During 1932, on the other hand, butter brought 20 cents a 
pound and during February, 1933, 18 cents a pound. 
Prices for all farm products during 1932, on an index ba i , 
w re on a level with price received by farmers for their prod-
ucts in the ninetie . With 100 the index number for the ba 
years 1910-14 price averaged 56 during 1932 and al o 56 for 
the nineties. The low year in the decad was 1897 with an 
index of 46, and the high year 1893 with an index of 68. 
It is evident, on the basis of farm product prices, that the 
farm debt in 1933 i at least four times too large. 
What Happened from 1900 to 1920 
The question no'" ari e · as to how uch a heavy debt as 
$71 an acre was ever incurred against nearly one-half the farm 
land. What happened between the nineties and 1933 is shown 
in detail in :fig. 10. Price of farm products from 1900 to 1919 
climbed almo t without interruption and at a steadily increas-
ing pace. Only 4 out of the 19 years howecl a lower index than 
the year preceding. While this wa taking place, farm income 
wa rising and the value of land wa being pu hed up. Each 
y ar the farms bouO'ht with mortgage credit were mortgag d 
for more dollars per acre than in the preceding year. In :fig. 10, 
th two curves, prices of farm products and debt per acre of 
land mortgaged, rjse together. The period 1900-19, therefore, 
witne sed the conver ion of land value increases into mortgage 
d bt . 
What took place following the price rece ion in 1920, as 
well a: in previous depressions, is be t pre ented by a record 
of farm-mortgage fore lo ures . 
• 
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Foreclosures in the Past 
Foreclo tires were freq11ent in the year 1858-60 becau e farm 
o'vner had a stlmed mortgag in the boom year 1857 whicl1 
they cotlldn 't m t ltlrin~ the depre ion year that followecl*. 
So inten e wa the agitation at thi~ · tim for reli f that the 
state legi lature pa d a bill 'vhich became a law in l\1arch, 
1860, allowing 9 month ' time betv een notic of foreclo ure 
and action by the cotlrt. Thi act continuccl in effect tlntil 
Jan. 1, 1861. 
Other 'vave of foreclo 1llre came \vith low price in tl1e ev-
entie and late eighti ~ . No action wa tal{ n by the tate legi -
lature in either of th . ·e in ·tances, however. In the middle 
nineti . price d clin d again btlt for clo .. tlre ''rere not a eri-
Otl~ problem. Thi~ i explained by the fact that prices of farm 
proclllCt. dtlring the I r c ding _ r ar hal not l1een high. 10n. ·e-
qtl ntly the mortgage d bt load was not h avy nough to call ·e 
'vide.'pread defalllt . 
From 1900 througl1 19~0 foreclo tlre , of farn1 mortgages '\\'er e 
almo t 11nh arcl of. \ hat ca did com b fore the COllrt \V r 
larg ly di ptltes ancl ~'ettl ment of e ~tate . 
Foreclosures, 1921-30 
In 1921, according to fig. 11, the increa ·e in .foreclo ure indi-
catecl that the liqtli lation of the lancl boom had tarted. A~ 
much land vva foreclo. ed in 1921 a in th ix prec ding year . 
The catl e for th . e foreclo~ ure can readily b inferred from 
tl1e drop in pric of farm products a sho,vn in fig. 10. 
Tl1 rear that follO\Y 1921 a\V 110 I t-tli in the tea ly 
liquiclation of all n1ortgages 'vhich could 11ot be l1andled \vitl1 
price fluctuating b t\v en an index of 120 ancl 1-0. Slightly 
le than 1 percent of the farm land in the tate was fore-
clo eel in 1922 and 1923. In the next 4 year ,, ho,,rever, more than 
1 percent of the land in the tate \Va old annually by the 
he riff. 
*For eclo ure information for th years 1854-1914 com from a tudy of B oone 
and Story counties; for the years 1915-32 from a study of 15 counties . 
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Fig. 11. Pe:rcentage of all farm land in for eclosure and proportion of foreclosed 
land involved in deficiency judgments, 1915-32. State estimates based on data fr om 
15 counties. 
This figure of 1 percent a year may not seem large by itself, 
but when there is added to it another 1 percent or thereabo"uts 
representing land assigned by the owner to mortgage holders, 
the liquidation caimot be considered other than significant. 
By 1930 the liquidation of second and third mortgages was 
largely complete. If the junior mortgage debt (including sec-
ond, third and fourth mortgages) for 1915 is called 100 per-
cent, this type of debt had risen almost four times or to 390 
in 1921. At the close of 1930, however, it was back to 150. 
During this interval the decline in first mortgage debt was rela-
tively small. 
While junior mortgages were being foreclosed, scaled down 
or cancelled through assignment, insurance companies and land 
banks were expanding their farm mortgage holding . At the 
close of 1921, insurance companies had $334,000,000 in Iowa 
farm mortgages; in 1927, a total of $507,775,000. From 1927 
the total declined to $482,900,000 at the end of 1930. The Fed-
eral Land Bank of Omaha had $27,562,000 outstanding in Iowa 
at the close of 1921 and $82,465,000 at the close of 1930. Joint 
stock land banks had $24,999,000 in Iowa farm mortgages on 
Dec. 31, 1921, and $82,925,000 9 years later. These figures 
• 
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indicate that a large portion of the mortgage loans of the e 
compar1i was taken on dt1ring a. period of agricultt1ral depres-
• SlOn. 
First Mortgage Foreelosures, 1931-32 
Foreclo~ llre a ~'ignm 11t ancl caling do,vn of fir .. t mortgag ~ 
w r tln l r "Tay a . earl~T a. 19.;./5, but did not bulle large until 
1931. Tho e cases \vhicl1 '' r .1 ttled prior to 1931 includPd 
farm~ t on " rhich a heavy first mortgage loan ha l been made and 
farn1., held by non-operator "\\"l1o were in financial difficulties. 
Fir t n1ortgao-e liq11iclation '"'a the exception, not the rule. 
Witl1 the year 19 1 fir. ' mortgages tool{ tl1 c nter of the 
'tag . Tl1i~ "Ta call , 1 b)T the 'Tiolent drop in 1 rice' of farm 
prodt1ct. ''Thich occllrrecl in thi j'ear tl1e ind x leclining from 
127 to 6. l\Iore than 11/2 p rc nt of the lancl \Va ~ sold at for -
clo 'tire , ale. In the fir ·t 11 months of 1932, th itllation became 
still " rorse. Price drOJ)P cl to 56 in 1932 and foreclo~ ure 
claim l practicalljT 3 p rc nt of all farm Ian l. Tl1i bring tl · 
do,vn to the farm mortrrag~ 111oratorit1m i ll d b, r th governor 
of Io,, ... a in J anuar}T 19:3: , and the tand till enactm nt of the 
tate 1 gi lature pa . ed i11 tl1 follo\ving month*. 
~0~--------------------------------~------~--------~ 
Satf~f ied 
~0 .,__ ___ --1 
Judgrrutnt Amovht 
50 t--------4. 
_J 
840 ~-------------------------------------------~~~~ 
"-0 
~30 ~------------------------~~---------------~~~~ z 
0 
-
...J 
~20 ~-----------------~~~-4~~~~~~------~~~~ 
~ 
1915 't6 n ·~ '19 'Zo •za •z.z ·~ 'Z4 •zs ·z~ •z1 •za 'Z9 '30 ·~· ·~a ,.. 
Fig . 12 1\mount of judgincntr:; in forerlosure in I o,vn nnd amount of defi cien cy 
judgmen Ls, 1915 -32 . State st.imates ha s d on study of 15 ('ounti 1 S. • 
*E or full text of this Act see app ndix to this chapter. 
76 WILLIAM G. l\iuRRAY AND RoLAND C. BENTLEY 
Changes in the number of foreclosure have been accom-
panied by similar changes in amount of mortgage debt can-
e lled by foreclosure action (fig. 12). While few loans were cut 
out by foreclosure in the years 1915-20, in the years ince 1920 
approximately 327 million dollars has been involved in judg-
m nt handed down by the courts. From 1922 through 1930, 
20 to 25 million dollars annually was the average for the state. 
In 1932, up to Dec. 1, 68 million dollars, it is estimated, was 
defaulted and cancelled through foreclosure sale. If figures 
w re available for the entire year, the result would probably 
show upwards of $75,000,000, or $759,000 to a county. 
Theer appears to be no region in the tate that ha been 
exempt from foreclosures. This is evident from fig. 13, a map 
showing the 15 counties for which foreclo ure information wa 
obtained for the la. t 18 years. The first vertical bar in each 
county represents the acreage involved in foreclosure in the 
5-year period 1921-25, the next bar for the following 5-year 
period 1926-30, and the third bar for the 2-year period 1931-32. 
-
........ 
••• 
...., .. 
" 
'· 
Fig. 13 . Acr eage in forcclo ure by periods in 15 counties, and proportion of for e-
clos d acr eage involved in defi ci ncy judgments in 14 counti es, 1921-1932. (See 
table II in Appendix.) 
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The darl{ shaded portion. represent the percentage of the acre-
age 011 which deficiency jt1clgments were sect1recl. This subject 
of d fici ncies will be di ctl. ~ ed in a late1 .. s ction of this chapter. 
To r tt1rn to the map 1larl{e, Cerro Gordo Gtlthrie and Han-
cocl{ cot1nti lead in tl1 p rc ntage of land for clo. ·ed. edar 
Boone and Cheroltee cot111ti . , at the oth 1.. ncl of the li t had 
r latively few foreclo. ·llr . Three importan r a ·on a.ccot1nt 
for the variations amo~ng counties. First, the amount of land 
ptlrcha during the 1910-20 period varied a~ bet~en counties; 
econd, in orne counti tl1e ability and \villingne~ s of farm 
O\vner~ to hang on to tl1 jr fa.rm excee 1ed that in other coun-
tie · ancl thi1 .. d, the a\ ig11m 11t of land to mor ·crao- holler toolr 
th place of foreclo~ tlr in orne counties mor han in other . 
In the la t 2 year , it 'viii b noted, th r ha,re been as many 
foreclo tlre a in itl1er of the two prec cling 5-year period . 
Thi. i the result of tl1e dra~ ftic price drop of 1931-32 which 
cat1ght farm o-vvner ill-prepared to meet st1cl1 a crisis. In 1921 
fi11ancial re erves enabl d ma11y farm O\vn r. to hold on, 'vhile 
in 19' 1 r er,re wer larg ly xhau ted. 
Who Did the Foreclosing? 
Private in\"e tor~ , l po. it banlr and morto-ag companie clid 
mo t of the foreclo ,ing of farm mortgages in tl1e years 1920-25 
(fig. 14). As wa. mentioned previously tl1e e were the year· 
"h n junior mortgage. 1 'v r foreclosed. l\1any of the seconcl 
an l third mortgag ari ·in('/' Ollt of land tran. a tion. ' ere h l i 
b3r pri,rat in,~e tor a ~roll!) '' hich inclucle · form r owner of 
land. 
From 1926 on, a n ''' grolll) of mortgage holcl r~ ri e in iin-
portance. Thi grotlp inclucles institutio11al in,re 'tors who e 
mortgages are limitecl to first mortgage~ . 'fhe in titutions are 
the in urance com1 ani ~ , the Federal LanJ Bank and joint 
tocl\: land banlc . In 1923 thi~' grotlJ) a cot1nt cl for only 17 
p rcent of all foreclo tlr .~, in 1930 for 45 p rcent and in 1932 
for 73 p rcent. 
Th hift from privat in'r . tor ancl l !)0 it bank to in ur-
anc com1 anies and land ba11k i ft111da1n·· ntal to an und r-
tanding of present foreclo~'tlr problems. lt r 11rc cnt a tran i-
tion from liquidation of junior mortgag clebt 1 to liquidation 
• 
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of debts that were considered by lending institutions as anything 
but speculative. 
Deficiency Judgments Increase 
In all but one of the la t 12 year , each ucceeding year has 
witne sed a larger proportion of foreclosur s resulting in defi-
ciency judgments. In 1921 only 26.5 p rcent of the foreclosure 
sales ended with the land bid in for less than the judgment 
against it. In 1926, the percentage bid in for less than the 
judgment amounted to 44 percent and finally in 1932 over 74 
percent were bought with a deficiency r maining. Thi · trend 
toward more deficiency judgments i pictured in fig. 11. 
100 
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20 
0 
1921 192~ 
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' • 
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Fig. 14. Percentage distribution of acreage foreclosed by lenders, 15 counties, 1921-
1932. 
A deficiency judgment can be made clear by an example. A 
mortgage for $16,000 on 160 acres i foreclosed. The total 
amount again t the land at the time of foreclosure sales i 
$17 500. This includes the original judgment allowed by the 
court of unpaid prindpal, interest and taxes, plus intere t and 
cost since the case was started. At the foreclosure sale, the 
sheriff sells the land to the mortgage holder on a bid for $15,000. 
As a result, a deficiency of $2,500 stands against the person 
or persons who arc liable on the original note for $16,000. 
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Fig. 15. Percentage distribution of acreage involved in deficien cy judgmen ts hy 
lenders, 14 counties, 1921-19a 2. 
In r cent year parti tllarly ince tl1 a], nt of in tlranc 
COinpanie d ficienC}' jll ]!Ym nt~ ha,re not b on }arO' in amOllllt. 
Tl1 p11rpo. e of th l i i lo''?i r tl1an th jt1l~111 nt ha be n to 
mal{e po~ ~· ible the appoi11tm n of a rec i'r r :o l1at an eqlliva-
1 nt of rent can b obtainecl from th prOJ) rty cluring tl1 
~rear of reclemption. F11rtl1er, this practic In(\ans the mortgag 
hold r avoid bidding an amollnt which inclllle~ accumulate 1 
int re~ t and taxe in ad lition to the prin ipal of the mortgage. 
Th 11 accllmtllated int r :t in . tlch ca es 'vill not sho\V up in th 
con1pa11~. ' incom acco11n . 
Th practice of e tlrino- deficiency jlldgtn nt~ ao-a.in t farm 
owner~· in foreclo tire l1a be n common 'vitl1 all len ling 
ag nci , (fig. 1-.) Th variations bet,,~een l nd rs follo,v.1 
clo, ly the. ituation witl1 respect to all foreclostlr . In the early 
v ar , 11p to 1928, J)rivat ill\' . tors and cl J)O,,it banlr wer tl1e 
main partie obtaining cleficiency juclgment . In recent y ar~ 1 
1 artictllarly ince 19 0, jn,'llrance comJ)anie. ancl land bani\: 
ha,,e pp d into the l ad. 
SOLUT I ONS 
rrhe d i. cu sion th u far has et forth two fact : Fir t, that 
the debt i. approximately four time too large to be supported 
80 WILLIAM G. M URRAY AND ROLAND c. BENTLEY 
by the present price level; second, that the debt now outstand-
ing doe not represent junior mortgages but chiefly first mort-
ga(J'es originating or renewed in the period 1921-2.9. 
The problem now i what should be clone with the debt out-
tanding, 91 percent of which is first mortgage debt. The major 
portion of thi fir t mortgage debt is owed to institutions who 
in turn are obligated to bond, policy and deposit holders. In 
February, 1933 the mortgage holdings of different lenders were 
estimated as follow : 
Group I. 
Insurance companies ...................................... $ 450 000,000 45% 
Land bank ...................................................... 140,000 000 14% 
Deposit banl<s ................................................ 160,000,000 16% 
Group II. 
Private invc tors ............................................ 250,000,000 25% 
Total ........................................................ $1,000,000,000 100% 
The lenders have been listed in two groups. The fir t in-
clude those having contract obligation to set again t their 
mortgage loans. The second includes private investor g ner-
ally without off etting contracts to other partie . This ques-
tion of offsetting contract obligation ha been rai eel becau e 
it plays such an important part in all discussions of mortgage 
relief. 
As to what should be done, three points of view and accord-
ingly three method of action pre ent themselves. The fir t, 
stripped of its qualifications, is the rai ing of farm income uffi-
ciently to make po ible the payment of interest on pre nt 
debts. The econd is turning over all heavily encumbered land 
to the mortgage holder . And the third, an alternative to the 
second, is scaling down debts to a ba is where the interest can 
be paid out of present income. 
At pre ent, with foreclosures being held in abeyance until 
March, J 935, no one of these policie i in effect. It would be 
po sible, of cour , to continue thi moratorium indefinitely, 
allowing mortgage holders whatever the farm produce , the 
equivalent of rent in place of interest. A number of ingenious 
plans have been devised to carry mortgages on this ba i , one 
of them being the adjustment of payments to the price level 
of farm products. But the chief purpose of recent leg· lation 
F AR~f 110RTGAGE FORECLOSURE 81 
has be 11 to allow time for public policy to be determined along 
on of the three line indicated. 
Raising Farm Income 
The fir t plan call~ for income and pric -rai i11g mea tlr 
t1ch a~ the ·v·oltlntary (lorn tic allotment plan, r mo,~al of Ian l 
from culti,,ntion by gov rnment lea ing, i11flation ru by rec1t1C-
tion in the amount of gol(l in the dollar, and redt1ction in artifi-
cial barri rs to international trade. Althot1gh nt1merous cliffi .. 
ct1ltie. i • orne of th m of a ~ rious nature, nltl t be O\'ercoln 
b for . tlcce ful x ct1tion of any incon1e-rai~·i11g ~ cheme can b 
accompli hed, ther i. · no qtl ,tion a to th r lief that \VOtlld 
follo'v immediately upon tl1 re tora. ion of ~ ay, the 1925-29 
pric l ,, l of farm pro 1llct. ·. To bring farn1 1 ric back to thi 
1 'el 'vot1ld olve the probl m more qt1icl\:ly a11cl more effectively 
than any other method. B catl e of the . ati. 'factory character 
of the income-rai ing sollltion, it i plac cl fir t on the li t, in 
pit of the difficulti ~ , '' hicl1 . tand in its ,,.3)7 • 
Transfer Land to Mortgage Holders 
Tl1 · cond solt1tio11 iL th tran fer of tl1 land from d 1 tor 
to cr clitor. Thi ha b 11 talcing place throt1gh foreclost1re a11 l 
a , ignments in Iowa for a 11 riod of 12 y ar ·. In 1931 and 1932 
tran fers of this kind increa ed at an alar1ni11g rate. In ca. ·e 
of for clo tlre titl lo s not 11a. tlntil one y ar after the Ian 1 
i ' 'Oll by the her iff at for lo. ·tlre al . I-I 11 th large amount 
of Ian l in,Tolved in for lo tlre in 1932 \vill pa s into th 
han l· of 1nortgag l1ol r: in 1933. A .· fig . 14 i11dicate in tlr-
anc companie an 1 la11d bani{ accot1nt for 7 1) rcent of all 
la11d in foreclo ur in 1932. This mean tl1e~,e institt1tions are 
to get the bullr of th lancl transferred in 1933. 
The main drav bacl{ to mortgage holcl r. · tal{ing over la11cl 
occtlr, ,~vhere an O\vn 1· i. operating th farm \vith, at lea~·t, 
averag ucces . For th ere lit or to a ... u1n 'v11er hip mean 
an economic \Va ~te . Fir ·t of all, a upervi. ·ion xpen e i acl ] cl. 
To manage their land, l n ling institt1tio11 1nt1 t employ cap-
able fa rm manager~. alarie and expen · ~ , for the~ e men ar 
no trivial item with fari11 income a lO"\V a..~ it i . With adequate 
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supervision, management will amount to 50 cents an acre, which 
is equivalent to 5 percent on a $10 an acre mortgage. 
In the econd place, absentee owner hip makes for addi-
tional expen e in connection with maintenance of the farm. 
The farmer living on his own farm naturally takes an intere t 
in keeping the farm in good condition. Work on fence , build-
ings, water system, soil improvement and weed eradication, 
he will and can do himself. On the rented farm this is not 
always the case. Here the landlord often faces the responsi-
bility of seeing that this work is done and of paying to have it 
done. 
A final argument again t land tran fer i the social lo s that 
follows : A farm is a home as well as a business. If many of 
the owner-operator farmers are uprooted from their farm an l 
placed at the foot of the agricultural ladder, the result would 
be a distinct loss to rural life. 
Debt Reduction 
Debt reduction the third plan, has di. advantages also. The 
arise chiefly from the nature of the debt . The debts are large 
and in addition are h ld for the most part by insurance com-
panies, land bank and savings bank . The e in titutions, as 
pointed out earlier, have contracts with policy, bond and de-
posit holders which call for specific payments of money at 
some future time. If caling down of farm mortgages should 
tart, the same policy would be demanded by city dweller· for 
the mortgage on their homes, and by other debtors who are 
finding it difficult to meet interest and principal payments. 
A further argum nt against debt scaling is the difficulty 
encountered in deciding to what level the mortgage should be 
reduced. If a mortgage for $12,000 on 160 acres is in default, 
what reduction would be required to bring about a satisfactory 
olution ~ In 1929 with farm prices at a level 4 7 percent above 
pre-war, this debt, we will say, W'a not too large. Today with 
the price level 57 p 1·c nt below pre-war, a debt of $3,000 i all 
that can be handled providing taxe are not heavy on thi farm. 
One way to figure the maximum mortgage load is to u e 
cash rents. According to cash rent figures, the average farmer 
on average land in Iowa paid $5.80 an acre rent with prices at 
• 
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100 (the a' rerage for 1910-14).* With price~· a· they were in 
1932, at 56, this farmer rould pay only $3.25 an acre, or with 
price. at 43, a~ they w r in Febrtlary 1933, only $2.50 an acr . 
On thi, ba. i a 160-acr farm 1· tt1rned only $520 above operat-
ing xp n, e in 1932. llt of tl1i sum hal to come taxe , up-
keel) of th farm and int r t on the mortgao- . Taxe. and up-
ke p ''rot1ld ab orb $300 1 a\ying $220 for int re t or 5 percent 
on a mortgage of $4,400. On the ba is of price~ in February, 
1933, and vvith taxe, a11d lll)l{eep reduced to $250, only $150 
woltld be left for interest, 'vhich is equival nt to 5 percent on 
a mort ao-e of $3 000. 
Altl1ot1o-h a $3 000 mort ag i all that an a,· rao-e quart r 
ection farm can 1 upport no,,r, the arne farm clllring the y a.r. 
1924 to 1930 carried a $1-;.J 000 mortgage asil, . I11 the e earli r 
year a~,ll r nt a''ferag(-ld $ .00 an acre. For th farm in qu .. 1 -
tion, thi~, meant $1,280 total income Otlt of whicl1 came not 
more than $400 for taxe. a11d llpkeep. Tl1 r~mainder, $8 0, 
wa~ amJ)le to cover th int r . t of $600. 
Th en~ e le crib l abo·v nla}r eem rat d. Trtl it 
doe .. 11 t repre lent tl1 x 11tional farn1 r 'vl1 i11 ntlitJ1 ha,' 
nabl l l1im to pro 1ltc 1nor cheapl~y· than l1i ~, n io-l1bor . But 
th 1 bt problem 1o not c nt r on tl1e Ollt,,tanding farm r. 
It hing , on the ability of th majority of th farm r to obtai11 
. 'tlfficjeJ1t income to pa)l' OJ)Cratii1g expen ·e ·, taxeH an(l intere. t.. 
To tall{ to mortga<r l1oli r about r cllicing 111 face valll 
of tl1eir mortgage, 7- p r nt, fro1n $12~000 to $3,000, i illogi-
cal. Tl1 repl3r of tl1 n1ort~age l1older i '\Vl1at r cotlr e " -ill 
'"'e l1a, .. e if price and farm income ri e in tl1 n • t f \V year. •? '' 
Th an.''" r i that th y 'vottld ha\re littl cha.nc of rai ing th 
princi1 al of the mortgag tlnle ., tlch a proc dllr " ra provid {l 
for in a contract drawn llJ) when the mortgag wa redt1ced. 
If thi~, last provi 1ion i, made, then in })lace of Olltright debt 
r clttction a ne\v plan i · 1llb tituted calling for a ljll ·'tment of 
J)riilCii)al and inter ·t pa)'m nts to income from h prop rty. 
Thi · m thod i more f a ·ibl than unconditional scaling lo,vn 
of 1 t . . 
*MiJlard P eck. A Plan for Adjusting Cash Rent to Changes in th Prices of Farn1 
Products. l lwa Agr. Exp. ta., Bul. 295. Page 207. Octol> r, 1932 . 
84 WILLIAM G. MuRRAY AND RoLAND C. BENTLEY 
A final argument against the debt reduction or land transfer 
solution is the fact that by arrangements of this kind no relief 
is afforded the mortgage holdeT. Th main difficulty i inade-
quate farm income. To cancel the debt or give the land to th 
mortgage holder does not increase the income from the land. 
In fact, many lending in titutions are findinO' it difficult to ob-
tain any income over taxes and upkeep on farms taken over 
through foreclosure or assignment. 
Regardless of the arguments against debt reduction, unle 
income rises, there is no escaping the adju tment of debt . And 
if uch a course is nece ary on a large cale, what plan should 
be followed? If for example, at the end of the present 2-year 
moratorium, income is still at the pre ent low level, what mean 
should be provided for handling the farm mortgages in default. 
Three fundamental propositions underlie the satisfactory ad-
justment of debt cases. First, each case must be considered as 
an individual one, on its own merits. In other words, no simple 
plan calling for a r duction of all debt by a certain percentage 
will prove succes ful. Circum tances in each ituation affect the 
type of adjustment needed. Second, debt adjustment can b t 
b completed by arbitration, which means the appointment or 
selection of boards to bring about a settlement between debtor 
and creditors. Councils of this kind have been organized already 
in some Iowa counties. Third, some basis for adjustment should 
be adopted; as, for in tance, reduction in line with prices, or in 
line with capacity to pay. 
The most succe ful method for debt adju tment, therefore, 
is the hearing of individual cases by county credit council or 
boards. These county credit council , compo ed of public pir-
ited men, including at least one lawyer, hear the claim of the 
debtor and his crediitor . After studying the e claims care-
fully, they outline an agreement satisfactory to all parties. Such 
a procedure, of cour e, is not as simple as it ounds becau e 
farm owners often have several creditors who e claims are dif-
ficult to appraise. Moreover, what is agre able to one creditor 
may not be to another. Nevertheles , there is no easy solution 
to the knotty problem of debt adjustment; and what has been 
described comes as close to a solution as is possible under our 
present system of contracts. 
FARM MORTGAGE FORECLO URES 85 
APPENDIX 
Thi · ction contain the l\ ortgage 1\ioratoritlm Acts of 1860 
a11cl 1933. E ·ver)r borro\ver and lender hOlllcl ~ tt1cly carefully 
the act of 1933. Follo,,ring tl1e copy of the r c n act, tables are 
pr ~'en d ~·hawing the for clo~ ure ~ ituation from 1915 to Dec. 1, 
1932 in 15 countie . Ta.bl . VII and I give the Dtlm-
ber of foreclost1re and amot1nt of debt involv d by lende .. 
Table~ X VIII and X . cla . sify the acreag~ in foreclosure by 
cou11ti~.. Tables X.£ I a.ncl XXII ho'v tl1e cleficiency judg-
ment~ bJ' l nder and p rc ntage of foreclostlr al . which have 
r e. tllte l in cleficiencJ7 jt1clO'ment . . 
Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1860 
EC''.riON 1. Fo1·eclos~tre . That i11 actions now conltnenccd, or which may 
hereafter be coinmenced, in any of the courts of thi& state, f<>r the fore-
closur e of any mortgage or 111ortgagcs, the defendants shall not be held to 
answer ther in until the xpiration of nine month~ after the date of the 
rvi e of the original notic in uch actions on the first d fenclant served, 
any pro vi ion in any law or ]a 'v e11acted by the g 11 ral assembly a.t its 
pre ~nt e ion to th c ntrnry notwith tanding. 
ECTION 2. From and aft r th first day of ,Janunry one thousand eight 
hundr d and sixty-one~ thi act hnll ea e to 1 in fore , and the clas of 
a ·tion 111 11 t ion eel in this a t ha 11 lJ governed by rule of pra ~tice concern-
ing u h a tions in force at that tin1c. 
E TION 3. Take Effect. This a ~t to take effe t and 1 e in force from and 
after it publication in the Iowa tate Register and th Io,va State J<>urnal, 
n wspaper s published at D s Moin s. 
This bill having remained with the Governor throe days, Sunclay excepted, 
th o General Assembly being in cs iotl, has becon1e a law this 21st day of 
March, 1860. 
Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1933 
E TION 1. The go~ernor of th tate of Iowa hnvi11a d "'clared that an 
en1 r g 11 ~ r now exists, and th g n ral as, en1bly having cl tern1ined that su h 
n1erg n y does exist, whi h i g nernl throughout th stat , and that th 
saf ty and futur e welfar of ·be tate as a whole is endanger d thereby, th 
g n ral a. en1bly acting un d r t,he power res rvecl by the people of Iowa, 
doc herehy nact the following: 
SE 'TION 2. In all action for tho foreclosure of real stat mortgages or 
d ds of tru t now pending i11 'vhich decree has not b ~e11 ntered, and in all 
actions her after commen~ 1 for th for clo ur of r al tat mortgage or 
deeds of trust, or <>n note ur d thereby, in a.ny ourt of: record in the 
tate of Iowa while this a t i in ffe t the ourt upon the application of 
tho 01vn r or owner of u 11 r al ~tat or person lin 1 l on aid m<>rtgag s 
or de cls of tru t, or not cur d ther by, who ar defe11dat1t in said cau }. 
a11d not in default for wa.ut of pl ading or appearanc shall, unless upon. 
hearing on aid application good 'au e is shown t.o the contrary, order such 
causa continu ed until March 1st, 1935, or so long a~ this act is in effect, 
pr{)vicling however, that i11 all auscs now pending in which default has been 
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entered but no decree signed, said owner or own rs of such real estate or 
persons liable on said mortgages or deeds of trust, or notes ecured thereby, 
shall have ten days from the taking effect of this act in which to file said 
application for continuance, and upon such order of continuance the court 
shall make order or orders for pos ession of aid real ta.te, giving pref r-
enee to the owner or owner in possession, d termine fair rental term to 
be paid by the party or partie to be in posse ion and the application and 
distribution of the rents, income and profits from aid real estate, and mak 
such provision for the pr servation of said property a.s will be just and 
equitable during the continuance of said cause, which order or orders sl1a1l 
provide that such rents, income or profits shall be paid to and distributed by 
the Clerk of the District CoUTt of the county in which said suit is pending, 
and further pTovide that in such distribution taxe , insma.nce, cost of maht-
tenance and upkeep of said real estate shall b paid in the priority named, 
and any balance di tribute i as the court may further direct; provided, how-
ever, that the couTt shall, upon a substantial violation of its said ord r or 
orders, or for other good and ufficient cause, set a ide said order or con-
tinuance and the cau o hall proceed to trial a by law now provided, the 
provisions of this act to the ontrary notwith tanding. 
SECTION 3. For the purpose of the admini tration of this act, the court 
may in all cases suggest and recommend conciliation. 
SECTION 4. All acts and parts of act.s in confli t with this act are sus-
pended while this act is in effect. 
SE TION 5. From and after the first day of March, 1935, this act hall 
cea e to be in force. 
SE TION 6. This a t b ing brought forth to meet an emergency through 
the police power of the stat a.nd being deemed of immediate importance 
shall be in full force and effect after its pa age and publication in the Fort 
Dodge Messenger, a newspaper published at Fort Dodge, Iowa and tho 
Sibley Gazette-Tribune, a newspaper published at ibley, Iowa. ' 
(This bill was signed by the governor Feb. 8, 1933.) 
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TABLE XXVII. NUMBER OF FORECLO URES BY LENDEI IN 15 COUNTIE . 
1915-1932* 
Year 
1915 . •.•.••... 
1916 ... .. ...... 
1917 
·· ····-··· 
1918 .. .. ... ....... 
1919 ...... ........ 
19.;.#0 
····· -···· 
1921 .... ..... ... .... 
1922 ... .............. 
1923 .................. 
1924 
·····-·-·· 
1925 
-·· ·· ··· -· 
1926 .......... ... 
1927 
··· ·· ·· -· · 
192 
----·· ·--· 1920 ............ 
1930 
····- · ···· 
1931 ·· ········ 
1932 ** ....... 
C1J 
$~ ~~ 
> C) 
·- > J... ;::: P-t • f"'1 
1 
23 
29 
11 
17 
17 
0 
215 
173 
235 
205 
203 
205 
136 
97 
97 
155 
217 
Total ..... .... . 2123 
P rcent -·· ··- 45.3 
cum (.)<1> 
~·~ 
cdd 
M("j 
::s~ 
u.S 
s::l 0 
t-10 
2 
.............. 
.............. 
................ 
3 
···--····· 
1 
7 
7 
15 
31 
46 
37 
76 
65 
72 
8~ 
225 
465 
1132 
24.2 
...,.;> 
·-CIY om A~ Q)s= 
~~ 
3 
7 
.. ..... . ..... . 
1 
5 
2 
4 
29 
GO 
77 ga 
77 
65 
71 
64 
45 
50 
71 
7 
08 
17.3 
*The 15 counties are listed in table XXX. 
**To Dec. 1, 1932. 
C12 
<l)Q) 
~·~ ~d 
b.O a3 
.....:.~ 
~a 
~g 
4 
1 
·-····-· 
4 
1 
3 
1 
6 
21 
26 
40 
39 
22 
19 
12 
10 
9 
16 
15 
245 
5.2 
.~ 
~ 
,.....d 
ce,.o 
J-1 Q) "' ~~ 
~-= 
5 
1 
.. ........... 
.. ......... .. 
.. ........... 
-· ·-···· 
............ 
............ 
-·------
1 
.. ........ 
4 
2 
2 
5 
4 
3 
17 
69 
107 
2.3 
,!(ell (.),!:d 
0~ 
....,ca 
rn,J:J 
....,:» 
~"d 
·- ~ 0~ ~-
6 
.. ....... . 
.. ........ . 
.. ... .. ... 
.. ........... 
... ........ 
--------
............ 
1 
1 
4 
8 
10 
9 
12 
18 
11 
51 
7 
203 
4.3 
ttJ 
::s 
0 
<1) 
S::ta 
dJ.-4 
-o 
..-- ~
ClJoo 
c...cu 
en 
..... > 
~-~ 
7-8 
····-·- · 
--------
2 
-·····-· 
3 
1 
2 
7 
7 
3 
7 
4 
5 
1 
3 
9 
8 
5 
67 
1.4 
........ 
ce 
....., 
0 
8 
31 
29 
18 
26 
16 
24 
124 
311 
300 
406 
3R6 
343 
3 7 
1)9'"" 6J .) 
249 
261 
543 
936 
46 5 
100 
T1\BLE X III. PERCENT GE li' TOTAL ACRE.AGE I FORECLO URE A rD 
PER ENTAGE OF TOTAL .ACREAGE INVOLVED IN DEFICIE 'Y JUDGI\IE ""T 1 
BY PEI~IOD , 1921-32 
ounty 
Boone ..................... . 
C dar . -·······-----··· 
erro Go1·do ---·· -·- ---· 
'heroke ··-·······- ·- ---
larke ·-··-·····-·-·····-· 
.B,ay tte --····-· ·· ···--·----
T u th r i ...... . __ ... __ ... _ .. 
I I a nco c k .... ___ ....... . _-. 
Hnrri.~on ............... . 
Jeff r son ·············-----L i 11 n _ .. _ ._ ..... _ ._ ._ ... _ ... __ 
L~·on ........ ......... _________ _ 
~fontgont ry ........... . 
Pocahontas ............. . 
tory -- .. ---.. . -.... -.- ... .. -.... 
Average ............. . 
T otal n reng in percent 
1921-25 
2 .6 
2.6 
7 .0 
7 .0 
6 8 
~.6 
7.0 
4. 
6.7 
3.2 
3.5 
2 .4 
2 6 
3.5 
4.3 
4.28 
2 .1 
2. 1 
6.8 
G. 
n ' ) I • <> 
5.2 
4 .9 
7 . :l 
4 .9 
4.~ 
#l 2 
•J . 
2 0 
1 
57 
4 
4 ~31 
1931-32 
2 .1 
2.5 
f>. B 
5.8 
1 3 3 
3.7 
5 .8 
4 .5 
:3 
3.4 
2 .5 
54 
3 .7 
4 .7 
4.2 
4.39 
ficiency acreage in percent 
1921-25 
1 0:3 
1 23 
... .... 
....... 
4 .96 
1 02 
2.83 
1 .70 
') .... 
., .) -
1 .09 
.96 
.97 
1 .06 
1 .05 
1.62 
19~6-30 1 
. 73 
1.1 
4 9 
1.75 
3 R2 
3 .60 
2.27 
3.2 1 
1 6 
.9 
.96 
2.30 
.66 
1.97 
1931-32 
1 . 79 
1.99 
. ~ .... 
.. -. -. 
7 . 4 
2 85 
5.2 
4 .0 2 
3.14: 
3.01 
2 06 
4.15 
3 !1 4 
3 
3.t!7 
3 .3 
TABLE XXIX. JUDGMENTS IN FARM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BY LENDERS IN 15 COUNTIES AND ESTIMATED STATE TOTAL, 
1915·1932 
Estimated 
Year Prinlte In uran ce Deposit Mortgage Federal Joint stock Misc. Total 15 Total for 
invel'tor s • banks • land bank lan d banks investors coun ti es state compa111es compames 
1915 
··· ··· ··---- ----
$ 112,398 $ ... ..... .......... $ 126,959 $ 5 ,298 $ ....... .. .... ..... $ ... .. .. ....... ... . $-- -- -------------- $ 244,655 $ 1,524,200.65 
1916 
-- -- -··· ·-------
1 59 ,423 
---- ----·------- ----
·----- ----·· ·· ····· · --··· ··· -- ----·· ··· · 
------- -- ---------- -
----· ----· --- ------- ····----~-- -· -··· · ·· 159,423 993,205.29 
1917 
-- --------------
70,95 9 
-- -.----- .. ------. --
368 2 0,822 
··--- --------·-- ·-· · ········- -- -- ---···· 
455 92 ,604 576.922 .92 
191 8 
· ··········--·--
1 0 6.162 17 ,584 29 ,340 6 ,550 
---------------· ··- · 
·············-··-··· --- ·- --- -- --- -------
159,636 994,532 .28 
1919 
------ -----·----
20.496 
--·- -- ··· ··· ········ 
9 ,432 6 ,23 5 ••••••~•• • ••a• • ••••• 
······-- ·------·--·· 
1 ,307 37 ,400 233,438.10 
19 20 
-----··- ---- ----
59 .6 07 5 , 748 7 ,109 21,355 
--- ----------· ·· ·---
---- -- --------------
2 ,900 96,719 602,559.37 
1921 
--- -----·· ····--
960 .927 7 4 .143 260 ,396 44,015 
--- --··- ---------- .. 
---------- ------···· 
2 ,275 1,341, 756 8 ,3 59,139 .88 
1922 
···-···-·-·····-
2, 777 .242 85 ,4 8 7 442 ,300 110,519 
· ·-·-········· ···· ·· 
9 ,627 41 ,977 3 ,467 ,152 21,600 ,356 .96 
1 923 
·····-------- -· · 
2 ,2 4 6 ,847 204 ,541 87 7 ,9 74 182,3 7 4 15,916 16.2 04 92,7 45 3 ,636,601 22 ,656,024 .23 
1924 
············-·--
3 .140,0 93 425 ,85 1 997,994 392,517 
···· ·· ··· ·········· -
59 .17 6 40 ,599 5 ,056,230 31,500 ,312 .90 
1925 
----------------
2 373 487 
' ' 
613,218 923,891 244,525 4 3, 117 90,4 02 96 ,595 4 ,38 5 ,235 27,320,014.0 5 
1926 
·---·-··--·---- -
2 ,039 .95 9 610,974 5 81,860 128, 771 12,399 1 34, 155 23 ,367 3 ,531 ,485 22,0 01,151.55 
1927 
---- --·--··-···· 
2,16 7,519 1 ,115,026 655 ,343 107,041 9 ,06 1 150,25 1 88,064 4 ,292,305 26,741,060.15 
1928 
---- --- -······· · 
1 .4 8 6 .573 1,0 38.303 665 ,5 1 3 72,973 36 ,3 89 117,977 11,816 3 ,429,544 21 ,3 66,059.12 
1929 
----·-·-·--·- -- -
1,115.028 1,057.947 307,2 2 4 152,1 30 42 ,440 269 .545 21,615 2 ,965,929 18,477,737 .67 
1930 
-······ -- ·· ·· ··· 
744,090 1 ,261,225 402,191 87,925 30 ,0 15 1 29 ,4 2 7 72,967 2,727,840 16,994,443.20 
1931 
--·- ··-· ·----··· 
1 ,278 ,951 3 .3 74,9 28 731,819 292,080 190 ,844 6 85,529 62 ,050 6,616,201 41 ,218,932 .23 
1932 "' 
···-·-·-·· ·· ·· 
1,689 ,944 6 ,896 ,158 576, 705 135,121 6 99 ,720 1 ,04 2, 119 31 ,084 11,070,851 68 ,971,401.73 
Total 
···- ···· ···· --- -
$22, 549 ,7 0 5 $16,781,133 $ 7 ,596,418 $ 2,010,251 $ 1,079,901 $ 2,7 0 4,412 $ 5 8 9,816 $53 ,311,636 $ 332,131,492.28 
Percent 
-- ---··· ·- ·· 
4 2.3 3 1.5 14.2 3. 8 2.0 5.1 1.1 100 
*To Dec. 1, 1932 . 
00 
00 
- -
TABLE XXX. ACREAGE INVOLVED IN FARM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN 15 COUNTIES. 1915-32* 
~ 
0 ~ 
~ a.. 
~ Q) 
0 Q) ~ = ~ 8 
" 
Q,) ~ ~ C) 0 0 0 Year ~ 4) ~ ...... 0 JJ cJJ bD <D ~ 0 .... ·- J-4 0 ~ .... (.) ~ ~ d as J.c Q,) .c L4 Q,) ~ J-4 ,_ ~ ~ ~ 0 rc; 4) ~. ~ ~ ~ 0 .... cd ::s Ct5 ("'" ~ 0 0 Q,) Q,) 
.d 
-
~ p:: '-4 ..:,) ..... ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 C:· C"b ~ \ ~ H H 
' 
1915 
-------· 
77 240 560 718 960 370 88 ............... 503 238 397 32 240 
1916 
---------
246 80 174 72 974 382 80 200 130 317 398 .............. ········•• 
1917 -..... --- .. ....... .. .. 4 120 390 ···------- 10 400 ···-·-···· 400 502 ·····-··-- 235 ............ ········--
1918 
-.. ------
10 80 505 
--········ 
520 160 359 640 808 290 747 ........ ... ... ....... . ... 
1919 
··-··-·· 
40 ........... 200 320 120 ·-···· ··· · ····-·--··· ·•········ 335 102 220 134 ·······-·· 
1920 
----- .... 
292 ........... 160 160 ............ 40 85 320 902 95 260 ........... •• ·•··•· · · 
1921 ........... 1, 61 405 1,044 520 1 .800 744 2,589 1,630 3.373 645 1,892 134 959 
1922 
---·-··-
2,951 1,570 2,600 2,962 5,110 1 ,440 7,013 3,118 4 222 1 , 714 3,333 2,635 1,690 , 
1923 
··-··· · · 
2,250 1,400 3,740 2,997 4 ,459 2,222 5,876 4,543 3,315 1,912 3, 760 1,108 1,138 
1924 ........ ... 3,696 4 , 22 10,059 2,374 2,971 4,893 5,190 4,059 10,834 830 2,618 1, 773 2,335 
1925 .......... 3,299 717 6,874 1,560 3,452 2,307 4,770 3,725 7,091 3,146 2,942 3,049 914 
19~6 
·-·--·-· 
1,904 520 5,012 2, 354. 4 ,062 4,826 4,723 4 ,633 5,600 1,839 1,476 1,574 1,091 
1927 
···--·-· 
1,913 2,324 6,054 2,935 2,910 4,264 3,676 8,336 5,223 1,291 1.796 2,755 1,216 
1928 
-- --- ·-· 
1,575 1.448 3,401 920 3,615 4,253 3,574 5,443 5,366 2,899 2,921 1,700 954 
1929 
·-----·-· 
1,020 1,959 2,965 1,206 4 ,327 5,656 2,730 3,541 3,0 0 1,9 6 4,380 520 520 
1930 
·-------
823 977 5,914 1,567 3,977 4 ,172 2,883 3,608 1, 751 2,855 2,491 745 910 
1931 
---·-··· 
1 433 2,735 6 ,0 53 4 ,722 18.625 5,9 36 8 ,357 6,819 4.355 4 ,220 2,896 8,000 3,045 
1932** 
-- ... -
5, 727 6,0 9 14,049 6,066 15,860 10,664 12,653 8,940 11,904 4,620 7 ,419 11,553 6,875 
Total 
··· · --··· 
29,117 25,486 69,754 31,453 73,752 52,729 64,646 59,955 69,294 2 ,999 40,181 35,712 21,887 
Percent of 
nll land . .. 8 .3 7.3 20.2 8 .8 28.4 11.9 17.9 17.0 16.1 11.2 9.7 9.9 8.2 
*\Vhere a farm ''"as involved in more than one foreclosure in the same year, the ncr age was count d only once. 
**To Dec. 1 , 1932. 
CD 
~ 
....:> 
~ 
0 
.d t' _. 
"' .5 C) 0 0 ~ 0 
~ 00 E-t 
..... -... - I 120 J 
I 
4,5431 
275 ............ 3,328 
····--···· 
60 2,117 
····- -· --· 
8 4 ,127 
252 118 1 ,841 
········-· 
174 2,488 
439 781 18,816 
1,995 2,266 44,619 
2,026 3,330 44,076 
3,519 2,880 62,853 
4,924 6,046 54,816 
5 354 4,895 49,863 
6,088 5,736 56,517 
4 ,140 3,947 46,156 
2,526 1,088 37,504 
2,622 1,494 36,789 
4,773 4,162 86,131 
12,203 10,565 145,187 
51,136 47,670 701,771 
14.1 13.4 13.3 
~ 
b.O 
...,.ce 
d<D 
- ~ J.c ~ (,) ~ce 
()-
f.-4 tC 
4)...., 
~£ 
.09 
.06 
.04 
.08 
.03 
.05 
.36 
.85 
.84 
1.19 
1.04 
.95 
1.07 
.88 
.71 
.70 
1.63 
2.76 
3.3 
13.3 
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TABLE XXXI. NUMBER OF DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS IN FARM MORTGAGE 
E ORECLOSURE SALES BY LENDERS, 14 COUNTIES, 1915-32 
"' p 
GO 
..1(111 0 <Vrn rn ..!< t.)~ Ill 
"' 
t.)Q) IV IV s:l 
.£1'l i=!UJ <V '-' ~-- !:D·- -~ c! 1-< Year ~ s:l ..., ~s:l 11Jc! ..,o 
·- ~.0 .0 -o ~..., 1-< <;S 
"'"' 
!:D~ _.., 
.... Ill"' :> ::3 ::;0. 0~ .... o, Q)'O .., -s:l'O t.lll) 
"' ·- I> 
wS O. s:~ 58 '0 ~:; 
·- s:l -~ :> .., 1-< l:l s:l 0 Q)~ ~ g Q)'"' Ool ~ .:: 0 p., ·- t-It.) A..o 
""'-
....,_ 8 
1915 
------- ---- -- ------- ------
2 ..... - 3 1 
·-··· · ---- -- ------
6 
1916 
-------····---------------
4 
.. ---- ------ . -- .. - --- ... 
-- ---- ------
4 1917 
-----------------------··· 
1 
------ ---·--
1 
------ ------
-----· 
2 191 8 
··-----·-------·----------
2 1 1 
-.- ---
---·-- ------ ---- --
4 1919 
------ ----- -------------- -
-------- ------
...... 
------ ·····-
... --- --- .. -
·· ··-··· 1920 
--- -----.--.-- .. ------.--- 3 
----·- ------
1 
-----· -----· ------
4 
1921 
----. -·· ·- -- .. ------- ····- 25 
-.---- 5 1 
------ ------ ------
3 1 1922 
--------------------------
6 1 7 7 
-- ---- -- .. --
------
3 1923 
·· ····---------- ··-- ------
75 2 17 6 
------ ---- --
3 103 1924 
--------------------------
84 4 28 12 
--- ---
2 2 132 1925 
-------· --- --···--------- -
80 14 22 1 2 6 1 143 
19 26 
------------------ .. ------
7 11 3 4 6 2 5 1 137 1 927 
-------···-------------··· 
69 19 27 6 1 8 1 131 1928 
---------- -- ------- -------
53 10 3 7 8 5 11 12 4 
---- --1929 
---------- ·---------------
36 20 20 8 3 13 2 1 02 1 930 
--------------------------
49 30 27 5 1 9 129 
19 31 
------------------·-------
102 1 32 53 14 13 49 5 368 1932* 13 1 304 59 10 55 64 - 62 ----·-----·------------- 0 
Tota l 
------- ·------------------
862 54 340 10 4 2 167 2 2,131 
All foreclosur es 
·-------
1 ,930 975 747 233 91 196 64 4 ,23 6 
Per cent of all 
for eclosures 
----------
44.7 56.2 45 .5 44.6 90.1 85 .2 43 .8 50.3 
*To Dec. 1, 1932. 
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TABLE XXXII. NUMBER AND IZE OF DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS 
14 COUNTIES 1915-1932 ' 
Year 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
192 
19 2 9 
1930 
· ··· · ··•········ 
•··••••·•· · •···· 
· ··· ··•• •· •·· · ·· 
····· · ·········-
·· · ····-··· -···-
· · ········ ·-·· · · 
..... . ..•. .• . •.. 
····· ·•• ·•·•···· 
•......... . ... . . 
....... .. -..... . 
•..•....• •.. . •.. 
. . ..•.. . . . . . •... 
•.•. . •• .. ...• . . . 
· · ·········-···-
··-·-···· ····-- -
· ···· ··-··- ··· · · 
.,.... 
28 
27 
1 6 
24 
1 5 
23 
117 
292 
2 80 
33 7 
339 
310 
3 47 
277 
235 
224 
193 1 ··· ··-·· ·· ·· ···· 5 0 7 
193 2* ··········· · ·· 8 4 
Total ····--·········· 4 ,236 
*To Dec. 1, 19 32. 
Nun1ber 
6 
4 
2 
4 
· ······-
4 
:3 1 
R3 
1 o:1 
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CHAPTER SIX DECEMB1ER, 1932 
The Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan 
BY THEODORE W. ScrruLTZ AND A. G. BLACK 
THE PLAN* 
In simplest term~, the domestic allotment plan proposes to do 
two things: ( 1) Give the farmers, for example, of wheat, cot-
ton, hog, , tobacco and rice certain benefits on that part of their 
production consumecl within the United State., (2) provide the 
neces ary control mea ure. to keep the producers from expand-
in()l production and, al o, if necessary, bring about a gradual 
reduction. Seven e ential features underlie the plan: 
1. The voluntary choice of farmers in entering the plan. 
2. The collection of the reqt1ired allotment f~unds from proces~ 
sors and manufacturers millers, packers, textile manufacturers, 
etc. by mean of an exci e tax or '' proce ing charge'' on that 
part of the commodity prepared for domestic con umption. 
3. A yearly estimate of the total quantity of crop (wheat, 
cotton, tobacco and ric ) requit·ed for dome 'tic u e other than 
feed and seed and th ntlmber of hog, needed for consumption 
otl1er than for breeding stocl{ and farm use. 
4. Allotment of thi · total among inclividual producers in 
proportion to the past production of their pr nt farms. 
5. The distribution to alltoment holders of a ''compensatory 
payment'' on each unit of the domestic allotments. 
*The foreword to cir cular No. 14l included the following statement: The plan 
was originally proposed by the late W. J. Spillman. Since th n it has undergone suc· 
cessive modifications at the hands of Professors J. D. Black and M. L. Wilson. A 
bill embodying the voluntary domestic allotment idea was introduced during th Jn~t 
session of Congress by Senator Norbeck of South Dakota and Representative Hope 
of Kansa . 
The discussion that follows is, in the main, based on the Norbeck·Hope bill. 'Vhat 
is said is of necessity tentative. The plan is comparativ ly new. There is no a ur-
ance tha~ it will not be materially modified by those now working on it. 
Our purpose is to point out the e ~ential features of the plan as now proposed, 
rather tha n to pass judgment. Our task is to show th proposal in its va1·ious pha e 
and 00 consider some of the problems that its application 'vould involve. Thi dis-
cusr-;ion should prepare the way for a more thorough study of it by Corn Belt farmers 
and farm leaders. 
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6. Tl1 . igning of a c ntract by allottne11t l1old r · agre in(7 
to r~.·trict prodtlction if and a~ the ad1nini tra ive ag ncy may 
1e i l . 
7. Tl1e automatic 
ha ~ ino- 1)0,, .. r of the 
i contin11ation of h plan wh n the pllr-
Olnmodi )7 r ach ~ ' th 1910-1914 le'T I. 
Voluntary Aspect of Plan 
Tl1 plan i v·olt111tar.. b atl 'e th claim to com1)en atory pay-
m nt, ,,~o11ld b acq11ir d by olt1ntary i~11atur to and f11lfill-
m nt of a contract \vbereb farm r arrree to li1nit or reclt1ce th ir 
prod11ction if a11 a, dir ct cl by the admi11i trative ag ncy. In 
no ca e ,~to11ld it O'Q into effect t1ntil 60 perc nt of the prodt1cers 
of a commodity o d 1ir d.* ll farmer. ~ ''lllo felt that th y 
\Y r acri:ficing tl1eir 1 r .1 011al liberty in ent rin~ the r quired 
prod11ction contract could tay out. They cot1ld continue to 
proc1uc ~ , much a~ th y d ired but of cotll\,e would o-et none of 
tl1 con1p n atory paym nt. . The expre: ion of "\\rillingne · of 
60 percent of the prodllcer may be m a tlred ither by nllmb r 
or b} a\r rage annllal I rodtlction. 
Collecting the Allotment Funds 
-"L ...... n xci e tax 'vill be collected from tho, 'e vvho proce~::; , manu-
factllr or di tribtlte the proc1tlct for dome ·tic con 'Umption. At 
just "l1at poi11t the tax will be levied i. not fix d. Whether it 
will be at the tim of proce 'ing or sale (le11 nd ~ upon which 
})rov the more qt1itable. When a proc · or eXI)Ort any part 
of th commodity on "\Yl1ich he ha 1)ai l a tax, l1e \vill b re-
fund cl tl1e amotlnt of the tax. 
Tl1 allointent funcl d ri,"etl from l1 ta .. i to be pail 
})rOdllc r . . It i · a paym nt di ti11ctly eparate from th 
u-t! t l1e ommodity. Each farmer i to r ceive hi prorata 
of thi ' fund, provid d he J 1igns a contract to restrict hi 
duction. 
0 tl1 
• pr1 e 
hare 
pro-
*The p lan ~~ it i s b eing appli ed by the Agri cultural ... t\djus tment Admini tration in 
the cas of \v heat does n ot r equire th nt a r eferendum b tak )n . \Vhether all or onlY a 
fev.' farm ers de ir e the plan, it will be put into operation . The individual contracts, 
howev r , a r e pur ely voluntary. 
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Estimate of Domestic Consumption 
Tl1e amotlnt of the con1p n ation payment to indiviclual farm-
er i cl terminecl b~y· th 111antitj' of the commodity proc ed on 
'v-hich th tax i collect l, the h io-ht of th tax, th admini -
trati,.. xpen. e deduct l a11d th aggregat allotm nt of pro-
dtlc r \~tllo ar ntitled to re i'' the payment~ . 
Fir t in im11ortance i· th .·ize of the yearly allotm 11t fund. 
Thi.· \Vill der>end, as alreacly tat cl, chiefly tlpon tvvo thing , (1) 
the qt1antity of tl1e com1noclity con tlmed "''ithin the United 
tat and (2) the heio~ht of tl1 tax. We con tlme annually 
abot1t -oo,OOO,OOO bu h L · of ''?!h at in contra.·t to ~0,000,000 
bu h 1 of ric . Obviotl.~Iy, 'vith the arne proce. ~' incr tax per 
btl ·hel the allotment fund .for \vheat will be 2- time a large 
a that for ric . But th r ar , of cot1r e many more 'vheat than 
rice gro'v r. 1 • Table ..L ..L III l1ows the maximu1n amount 
tl1at can J)O~. ibly be call cted for each of the five commodities, 
unle l pro luction is ~harply redtlced. It i ba ·e 1 on th xi ting 
tariff rate , xc It cotton, \vhich i calculated at 5 cent a pound. 
TABLE XXXIII. E TI!v!ATED AN~U.AL MAXI~1UM C' fPE .ATORY PAY-
1fE~T TO PRODtT ER I TIIE G~ITED T.ATE " 
To producers of: 
1J nits of 
rneasure 
_t nximum 
P1·oductionb Consumptionh payn1 ntsc 
( in thousands) (in thousands ) (million dollars; 
----------------------~------------~----------------------
Hog .. .......... .. .......... Pound 
,, .. hat ...................... l3u,hels 
otton ............... . .... B J. lP 
T obacco ··--·····--·-··-·· Po .. tnds 
Rice ...... .. ............... J3u. hels 
Tota l 
14.950 .000 
GO,OUO 
] 4 .800 
1,400,000 
4 H,OOO 
1 3,390 ,000 
500 , ouo 
CJ ,GOO 
900,000 
20 ,000 
267 
210 
165 
,. -
>:tO 
6 
693 
aBa~ed on 5 ents a pound for cotton and th e existing tariffs: " rh eat 42 c nts a 
bu hel ; hogs, 2 cent a pound: tobacco, 5 c nts a pound; rice, 1h cnt a pound. 
bFiv -y nr a rage, 1926-30. 
cAsstuning thut th 'vhole burdPn of the tax is borne by th con~umer nnd that there 
i ~ no d ecrease in the quanbty con su1n ed, and also, thnt there nre no admini stra· 
tive costs. 
Making the Allotments 
1 II allotm nt are ba~ ed tlpon ho\v much tl1e tate county, antl 
indiviclt1al farm ha~ be n J)roclucing. In thi, tl1 plan i really 
qt1i impl in cle jgn. The amot1nt of the dome~ tic con umption 
of ach co1nmodity i allotte<l to the vario11 l)roduci11o- .1tates in 
pro1 ortion to their average prod11ction in tl1e prec ding five 
96 
year . For example, the annual do·me tic const1mption of flour is 
cquival nt to approxima+ely 500 million b'U hels of wl1eat. Since 
Iowa ha~ averaged only 1 percent of the total prodtlction of the 
cot1ntrv it is entitled to an allotment of 5 million bushels on 
•• 
\vhich tl1e compen atory payrnents are made. 
The l tate allotm nt i divided among th cot1nties in exactly 
the . arne way. Each county receives a bar of the state allot-
m nt in proportion to it production. Lilrewtise within the 
cot1nty, the total county allotment is di~ tribt1ted among the in-
dividual farms on the ba is of their past production. Each 
farmer is then i ued allotment certificates. These certificates 
belong to the farm. They are a property right over that hare 
of the dome tic con umption prorated to that farm. The certifi-
cate pre umably will have a fairly constant value. Note again 
that the allotment certificate and the payments proposed on 
thetn are in no way connected with the going market price. The 
price structure is not affected. The payments are wholly supple-
mentary. 
Distribution of Compensatory Payments to Allotment Holders 
Allotment holder ar to r ceiv1re a payment per bu hel, bale, or 
pound on their allotment. The market price paid to the farmer 
i not di turbed in any way. He may sell his products to anyone 
at any tiine. Definitely, the compensatory payments do not aim 
at higher market prices; it leaves them to be determined by the 
ordi11ary forces. Tlte plan ,,_- income suppl et1te1~t1:rLg a1td not lYrice 
• • 
ra1 1n.g. 
The number and the ize of the farms will determine how 
large a hare of the net allotment fund is to go to each farmer. 
TABLE XXXIV. E TIMATED AVERAGE ANNUAL MAXIMUM PAYlfENT 
PER ~""Al~M IN THE UNITED STA'r~J 
Hogs: n ited tates ... 
Io~ ... a . ................ . 
\\heat ··············----·---·-
Cotton . ·····-····-······-· ·· --
T obacco ..... .............. ... . 
Rice .. .................... .... . . 
Numb r of 
farm reporting 
( 1930 census) 
3,600,000• 
1 (' 0 .000 
1 ,210,000 
1,9 6 ,000 
433 ,000 
9,000 
Maximum 
pa.n1·nt 
(dollars) 
267 .000,000 
54, 00,0 0 
210.000 ,000 
1 65,0001000 
45.000,000 
6 ,000,0 00 
•Number of farms reporting hogs fron1 1925 Agricultural ensus. 
Average paym nt 
p e r f arm 
( dollars ) 
74 
300 
174 
3 
104 
667 
THE VoLUNTARY DoMESTic ALLOTJ.IENT PLAN 97 
Inciclentally, the name of the plan arises from the fact that the 
payment~ are allotted to specific farms. A payment wtill be made 
to the farm regardless of the quantity produced or sold, pro-
vided, of cour e, that the term. of the contract are not violated. 
The Contract and Production Restriction 
Allotment certificates are given only to those producers who 
will sign a contract not to increase their production, so far as it 
is within their control. The producer, also, must agree to re-
duce his production should the administrative agency decide that 
a reduction is desirable. The deci. ion whether or not a reduc-
tion is advisable '\'"ill be made after considering both the domestic 
and foreign economic pro. pects and the expressed opinions of 
the producers of the commodity. 
This contract, voluntarily entered into by the farmer, i a most 
important feature of the plan; in fact, the heart of it. The con-
tract feature is what distingui hes this plan from the equaliza-
tion fee and export debentt1re. It is a real virtue of the plan that 
it would not stimulate prodt1ction. Because no farmer is likely 
to pa sup the compensatory payments to which he is entitled by 
the allotment, it appear\ that he will gladly enter into the con-
tract. But there is no obligaion upon him to do o. If the con-
tract is not observed he lose his allotment right . 
The importance of the contract around which the domestic 
allotment plan is built can hardly be over-emphasized. It gives 
a definite method "Yvhereby farmer can re. trict production when 
desirable. It protect~ the plan again t the char()te of dumping; 
there hould be no danger of reprisals or retaliations on the part 
of foreign countries. It prevents increased incomes from stimu-
lating production. Finally, it lays the foU11dation for a system 
of planning as well as controlling agricultural production. 
Purchasing Po~wer Provision 
The application of the plan is contingent upon the condition 
that the commodity i selling for les than it pre-war purchasing 
pOl\7er. After the plan i once in operation special provision is 
made for its automatic di~ continuation '\\rh n the price of the 
commodity rises to the 1910-1914 purcha 'ing power level. This 
feature of the plan i clearly intended to protect the consumer. 
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The Application of the Plan Illustrated With Hogs 
From 1926 to 1930 the United States produced an average of 
14,950 million pounds of hogs annually. Iowa's production was 
approximately 2,935 million pounds, or 20 percent of the total. 
This, then , would be Iowa's production allotment. 
The pork and lard consumed each year in this country is 
equivalent to about 13,390 million pounds of hogs liveweight. 
The difference between 14,950 and 13,390 million pounds repre-
sents exports, principally lard. Iowa's share of the domestic con-
sumption would be around 2,678 million pounds. On this part of 
its yearly marketings Iowa is to receive compensatory payments. 
At 2 cents a pound this would net the hog farmers of Iowa a 
maximum of not more than $54,000,000. 
But how would the plan apply to a farmer who, for example, 
usually keeps 10 brood sows ? Fo-r the past 5 years Iowa farmers 
have had about 2 million sows farrow annually. These sows 
have averaged virtually 6 pigs to th litter. Thus, if a farmer in 
Iowa had a production allotment of 10 sows, meaning 10 litte-rs 
of pigs, he would be entitled to sell in the neighborhood of 15,000 
pounds of hogs. On the basis of the calculations given above, he 
would r eceive compensatory payments on 13,500 pounds of his 
production. Therefore, if he sold for slaughter not more than 
15,000 pounds he would be paid as a maximum on his allotment 
certificates $270. 
In operation this would result in each farmer selling his hogs 
when they about r eached the gross weight allowed him. With 
small litters it would mean heavy hogs and with large litters 
light ones. It is apparent that the certificates in the case of hogs 
must be made transferable, in whole or in part. Thus, if a farmer 
lost his hogs by cholera, he could sell his certificates to another 
farmer. This would provide some insurance for his pig crop. 
Similarly, if his feed crop should fail, he could sell his pigs belo·w 
the gross weight allotted to him and also his remaining unused 
cer tificates. Under such an arrangement there would be consid-
erable f r eedom in handling the breeding and feeding operations 
of the farm. 
Of particular urgency is the need for a thoughtful considera-
t ion of the plan 's application to the hog industry, mainly, be-
cause the domestic allotmen t plan has been conceived largely in 
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t~rms of wheat and cotton. What can it do for the hog producer~ 
Is it at all workable when applied to hogs~ If it is, what specific 
modifications are necessary ? These and related questions in-
volving a more or less critical appraisal of the· plan under Iowa 
conditions merit, if not demand, the attention and study of Iowa 
farm people. 
THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATION 
Each farmer is to receive a prorata share of the compensatory 
payments in proportion to his past production. How hard is it 
to make these allotments to individual producers ? It is safe to say 
that the allotment;;;; to the state are easily determined. Even the 
allotments to the respective counties within a state such as .Iowa 
can be made fairly satisfactorily on the basis of crop reporting 
figures now available. But the division of the total allotment of 
the county or township to each farm is likely to be a big task. To 
the extent that assessors' data are complete, this final step neces-
sary to make allotments is not a serious administrative weakness. 
It is assumed also that the claims of individual farmers within 
the township will be published and that this publication will 
serve as a check on exorbitant claims. It would seem, therefore, 
that reasonably satisfactory allotments may be made to each 
farm. 
To change the distribution of the allotments from time to time 
so as not to impede completely the natural shifting of production 
areas also presents a problem. If it is done each year, producers 
may be led to increase their production unduly for a few years so 
as to get a right to a larger allotment. On the other hand, if the 
production quotas are not redistributed at all, it will greatly re-
strict needed adjustments in production areas. 
Another difficult task in administration is obtaining accurate 
information as to whether or not producers have fulfilled their 
contracts with regard to acreage devoted to wheat and cotton. In 
hogs, how is it f easible to determine just when a producer has 
increased his production ? 
Then, too, the q ueBtion arises, how is it possible to keep these 
commodities from being sold to consumers without the payment 
of the processing tax ? Processors may conceal evidence of pur-
chase of hogs and production and sale of pork and lard to the re-
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tail trade and thus save the cost of the 2-cent tax. Conceivably, 
processors may enter into gentlemen's agreements to conceal a 
proportion of their transactions. In the main this problem is less 
real than it may appear. The inspection of slaughter and the 
various checks on hog sales at the packing plants provide suffi-
cient safeguards. With wheat it is even less a problem. 
A more perplexing administrative problem lies in controlling 
slaughter for lo~al consumption. Hogs slaughtered for home use 
are of course exempt from the processing tax. But slaughter for 
local sales by farmers and butchers is an important hog outlet, 
particularly in the East. For example, 50 percent of the farm 
slaughter of the New England states, compared with 2 percent 
for Iowa, is sold as pork. How i it possible to collect the 2-cent 
a pound tax on this local slaughter and not at the same time en-
courage the "bootlegging" of pork? Is it safe to assume that 
public sentiment would support rigid enforcement of the tax law 
in farming districts 1 Further study may indicate some modifica-
tion that will overcome this difficulty. 
SOME PROBABLE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
PLAN 
What effect will the plan have upon consumption, prices, shifts 
in production areas, trade movements, and the many other ad-
justments that are apparently involved 1 All of these problems 
need to be carefully analyzed. Much technical information is 
needed. Special work is now being done by research workers at 
Iowa State Colleg~, at Washington and el ewhere. 
It W<ill be helpful to indicate some of the more important con-
sequences that may be anticipated when the domestic allotment 
plan goes into effect. This discu sion is at best only a prelimi-
nary survey of the economic effects of the plan. The following 
suO'ge ted consequence , provisional as they are, should aid in 
focusing attention upon those parts of the plan that most need 
consideration. 
Plan Assures Minimum Farm Income 
The dome tic allotment plan provides some important insur-
ance features. It a ure the farmer of a minimum income re-
gardle of low price or crop failure. The compen atory pay-
• 
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ments, depending mainly upon the quantity consumed, are not 
likely to vary much from year to year. Because the compensa-
tory payments are certain they would reduce the hazard of price 
decline. Thus, if the assumed payments were added to the pres-
ent farm prices of wheat, cotton and hogs, they would practically 
double the income that farmers receive from these commodities. 
In view of the ruinous low prices now current, the social im-
portance of some such safeguard is patent. 
The plan is also an insurance against production failures. As 
already suggested, any farmer having lost his hogs due to cholera 
will still receive compensatory payments on his allotment certifi-
cates. Similarly, it is a protection against crop failure. The need 
for some form of insurance in cotton and wheat farming against 
crop failure has been repeatedly dramatized. The experiences 
in the spring wheat area in 1931 and the winter wheat area in 
1932 are all too near to be forgotten. 
The farmer is to be given a payment whether he produces a 
single bushel, or pound of pork, provided he has been a wheat or 
hog farmer in the past. This is in some ways a wide departure 
from the usual social philosophy. It is justified, however, by some 
of our foremost economists on the ground that there is a net gain. 
They hold it is good policy to give up some production efficiency 
in order to obtain a larger measure of certainty in social well-
being. 
Would Prices at the Farm Drop? 
Will the packer, miller, and textile manufacturer simply pay 
proportionately less for hogs, wheat, and cotton when the domes-
tic allotment plan goes into effect ? Clearly, the assumption un-
derlying the preceding diiscussion has been that farm prices will 
not be affected adversely by the processing tax. 
Neither will farm. prices drop by the full amount of the pro-
cessing tax nor will the consumer bear the whole burden. Take 
wheat; suppose the miller pays 30 cents a bushel tax. What will 
prevent him from paying that much less for wheat in the open 
market 1 The answer is to be found in world prices. If the miller 
offered less than the exporter could receive by shipping to Liver-
pool, his bins would remain empty. And, presumably, if the total 
amount of flour consumed in the United States remained un-
• 
I 
• 
I 
I 
• 
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changed the farm price of wheat would not be lower after the 
adjustments were completed. 
But sight must not be lost of the fact that higher prices wilJ 
decrease domestic consumption. The processor will try to pass the 
tax on to the retailer who will in turn raise his price to house-
wives. They will buy less. Just how much less is a rather tech-
nical question. It is different during depression than in boom 
times. Each commodity would have to be studied separately. 
Returning for a moment to wheat, to the extent that domestic 
consumption decreases, wheat prices will decline to a point that 
will permit either larger exports or more domestic consumption. 
If, as is proposed in the plan, wheat acreage is reduced, the les-
sened consumption may be counteracted. Then, farm prices 
would not drop. 
The balancing of any decrease in consumption by less produc-
tion so as not to disturb farm prices and exports is the central 
idea underlying the domestic allotment plan. Whether or not this 
is a profitable adjustment for farmers depends large1y upon the 
type of demand they are dealing with. In this, too, each com-
modity is different. In general, though, it is true that higher 
prices do not reduce the consumption of foodstuffs proportion-
ally. The demands for necessities are usually quite inelastic in 
character. With inelastic demands the processing tax is largely 
borne by the consumer. Here, again, the problem is very intricate. 
The demand for pork particularly presents a very knotty 
problem. The price interrelationship of pork, beef, mutton and 
eggs is of special interest. .Any appreciable rise in pork prices 
would cause housewives to use more of these other foods. The 
consumption of pork would consequently decline accordingly, 
but this very proce s of substitution would increase the demand 
for pork substitutes, hence their price. Thus, indirectly the plan 
will benefit the cattle, sheep and poultry farmers. The problem 
is not whether substitution will result, but to what extent it is 
likely to take place. Again, the question can only be raised at 
this time. 
• 
Probable Immediate Effect on C<>nsumer Prices 
The domestic allotment plan will perforce increase prices to 
the consumer. But consumer prices will not increase at once by 
• 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
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1 
( 
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the full amount of the tariff charge. Thus, if the miller were re-
quired toda}? to pay a tax of 30 cents, it would nearly double the 
cost of his 'vheat.* But eve11 though the cost of wtheat to the 
miller were increased from around 40 cents to 70 cents a bushel, 
it is not likely that the price of flour, much less of bread, would 
rise proportionatel)7 • For the time being much of the processing 
tax would be absorbed in the distributive system in the same way 
that much of the price decline of these raw materials has not 
been reflected in retail prices. 
Although in general consumer prices will not increase at once 
by the full amount of the tax, some will do so more quickly than 
others. Prices of cigarette , cigars, and snuff in all probability 
are influenced very little by a tax of, for instance, 5 cents a 
pound on tobacco. On the other hand, 2 cents added to the price 
of hogs wot1ld soon be reflected in higher retail prices. But gen-
erally speaking, shot1ld the processing taxes go into effect now 
-vvith wl1eat, cotton, hogs, tobacco, and rice, prices all proportion-
ally lower compared with 1920 to 1929 than the prices of the 
respective con umer goods made from these commodities, it is 
probable that a large part of these taxes would be absorbed by 
the proce or, manufacturer and distributor. 
Lard and Lard Substitutes 
Lard is being severely pressed in the domestic market by sub-
stitute , particularly by vegetable oils. Presumably, the disad-
vantage of its competitive po ition would be further accentuated 
by the proposed tax on hog . Several po sibilities arise: (1) The 
paclcer may force more lard into export channels, (2) the tax on 
hogs may be shifted to other pork products, especially cured 
pork, ( 3) some countervailing tax might be imposed on lard sub-
stitutes. The processing tax applied to cotton may increase the 
price of cottonseed oil, especially if acreage is re tricted. This, 
then, would help the lard market. The appraisal of each of these 
adjustments is not possible. The information at hand is too frag-
mentary. The outloolr for lard and lard prices is even now 
clouded by a number of tlncertainties. 
*December, 1932. 
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SUMMARY 
The allotment plan differs from the McNary-Haugen bills and 
the export debenture in that it definitely recognizes the need for 
some form of production control when prices are increased. The 
lack of such control is one of the strongest economic arguments 
that has been directed against the other two farm relief pro-
posals. 
Clearly, the domestic allotment idea is a recognition of the 
principle that a tariff does not benefit farmers who produce a 
commodity of which there is an exportable surplus. Since this 
country is committed to high tariffs and since foreign countries 
have turned to almost every conceivable form of restriction-
export bounties, licensing systems, import quotas, mixing regu-
lations, importing monopolies, etc. the domestic allotment plan 
has been developed to give the American farmer the benefits of 
protection for that portion of his produce used domestically. 
Although economic isolation is not in the best interest of 
the welfare of the world as a whole, we must recognize that 
the trend has been decidedly in that direction. The Ameri-
can farmer has been a victim of economic nationalism at 
home and abroad. The allotment plan is frankly a means 
for equalizing the social costs of adjusting the agricultural 
plant of the United States to this situation. 
With farm distress having reached the emergency stage, there 
is today a widespread feeling that the plight of agriculture reacts 
adversely upon the whole economic community. The purchasing 
power of farmers has been disastrously diminished. It is argued 
that it must be restored before it is possible to have business re-
covery. Many w.:b.o heretofore have opposed the very idea of farm 
relief are now granting its necessity on social grounds. Because 
of this, there is the danger that the domestic allotment plan, com-
ing to the fore during a general emergency, may be adopted with-
out due consideration of the more important consequences that 
may result. 
In short, the plan calls for distributing compensatory pay-
ments among producers on the basis of their past production. It 
derives the necessary funds from excise taxes levied on processors 
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and manufacturers. The plan is decentralized in the procedure 
of making the allotments to individual farmers. Farmers' claims 
to the payments rest upon voluntary signature. The contract 
calls for a restriction of production as the federal agency may 
prescribe. 
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CH~L\.PTER SEVEN JANUARY, 1933 
Control of the General Price Level 
BY GEOFFR.EY SHEPHERD AND w AT,LA.CE WRIGHT 
Without question, one of the gravest defects in our present 
economic ystem is the unstable value of our money. Whenever 
the value of money change , it work harm either to debtors or 
to creditors, and sometimes does damage to both; it takes pur-
chasing power from one class and gives it to another, dislocates 
exi ting business r~lationship , and (in the case of an increase 
in the value of money) throws our whole economic machinery out 
of gear. One has only to look about him at the present time to 
see full evidence of the terrific havoc that an abrupt change in 
the value of money can work. 
During the past 20 years, the value or purchasing poV\rer of the 
dollar has varied tremendously. If we regard the pre-war period 
as normal, we can say that before the war the dollar wa worth 
100 cents. Then came the war time inflation; the value of the 
dollar in terms of the amount of goods it would buy fell to 44 
cents in 1920; it recovered part way to 68 cents by 1926, and 
finally (October, 1932) has risen to 106 cents. 
Now a change in the value of the dollar is the same thing as 
an (opposite) cliange in the general level of prices. If we prefer 
to talk in tertns of changes in the price level, we can say that the 
price level started out at 100 before the war, rose to 225 in 1920, 
fell to 151 by 1926. and from 1929 onward fell rapidly to 94 by 
October, 1932.1 
The decline in the general price level after 1920 was accom-
panied by a world-wide bu iness depre sion that was severe but 
comparatively short lived. The decline in the price level that 
started in 1929 has been accompanied by a still more severe de-
pression, that is by no means short lived. It is now entering upon 
its fourth year, and no one knows when it will end. 
Effect of Declining Price Level 
A sudden decline in the general price level has a disruptive ef-
fect on our whole economic machinery, because all prices do not 
decline equally. The prices of raw materials decline farther than 
[107] 
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wholesale prices; wholesale prices, in turn, decline more than re-
tail prices; rents and taxes follow with a good deal of lag, wages 
de cend rapidly in gome ca es and slowly in others, 2 while many 
charge capital and interest payments on debts, railroad rates, 
etc. decline very slowly indeed. As a result, the productive ma-
chinery of the country is thrown out of gear and cannot work 
properly, wiith some classes bearing an unduly large proportion 
of the general burden. 
A decline in the general level of wholesale prices always bears 
heavily on the producers of raw materials, because the costs of 
distribution from producer to consumer do not decline as rapidly 
as other prices. The heavie t part of the burden is therefore 
passed back to the producer. ~-,urthermore, a great decline in the 
• 
commodity price level is generally accompanied by a business de-
pression and a general reduction in demand, and most industries 
reduce their produetion accordingly. But farms cannot be shut 
down part-time like factories; in spite of the reduction in de-
mand that has occurred during the present depression, agricul-
ture has continued to produce as much as she did before the de-
pres ion began.3 This has laid an additional burden on 
agricultural prices. 
The extent of the decline in the prices of agricultural products 
is clearly shown by the price data of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture. The recent 34 percent decline in the gen-
eral level of wholesale prices has been accompanied by a 60 
percent4 decline in average agricultural prices for the United 
State . For Iowa, the decline has been even greater; the price 
of Iowa farm products have been cut 66 percent. 6 That is, Iowa 
farm products are now selling for one-third of their 1925-1929 
prices. 6 
Where Prices Stand Now I 
The height of the general price level in the United States to-
day, in relation to past years, is hown in fig. 16. The line shows 
the movements that have taken place in the general average level 
of commodity prices at w,hole ale during the pa t 130 year . In 
the preparation of thi chart, the period of years from 1910 to 
1914 wa taken as the ba e period, and the changes in the price 
level are expre ed as a percentage of that base. 7 
I 
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The price line in the chart shows three bold peaks. They re-
sulted from inflation during the War of 1812, the Civil War and 
the World War. 
The chart shows further that the general price level has now 
returned approximately to pre-war levels. In fact, during the 
latter half of 1932 the price level fell to 5 to 7 points below pre-
war. 
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Fig. 16. The general price level in the United States, 1800-1932. 
Some observers have noted this return to appro~ximate pre-
war levels with approval. They regard it as an evidence that the 
world has finally got the war and post-war inflation out of its 
system and returned to the sound monetary conditions that ex-
i ted just before the war. 
This opinion has very little basis in fact. It is now 19 years 
since the World War began, and the world monetary situation 
has passed through some revolutionary chance since then. The 
United States and France together now hold 60 percent of the 
world's monetary stocks of gold.8 Most of the other countries 
of the world went off the gold standard during 1931; if they 
return to gold, they will probably revalue their currencies at 
lower gold values than before the war. France revalued her 
currency at one-fifth of its pre-war gold value, in 1928, before 
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the depression began. In fact, the United States is the only 
important country whose currency has the same gold value now 
as before the war. 
Furthermore, the establishment of the Federal Reserve sys-
tem in the United States has altered the monetary efficiency of 
gold; and in both England and the United Sttaes, gold has al-
most completely disappeared from hand-to-hand circulation, be-
ing now held in the vaults of central banks. 
Along with these monetary changes have gone great disloca-
tions in world relationships and reversals in financial and trade 
policies. These upheavals have altered debtor-creditor relation-
ships and r esulted in a heavy "one-way traffic" of payments to 
the United States and France. This has resulted in a great mal-
distribution of gold in the world, so that the world's stocks of 
gold at the present time are not able to exert their full effect on 
• pnces. 
"'\Vhat the net result of these conflicting changes will be, no-
body can tell. They may give u higher price levels, or lower 
price levels, than those which existed before the war. It is only 
by chance that they will give us levels the same as pre-war. We 
can regard present price level as only a temporary resting place, 
not as bed-rock. Fig. 16 shows that after the Civil War, prices 
declined to roughly pre-war levels for a few years, and then de-
clined 27 percent during the ensuing 15 years. Nobody knows 
whether history is likely to r epeat itself now, or to reverse itself. 
Some cyclic recovery of prices from the bottom of the depres-
sion may be expected to take place, but the disturbing thing is 
that nobody knows whether we have yet reached the bottom. The 
general price level, after falling almost continuously since 1929, 
stopped falling in June, 1932, and by September had risen more 
than a point. Observers then breathed easier. They hoped that 
the dollar, having returned roughly to its pre-war value, was go-
ing to stabilize at that point. But since September the general 
price level ha been declining again, one or two point a month. 9 
A this is being written, hogs at Chicago are making a new low 
since December, 187 / c and grain in Liverpool is smashing bot-
tom records extending back 344 years.11 
We have no a surance that our general price level has yet 
reached bottom. We cannot ay that becau e prices are now back 
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to their pre-W:ar levels, they will not go lower. We cannot 
assume that our price levels will remain stable at their pres-
ent height in the future, any more than they have in the 
past. There is no certainty that if things are left to them-
selves, the price level will stabilize of its own accord. Unless the 
world intends to let its price levels drift up or do\.\rn to whatever 
point the supply of gold, the distribution of gold, credit policies 
and other forces carry them, some form of control of the gen-
eral price level is imperative. Several different plans for accom-
pli~hing· this end have been advocated. Since we are now suffer-
ing from a fall in prices, the first objective of these plans is to 
inflate or reflate present price levels toward the levels existing a 
few years ago. 
THE VALUE OF MONEY 
The intent and purpose of reflation becomes clearer if we con-
sider for a moment w·hat the dollar r eally is. 
The dollar is to the economist and the business world what the 
foot rule is to the engineer. It is the standard unit of measure, 
the yard-stick by which value is' measured. Suppose that all en-
gineering foot rules had increased in size during the last three 
years so that they were now 18 inches long instead of 12 inches ; 
confusion and breakdown in the engineering world would imme-
diately r esult. No new machinery or implements or tools would 
fit in with those already in operation. The obvious remedy would 
be, not to stretch the size of every product in existince to fit the 
stream of n ew goods made with the new 18-inch foot, but to 
shorten the foot rule down to its original length. That is what the 
reflationists purpose to do with the dollar; they propose to reduce 
its length or value or purchasing power to its previous status. 
Changing the Purchasing Power of the Dollar 
But how can this obj ective be achieved ? How can the value 
of the dollar be reduced part way or perhaps all the way to its 
1922-1929 level ? 
The r eflationists answer this question by saying that as far as 
changes in its value are concerned, money is like other goods-
its value rises if the supply decreases, and falls if the supply in-
• 
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creases. They say that since a decline in the general price level 
is nothing but an evidence of an increase in the value of money, 
the thing to do is to decrease the value of money; and this can 
be accomplished by increasing its supply or quantity. 
With proper qualifications (chiefly concerning changes in ve-
locity of circulation as well as in quantity of money) this reason-
ing is sound, and price history bears it out. From the Civil War 
on to the 1890's, the ~mount of gold in the world was not increas-
ing as fast as the production of goods. The general price level 
declined steadily, culminating in the depression of 1892-96. Then 
came great discoveries of gold in South Africa and the Klondike, 
and the development of the cyanide process of extracting gold 
from low grade ore. A stream of new gold poured into the mar-
kets of the world. The general price level ceased to fall, and, in-
stead, began to rise. This rise continued until the outbreak of the 
World War. 
During the World War and afterward, all of the belligerent 
nations demonstrated how inflation (i.e., increasing the quantity 
of money) can send prices sky-high. Russia and Germany allowed 
the inflation to run on until the qubble burst; the supply of their 
money was so excessive that it became worthless. France was able 
to catch herself in time to prevent disaster, but her franc now is 
worth only one-fourth of its pre-war value. England and the 
United States also inflated their currencies, but less drastically; 
the English pound and the United States dollar have now re-
turned to roughly their pre-war purchasing power.12 
The argument is not whether inflation would raise prices; with-
out any question, i.t would do that. The question is whether a 
policy of inflation should be undertaken; and if it should, 
whether inflation once started could be controlled. :Many ob-
servers fear that inflation as a remedy for the present depression 
would lead to results that would be worse than the disease; some, 
because they are afraid that it would force the United States off 
the gold standard; others, because they believe that inflation 
would soon get out of hand and go too far; and others, because 
they consider that it would not last and that sooner or later an-
other deflation would follow. 
These questions should be thoughtfully considered. The an-
swers depend largely upon the method or methods by which in-
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flation is brought about. A number of different methods have 
been proposed. Roughly speaking, they may be grouped under 
three heads: (1) those which would work through credit inflation, 
(2) those which would work through currency inflation, and 
( 3) those whose aim is to increase both currency and credit by 
reducing the gold value of the dollar. 
This chapter deals with the first of these three methods, credit 
inflation. The next chapter will discuss the other two. 
WHAT MONEY IS 
In order to avoid confusion in our discussion of credit infla-
tion, we must first get a clear understanding of what money is. 
Currency or Cash Mo~ney 
The business of this country is transacted with two kinds of 
money. The first kind is the everyday cash or currency that 
passes from hand to hand and back and forth o'rer the counter. 
It is mostly paper dollar bills, five dollar bills, and so forth-
with some gold, silver and copper coin. 'fhe composition of this 
kind of money in circulation on Oct. 31, 1931, is shown in table 
XXXV. 
TABLE XXXV. KINDS OF MONEY IN CIRCULATION13 
( In Million s of D oll ar s) 
Oct. 3 1, 1932 
Kind of money 
Go.ld coin · ····-·-····· ··-········ ·····-- ·· ······ ······· ····--··········-············-··-· 
Silver coin -------·-····· ·····--·--········ ·······--·-···· ···-····-··· ······-·········· ·· 
M . . 1 nor co 1 n .... .. ...... _ .............. ........ .... _ ..... _ ... ....... .. .... .. ... _. _ ... ....... . 
Amount 
445 
2 86 
113 
F ederal Reserve notes ....................................... ........ ..... ........ 2 ,68 9 
Other notes .......... ..................... ....... .... .. .... .... ..... ........ ............ 2,095 
Total money in circulation .............. ........ .... .. ....................... . 
844 
4, 7 8;l 
5,628 
The table shows that about 85 percent of our currency in cir-
culation ordfnarily consists of paper notes; the other 15 percent 
is made up of gold, silver and other coin. 
Credit Money, the Major Eleme~nt 
The second kind of money is different from this physical cash 
mone:y· or currency; it is simply credit money. A merchant who 
borrows $1,000 from his bank in order to buy goods does not 
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draw out the money in cash. He simply signs hi note to the bank 
for $1,000 and pa) · for his good by checks on the banlc No 
curr ncy changes hand , but $1,000 of credit money came into 
beina when he rai ed the loan, and that $1,000 of credit money 
di appeared when he old hi good and paid back hi loan. 
Thi kind of money credit money i just a real a cash 
money; and in its effect on price it is many times a important 
as cash money, becau e there i about 10 time as much of it in 
u e. Only about one-tenth of our total payments in this country 
are made in currency; the other nine-tenths are made by cheekY 
When we look at the figure showing the changes that have taken 
place in our credit money during the last three years, we find 
that thi cr edit money ha decreased from 53 billions in the 
econd half of 1930 to about 42 billion in the middle of 1932Y 
Thi mean that during the last 2 years, 11 billion dollar of 
this credit money ha di appeared. This situation is shown by 
the upper line in fig. 17. 
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Fig. 17. hanges in the volume of money, 1914 to 1932. 
In view of the tremendo hrinkaae that has taken place in 
our cr dit mon the mo t logical inflationar y mea ure would 
eem to be credit inflation. We will therefor turn fir t to a di -
u ion of thi method. 
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THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
In normal times, the most important agency for controlling 
the volue of credit money is the Federal Re erve Banking Sys-
tem. The leading nations of the world each have a central bank 
at the head of their banking systems. In the United States, our 
central banl{ is the group of 12 Federal Reserve Banks located 
in different parts of the country. 
Our Federal Reserve S}rstem, like the central banks of other 
nations, has tvro means of coiltrolling the volume of money out-
standing. 
Control of the Discount Rate 
The fir t means is the raising or lo,vering of the di count rate. 
This di count rate is the rate of interest that the central bank-
in Otlr case, the group of 12 Federal Re erve Banks charges the 
ordinary city or country bank for funds it loans out to them. A 
country banks charge intere t on the money or credit it lends to 
farmers, storelreepers and other individual borrowers; similarly, 
the Federal Reser,re 13ank charges interest on the money it lends 
to these banks. The rate of interest that it charges is called the 
discount rate. 
Ordinarily, when a city or country bank lowers the rate of 
interest it charge its borro\vers, the e borrowers borro\v more; 
when it raises the rate of interest, they borrow less. Money is like 
other things; if the price of a year' use of money (the intere t 
rate) ri~es, pe01)le will take les of it; if the interest rate falls, 
they will tal\:e more, and the volt1me of money will expand. (In 
theca e of money as with other good , these statements hold true 
only if no changes tal{e place in the demand. Large changes in 
demand may operate to more than off et changes in the interest 
rate. This is discus ed fully later.) 
Open-Market Operations 
The second method of expanding or contracting the amount of 
credit money in the country is referred to as the ''open-market 
operations of the F deral Re erve Banks.'' This is a formidable 
sounding phrase, but the thing described is really simple. When 
the Federal Reserve Banlr find that credit money is contracting, 
• 
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and believe that this contraction should be stopped, they go into 
the open market for United States securities and buy up large 
quantities of them from the regular city and country banks. The 
money which the Federal Reserve Banks pay these regular banks 
builds up the reserves of idle money of the regular banks. 
Now banks do not like to have idle money lying unused and 
drawing no interest. The regular banks, accordingly, extend more 
credit, make more loans to their local customers. In ordinary 
times they can lend out 10 times as much as their reserves. This 
means that if a bank has sold $10,000 of United States securities 
to the Federal Reserve Bank, it now has $10,000 more reserves 
and can lend out $100,000 more than it could before; $90,000 of 
additional credit money has been created and ''pumped into the 
country." 
Conversely, when the Federal Reserve System thinks that 
credit money is expanding and should be contracted, it sells 
United States securities in the open market. Country and city 
banks all over the country buy them up. But this buying reduces 
the reserves of the country and city banks. If a bank buys $10,-
000 of United States securities, it has to reduce its loans to its 
local customers by $100,000; in that process $90,000 of credit 
money is destroyed. Thus do the ''open-market operations'' of 
the Federal Reserve Banks effect an expansion or contraction of 
credit money. 
These two methods, raising or lowering the discount rate and 
buying or selling United States securities in the open market, are 
generally used in conjunction; the one reinforces the other. Cen-
tral banks in Europe have used this control of the discount rate 
for generations. The Federal Reserve Banks in this country have 
been using both methods since the Federal Reserve System was 
set up in 1913. Bankers in this country have not has as much 
experience with credit control as European bankers have, but 
they have been gaining it. The job requires skill rather than ef-
fort. It is like driving an automobile along a highway. Under 
ordinary circumstances, a touch on the wheel now and then is 
all that is required to keep the automobile in the road; but the 
driver must keep constantly on the watch, otherwise small errors 
in direction will accumulate and the machine will leave the road . 
• 
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The Federal Reserve System Has Tried to Check Deflation 
The Federal Reserve System has been making use of these 
credit control methods during the present depression. 
During the 1928 and 1929 boom, the Federal Reserve System 
repeatedly issued warnings, and raised the New York discount 
rate slowly from 4 to 5 and finally to 6 percent. They also sold 
large quantities of United States securities. The general banking 
and business world, however, did not pay much attention to these 
actions; some prominent bankers, indeed, opposed them. 
Then came the stock-market crash in October, 1929, and the 
beginning of the depression. The Federal Reserve System re-
versed its policy and began a program of ''easy money.'' The 
reserve banks started reducing their discount rates. On Nov. 1, 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank lowered its rate from 6 to 5 
percent; thereafter it continued to reduce it steadily, half a point 
at a time, until by May, 1931, the rate was 1.5 percent. This was 
the lowest rate in its history. . 
The Boston, Chicago and Atlanta Federal Reserve Banks Wfre 
less prompt and vigorous; they reduced their rates only half a 
point, and that not until near the end of 1929. The rest of the 
12 banks took no action until February, 1930, when they cut 
their discount rates half a point. Thereafter they all continued 
to reduce their rates until the early part of 1931; by that time 
they were all down to 2.5 or 3 percent, and that was as low as 
they got. After October, 1931, the banks all began to raise their 
rates again.16 
The reserve banks also used the second method of checking 
credit deflation, namely, open-market operations. During 1929 
they had sold nearly all of their holdings of United States se-
curities in an attempt to curb speculative inflation; in the second 
and third quarters of 1929 their holdings of these securitief 
amounted to only 150 millions. Immediately after the initial 
stock crash in 1929 they reversed their policy and started buying 
heavily. Before the end of the year they held 500 million of 
United States securities. By the third quarter of 1931 they held 
over 700 million.17 
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Internatio.nal C()mplications Set In 
In normal times these mea. ures should have resulted in an ex-
pansion of credit money in the country of 6 or 7 billion dollars. 
If the United States were as much isolated from the rest of the 
world economically as it is geographically, these activities of the 
Federal Reserve Board might have played a large part in over-
coming the depression. But in 1931, undermined by the effects o:f 
two years of depression, the weakened financial structure of sev-
eral European countries gave way. In rapid succession Austria, 
Germany and England were forced off the gold standard. Euro-
peans even began to fear lest the United States should be driven 
off the gold standard also. Precipitately they drew gold out of the 
United States, exactly as depositors make a run on a. local bank 
when they think it is getting shaky thereby often bringing on 
that which they fear. The international run on the United States 
drained 700 million dollars in gold almost as much as the entire 
British stock out of the country in two months. The stocks of 
gold in the United States were o large that we met these heavy 
drafts without difficulty, but the shock to our confidence was 
severe. 
The Glass-Stegall Bill Releases Tied-up Gold 
The situation had elements of danger in it. People in this coun-
try were afraid of the banks, and in that fear they began to hoard 
currency. lVIuch of our gold was tied up as backing for Federal 
Reserve notes (currency), which ordinarily are backed by 40 
percent gold and 60 percent commercial paper. The amount of 
commercial paper available, however, had become less than 60 
percent of the notes outstanding; so the banks were being 
forced to increase the gold cover of their notes above 40 percent, 
to fill the gap. 
The danger was that, if the hoarding of currency should in-
crease, more Federal Reserve notes would have to be issued, and 
that would tie up more gold perhaps enough to embarrass us 
should another international run be made on the United States. 
Early in 1932, therefore, the Gla.ss-Steaga.ll Bill18 was enacted 
into law, stipulating that the Federal Reserve Banks could use 
United States securities in place of commercial paper as 60 
• 
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percent baclting for note~ , whenever there was not enough com-
mercial paper to go around. This bill made it po~ sible to free 
large quantities of gold (previously tied up a backing for Fed-
eral Re erve notes) if necessary to meet foreign rllns; it also per-
mittecl the Federal Re erv~e Banks to buy up much larger quan-
titie of United States securitie than had ever been anticipated 
before. 
In April, 1932, tl1erefore, the buying of United States securi-
ties was resumed on an unprecedented scale. Holdings rose from 
809 millions in lVIarch to over 1,800 millions in July.19 Since then 
they have remained roughly constant at about 1,850 millions-
that is, at nearly 2 billion dollars. 
The Reco~nstruction Finance Cor poration 
From 1931 on, some weal{ points began to show up in Ollr credit 
structure. Many banks had been caught with ''frozen assets''-
mortgage and bonds that were good but could not be turned into 
cash qui.cl\:ly enough to meet the demand for liquid funds. To 
meet thi situation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was 
formed in January, 1932, with a capital of 500 million dollar 
s11bscribed by the United States Treasury. Its purpose wa to 
render frozen assets liquid. By the end of September, 1932, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation had authorized loans to the 
amount of 1,410 million dollars, nearly three times the amount of 
its original public capital, the additional amounts coming from 
private ources. Banks received 850 million dollars of this total; 
railroads got 264 million; building and loan associations, and 
mortgage and ins11rance companies got 24 7 million; land banlc 
and other agricultural credit institutions got 45 million.20 
Ordinary Methods. Not Effective N o~w 
Thi is the record of the efforts of the Federal Reserve Banlc-
ing ystem and the Recon truction Finance Corporation to pro-
mote reflation, or at lea t to check deflation. It can be objected 
that the Federal l~eserve ystem did not move quickly enough 
nor deci ively enotlgh; but after it did start, it carried the regu-
lar methods of credit control to extremes never heard of before . 
• 
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What has been the result? The Federal Reserve System has 
performed a real service in checking deflation and reducing or at 
least postponing some liquidation. But the blunt fact remains 
that as far as raising the price level is concerned the results are 
nil. Indeed, although the general price level flattened out from 
May to September of this year, it is now declining again. 
What is the trouble? Why have these measures not "taken 
hold?" 
The reason is that the forces of deflation are too powerful and 
widespread for the ordinary methods of bank credit inflation to 
take effect. We have said that these methods are like steering an 
automobile, in that ordinarily only a touch on the wheel is needed 
to keep the machine on the road. There is a further resemblance 
-these measures will not work if some obstruction pushes the 
machine off the road entirely. If you are driving an automobile 
and meet a heavy truck that forces you off the road into a muddy 
ditch, skillful handling of the controls may keep you from over-
turning, but it will not get you out. 
That is roughly the situation the country is in at the present 
time. The world dislocations outlined in Chapter Two have 
forced our economic machine off the highway. Ordinarily, the 
supply of credit is the factor that controls the volume of money 
and the general price level; but at the present time the limiting 
factor is not the supply of credit but the demand for it. There 
is plenty of credit in the banking system, but the bankers are 
afraid to let go of it and people are afraid to take hold of it. 
Even when a manufacturer can persuade a banker to make him a 
loan, there is no profit in borrowing money to make automobiles, 
radios, furniture, etc., if the goods cannot be sold after they 
are made. 
In ordinary times, producers and consumers keep calling for 
more credit or purchasing power than the· banking system can 
supply. When the supply of bank credit or purchasing power is 
increased, then, it is taken in tenfold amounts by the general 
public ; general purcha ing power and demand is increased, and 
prices rise. But now tL.e general public's demand for funds or 
credit or purchasing power is less than the supply; so measures 
for increasing the ~npply do not have their usual effect on price 
level . 
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Reflation Has Nort Yet Been Attempted 
The ordinary methods of bank credit inflation are incompetent 
to deal with a major price decline such as that which 'We are now 
going through. Tltey amount to nothing more than an attempt 
to check deflation. In time like the present, they cannot be con-
sidered as reflationary measures; they are only anti-deflationary. 
The conclusion to be drawn is not that reflation has been tried 
and found impossible; the fact of the matter is that reflation has 
not yet been attempted. If we want reflation, we must turn to 
stronger measures. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT FEBRUARY, 1933 
Monetary Inflation 
BY GEOFFR.EY SHEPHERD AND WALLACE WRIGHT 
The more drastic inflationary proposal con idered in this 
chapter are (1) currency expansion and (2) reducing the gold 
content o~f the dollar. We "rill deal 'vith currency expansion first. 
Curre,ncy Is Only a Small Part of Our Total Money 
Programs of currency expansion have seriOllS limitations. To 
begin with, currenc~y· is only a n1all element in our total circu-
lating medium. Ordinarily, only 10 percent of our total circu-
lating medium is currency or cash money; the other 90 percent 
i credit money. There ll ually i about 10 time as mllch deposit 
or credit money in existence as there is currency. 
Some advocate of currency expansion, observing the 10 to 1 
ratio that ordinarily exi ts between currency and credit money, 
believe that currency i the base or foundation, and that credit 
money is a sort of 10- tory uperstructure built upon it. They 
belie·ve further that if 'the ba~ e V\rere broadened the super truc-
ture V\rould widen proportionally ; the i ue of 1 billion dollar of 
currency \:rould then result in an expansion of 10 billion dollars 
of credit money. 
But this belief is not correct. The foundation of the credit 
super trt1cture is not currency, but gold. 'fhe amount of credit 
money outstanding is not determined by the amount of currency 
in circulation. It is determined by tvlo other thing , (1) by the 
toclts of gold in the country, and (2) by the state of bu ine 
confidence, which determines ho-vv closely the limits set by the 
gold supply will be approached. 
The toclts of gold in the country set the outer limits beyond 
which credit expansion cannot go, because the law specifie that 
our bani{ reserves (i.e., monetary foundation) hall be based ulti-
mately on gold; a.nd the law further specifie definite legal mini-
mum reserves of gold that cannot be exceeded except under 
penaltJr· Ordinary country and city banlr that are members of 
the l11 ederal Reserve )'~stem mu t maintain a 10 percent re erve 
with their re erve ba11lr (the percentage ranges from 7 to 13 
[123] 
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according to the size of the city in which the bank is located) be-
hind their depo. it or credit money outstanding. They cannot 
expand their credit money, i. e., their deposits, to an amount 
more than 10 times as great as their reserves except by borrow-
ing from Federal Re erve Banks. And the Federal Reserve 
Banks must maintajn a 35 percent reserve of gold against their 
deposit liabilities, which consjst mainly of the reserve accounts 
of the ordinary city or country banks that belong to the system.1 
The stocks of gold in the country, therefore, are the foundation 
on which the superstructure of credit money is built. Because 
of the legal minimum reserve requirements mentioned above, the 
gold foundation ordinarily will not support a credit money struc-
ture more than 12 stories high that is, more than 12 times the 
size of the gold foundation. 
It is the second factor, the state of business confidence, how-
ever, that determines whether W'e will build our superstructure 
of credit up to that limit, or whether we will stop short of it. 
When confidence reigns, people ask freely for credit, feeling con-
fident that they can repay it; and bankers lend it freely, for the 
same reason. It maires very little difference whether people take 
the credit money they borrow in the form of currency, or 
whether they prefer to leave it on deposit and write checks on it. 
At the present time, our gold foundation is ample; but busi-
ness confidence is shaken, and our credit superstructure has 
shrunk from 12 stories until now it is only 9 stories high only 
9 times the size of our gold foundation. 2 
Small Effect <>n Total Money 
The factor determining the amount of credit money outstand-
ing, then, is not the amount of currency or paper money in cir-
culation, but the stock of gold in the country, which sets upper 
bmi.ts beyond which credit expansion cannot go; and the state 
of business confidence determines how closely the limits et by 
thi stock of gold will be approached. Expanding the currency 
would not increa e either of these two controlling factor . It 
might imply di place an equivalent amount of other money. The 
most that can be expected of an increase in the currency is that 
it will re 'Ult in an increase in total money of the same amount. 
That i , if we were to increase the currency 1 billion dollars, 
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the most we could expect would be that it would increase our 
total money 1 billion dollars. 
Figure 17 on pag·e 114 shows that in the United States at the 
pre ent time there is 41.8 billion dollars of credit money out-
standing,3 and 5.7 billio11 dollars of currency. The total money, 
then, is 47.5 billion dollars. 
Some propo al for currency expansion have recommended the 
i sue of 2 or 3 billion dollars of additional currency. These 
represent rather large amounts of currency, but they constitute 
ratl1er small additions to our total money out tanding. Three 
billion dollars is only 6 percent of our total money of 4 7.5 billion 
dollars. The direct effect on prices of onlJr a 6 percent increase 
in the total money would not be large; in fact it might be off et 
by other contrary effect . It is evident in fi.g. 17 that during the 
pa.st three years our currency in circulation has increased from 
4.5 to 5.7 billion, but our credit money has decreased from 55 
billion to 41.8 billion. This is a net contraction of 12.2 billion. 
The 1 billion dollar increase in Cllrrency since 1929 has not 
kept prices from falling, because it has been 1nuch more than 
offset by the 13 billion dollar contraction of credit money. To 
restore 1925-1929 a-v,.erage prices we would have to expand our 
currency at lea t as mucl1 as our credit money has contracted, 
say 12 or 13 billion dollars. 
This is a pretty big order. It would mean expanding our pres-
ent currency to three times its present volume. There is not free 
gold enough in the country for that. JYiost of our currency re-
quires a backing of 40 percent gold; 40 percent of 13 billion is 
about 5 billion, and there i not that much gold in the United 
States; our total stocks of gold tand now at about 4.4 billion 
dollar , and most of it is already tied up as backing for currency 
and credit. 
This gold-supply limitation is not insurmountable. It cot1ld 
be handled by r educing our minimum gold reserve requirements 
from their present 40 percent to say 20 percent, or by aboli hing 
gold reserve r equirements entirely. These possibilities are con-
sidered in later sections of this chapter. 
A Surplus of Currency 
A second difficulty confronting programs for currency infla-
tion is that we are not a currency using nation; we are primarily 
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a check-and-deposit using people. W e make 9/ 10 of our pay-
ments by check. W e do not like to carry large amounts of cur-
rency around; it is bulky and inconvenient and is likely to be 
lost or stolen. We prefer to deposit most of our currency in the 
bank and write checks against it. 
Accordingly, if a ubstantial amount of additional paper 
money were issued, it would not stay out in circulation. Most of 
it would be deposited in banks, and the banks would send it in to 
the central banks to be counted as r eserves. It would simply 
build up the re erves of banks. 
This would not do us any good. Our banks at the present time 
already have more reserve than they feel they can profitably 
loan out. The open-market operations of the Federal Reserve 
Banks in 1932 r esulted in a great surplus of bank r eserves, but 
these large reserves have not caused prices to rise. Building up 
these bank reserves still further by expanding the currency 
would not be any more effective. 
There is one respect in which an expansion of the currency 
could help prices. If the currency were issued in such a way 
that it placed additional income and purchasing power in the 
hands of people who at present lack purchasing power, the spend-
ing of this additional purchasing power would increase the 
demand for goods and would raise prices. A great deal depends 
upon how the currency is issued and who gets it. We will con-
sider that question next. 
Putting the Currency in Circulation 
If the federal government simply paid out the n ew currency 
in the ordinary course of its operations, the effect on prices would 
be nil. Government employees, war veterans and other re ipi-
ents would simply deposit the currency in the bank, and draw 
checks on their accounts as before. Any currency that was not 
thu exchanged for bank deposits would merely r ender an equal 
amount of already existing currency excessive and cause it to be 
retired. No new purcha ing power would have been brought into 
the market, and there would be no reason for prices to rise. 
The only way to make the issue of additional money affect 
price i to place it in the hands of people who will go out and 
buy things with it, things which otherwise they would not have 
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bot1ght. The new buying must be additional buying. It is this 
increase in purchasing, this increase in demand, that raises 
prices. There is no u e in is uing more money unless this will 
result in additional purcl1asing po\ver in the market. Prices 
rose during the World War, not simply becau e the government 
is ued more money, but becat1se it went out and spent it. 
This means that new government money is.,tled now would 
raise prices only if it represented additional spending on the 
part of the government spencling for unemployment relief, for 
example, through a program of public construction work, or di-
rectly as subsistence payments to unemployed families. 
Novv there are only three sources from ~rhich the federal gov-
ernment can get fund for additional spending. One is increased 
taxation; the second is the ale of bonds, i. e., borro\ving; and 
the third is the is ue of paper money. 
Increased taxation would meet with great popular objection 
at the present time, and in any case would probably fall hort of 
supplying all the funds required. The second or third method 
would have to be used; the government would have to i sue more 
bond , in order to make its budget balance, or el e resort to paper 
money. 
Tl1e prospect of issuing more bonds inspire alarm in some 
quarters. It is pointed out that already the federal deficit for 
the first seven months of the 1932-33 fi cal year is 1,272 million 
dollars, 4 and that thi~ has had to be met by i st1ing an equal 
amount of bonds; and if the government increased its expendi-
tures still further, the budget would be still further unbalanced. 
Should the Budget Be Balanced? 
Opinions differ, ho-vv:ever, as to whether an unbalanced budget 
in time of depression is necessarily an evil. Some economists 
believe that during depres ions the government should not bal-
ance the budget, at least not by reducing expenditures. They 
point out that during a boom, industrial expenditllres are greatly 
increased, and during a slump, they are greatly curtailed. If 
government expenditures \vere decreased during a boom and in-
creased during a lump, this would offset some of the fluctuations 
in bu iness expenditures, partly stabilize employment and reduce 
, 
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the severity of the swings from prosperity to depression and back 
• 
aga1n. 
During the present depression, then, some argue that it would 
be good policy for the government to anticipate its construction 
expenditures for the next 10 years and embark upon them heav-
ily now rather than 5 or 10 years from now. The government is 
already loaning or spending large sums for unemployment relief. 
If these sums were spent instead on self-liquidating projects and 
other construction work, the government would have a definite 
addition to its physical plant to show for its money, and would 
be able to spend less money on construction work in the future. 
We would then have, not a currency inflation, but a mild form 
of government credit inflation. 
Probably the greatest limitation of this policy is that it re-
quires financing by the sale of federal government bonds, and 
there is a limit to the amount of these bonds that the market can 
absorb. During 1932, the amount of United States government 
securities outstanding increased 3 billion dollars, from 17.5 bil-
lion to 20.5 billion. 5 During 1933 the amounts are expected to 
increase still further. 
Opinions differ as to how many additional billions could be 
issued without burdening the market for all bonds, or perhaps 
arousing fears as to the ultimate solvency of the government. All 
that we can say is that somewhere a limit to additional security 
issues does exist, that a program dependent upon additional 
flotations of United States securities has limits, and that these 
limits probably lie this side of pronounced price inflation. 
Inconvertible Paper Money 
We have dealt with two sources of federal funds, increased 
taxation and increased borrowing by issuing bonds. Both of 
these have limitations. The third source would be free of these 
limitations, and it would not unbalance the budget. The federal 
government could issue currency that would not be convertible 
into gold. This currency would be inconvertible paper money, 
like the greenbacks that were issued during the Civil War. 
Inconvertible paper money, however, is subject to two or three 
seriou disadvantage . If only a small amount were issued it 
' 
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would imply displace an equivalent amount of our present cur-
rency. If a large amount were issued, it would not stay out in 
circulation any better than a large amount of convertible paper 
would. And finally, it would involve our go·ing off the gold 
tandard. 
Now there is nothing sacred about the gold standard . .A large 
part of the world is now off gold, and in view of the 
present world ituation, is much better off than if it had tried to 
stay on. England -vvent off gold in September, 1931, and its 
general price level has remained practically stable ever since; but 
price levels in the United States have fallen 10 percent and in 
France have fallen 13 percent.6 
The gold standard may be judged, like anything else, simply 
on its merits. It may be that the merit or advantages of the 
gold tandard are greater than its disadvantages; it may be that 
they are less. Let us see wl1at these advanages and disadvan-
tages are. 
What the Gold Standard Does 
When the gold standard is permitted to work freely, it has 
three merits. It serve as a check on extreme inflation, it facili-
tate. international trade by l{eeping exchanges stable, and it 
l{eeps the value of the different nations' currencies in line with 
each other. 
\Ve have spolcen of the uperstructure of credit that is erected 
upon the foundation of gold. In the United States, the legal 
minimum gold reserve restrictions make it difficult to build this 
superstructure more than 12 or 13 stories high. Beyond that 
point, inflation is checl{ed by the limitation. of the gold supply. 
Furthermore, if price in one country rise more than those in 
other countries, that cotlntry becomes a good market for the sale 
of other countries' goods. Additional goods therefore flow in, 
and gold flows out to pay for them. Thi outflow of gold pulls 
prices down in line with tl1eir former relationship to price , in 
other countries, and equilibrium i re tored. 
Finally, international trade is facilitated 'vhen nations are on 
the gold standard, because goods can then be paid for in terms 
of currencies which remain fixed in relationship to each other. 
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Gold Standard Difficulties 
These are the benefits that are usually associated with the gold 
standard. Since the war, however, the gold standard has ap-
peared to be attended with great disadvantage . For example, 
England's return to her pre-war gold standard in 1925 appeared 
to be one of the fact.ors that dragged her into financial and indus-
trial troubles; her situation :finally became so acute in 1931 that 
in order to get partial relief, she had to go off gold. 
What appear to be shortcomings of the gold standard today, 
however, are almost entirely the result of arbitrary restrictions 
and regulations that have kept the gold standard from working; 
these restrictions in turn are a result of conflicting international 
trade and financial policies after the w!ar. The trouble with 
the gold standard since the war is that it has been almost smoth-
ered by tariffs, exchange r estrictions and other measures designed 
to keep it from working out its normal effects. Each country has 
attempted to regulate the operation of the gold standard to its 
own advantage. As a result, more than half the world has been 
drained dry of gold and is now off the gold standard; and the 
rest of the world has such a surplus of gold that its gold has lost 
many of its functions. 
England benefited by going off the gold standard ; her action 
relieved the pressure which foreign drains of gold were exerting 
upon her slender gold r esources. But the United States is bur-
dened with an excess of gold. It would not be any advantage to 
us to go off the gold standard in order to issue greenbacks; that 
would not relieve us of any adverse effects of gold, and it would 
rob u of what advantages there are in being on the gold stand-
ard today. 
MEASURES TO REDUCE THE GOLD CONTENT OF THE 
DOLLAR 
Currency expansion is only one of the many different method 
of price inflation. Another method for attaining price inflation 
i the propo._,al to reduce the gold content of the dollar from its 
present figure, 23.22 grain of gold, to, say, 16 grains. 
orne people reason that since the general price level ha fallen 
one-third since 1929, the value of the dollar in turn has risen 
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one-third ;7 and that reducing the gold content of the dollar 
one-third would lower its value and restore the general price 
level to its former height. 
There is a rather serious que tion about the econd step of thi~ 
reasoning. The gold content or gold price of the dollar has not 
changed for generations; it has remained fixed at 23.22 grains 
since 1837. It is tl1e goods purchasing power of the dollar that 
has increased since 1929. Lowering the gold content of the dol-
lar is only one step in the direction of loiwering the goods pur-
chasing power of the dollar; it would not lower the purchasing 
po,ver directly, but only indirectly; and this indirect effect would 
follow only under certain conditions. 
Let us tr:T to trace the chain of cause and effect by which low-
ering the gold content of the dollar might lower its purchasing 
povver, that is, raise the general price level. 
Action Needed to· Prevent Heavy Movements of Gold 
The first effect of reducing the gold content of the dollar would 
be thi : As soon as it became evident that the government was 
going to reduce the gold content of the dollar, the natural thing 
for people to do would be to take currency five-dollar bill , etc. 
-to the bank and a k for gold in exchange. They would get 
23.22 grains of g·old for each dollar of currency presented. 
After the gold content of the dollar was reduced to 16 grains, 
people who had previously presented currency and demanded 
gold in exchange for it Would then rever e the process ; they 
would present the gold they had obtained and demand currency 
for it. For each 23.22 grain of gold they pre ented, they could 
then demand $1.45. 8 The operation of exchanging currency for 
, gold before the gold content of the dollar was reduced, and then 
reYer ing the proce ' afterwards, would net them 45 percent on 
tl1eir money. Peor)le in foreign countries could do the same as 
our citizens. 
Accordingly, the fir t effect of reducing the gold value of the 
dollar would be a general scramble for gold. A great internal 
and external drain of gold would take place. The temporary 
withdrawals of gold would be heavier than our stock of gold 
could meet. For the time being, the United States would have 
to refu e to pay out gold that is, it would have to go off the 
I 
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gold tandard. She would have to take this action early, because 
people would start to draw out gold as soon as reducing the gold 
content of the dollar began to be seriously considered in Congress 
-long before the reduction could actually go into effect. Busi-
ness confidence would be somewhat disturbed by the United 
States going off goJd, but how much disturbed, no one can say. 
In any case, the United States could return to the gold standard 
without delay as soon as the reduction of the gold content of the 
dollar was effected. 
Suppose, then, that the United States Treasury announced its 
intention to reduce the gold content of the dollar from 23.22 to 
16 grains. Suppose also that it went off the gold standard until 
this reduction had been effected, and then returned to gold. 
Would this action r·aise the general price level in the United 
States ~ 
The answer depends upon two things upon the reaction of 
people in the United States, and upon the reaction of people in 
foreign countries. 
Reactions Abroad 
Let us first consider the reactions abroad. 
We can use France's response as an illustration of what would 
be likely to happen abroad if we reduced the gold content of the 
.. 
dollar. At the present time, 25.6 French francs have the same 
gold content as one United States dollar. Both countries are on 
the gold standard. The ratio between the gold values of the two 
currencies is therefore fixed, and the gold behind 25 .6 French 
francs will buy $1.00 worth of goods in the United States. 
If the gold content of our dollar were reduced from 23.22 
grain to 16 grains (a reduction of about one-third) the gold 
behind the 25.6 French francs would then be worth $1.45 instead 
of $1.00. French importers could therefore buy gold in France, 
send it to the United States, and get nearly one-half more United 
States cotton or wheat for it than they could have obtained pre-
viously (unless prices in the United State had already risen) . 
If the French government permitted l1'rench importers to ship 
gold out of France to the nited States for this purpose, French 
purchase of United States cotton and wheat would increa e. As 
a result, the price of cotton and wheat in the United States would 
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rise. This rise in prices would soon spread to other commodities, 
directly because of substitution and competition, and indirectly 
because of the stimulating effect that a rise in prices of one group 
of commodties would ha,re on all business. 
The prices of United States industrial tocl{s might be stimu-
late(l by foreign buying. This buying wot1ld be purely specu-
lative; it would be based on an expectation of United States in-
dustrial stocks rising as a result of the gold content of the dollar 
being reduced. It would not be based on the l{nowledge that 
foreign gold would now buy more United States stocks than be-
fore, because the dividend paid on those stocks would be worth 
le s than before in terms of foreign gold . 
• 
Objections from Foreign Governments 
These things would happen, as we have said, if the French 
go,rernment would permit them. It is most unlikely, however, 
that France would let them happen. There are two reasons for 
this. 
In the first place, France already has a high tariff again t 
wheat, in order to protect her own wheat producers from foreign 
competition. Her vvheat producers would protest if a lowering 
of the gold value of the United States dollar should enable United 
States wheat to climb the e French tariffs and compete with 
French-grown wheat. Her farmers would asl{ for a 50 percent 
ad valorem increase in the French tariff on wheat, enough to 
offset the reduction in the gold content of the dollar; and if this 
were granted, United State wheat exports to France would not 
increase, and United States wheat prices vvould not rise on that 
account. 
Even if the French government did not listen to the complaints 
of its wheat producers, it would probably give attentive ear· to 
objections from its treasury. If French importers started to ship 
gold out of France for purchasing goods, gold would flow out of 
France to the United States. Now France doe~ not like to lose 
gold. he wiould probably either raise her tariffs or prohibit 
exports of gold (i. e., go off the gold standard) or ration and re-
strict her foreign exchange. Other countries, both those that 
were on the gold standard and those that were not, would do the 
same thing. 
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If foreign countries did not take these step at once, they 
would . ooner or later be driven to take them by the march of 
event . Unless prices in the United State ro e 45 percent at once, 
gold would flow from the rest of the world to the nited States. 
We would be offering more good per grain of gold than before. 
But we already have more gold than we need and other countri6's 
have le s. They would quickly act to stop their gold draining out. 
France is notoriously tenacious of gold, prizing it a a ''war 
che t" as well as for peace-time monetary purposes. The sim-
plest way for them to stop gold flowing to the United States for 
the purchase of goods would be for them to raise their tariffs 50 
percent ad valorem. That would more than offset the reduction 
in the gold content of the dollar. 
The interests of the foreign nations in this case would coincide 
with the intere ts of the world as a whole. From the world point 
of view, an additional flow of goods from the United States and 
an additional flow of gold to the United States would be ex-
tremely undesirable. It would accentuate a condition that has 
played a leading part in bringing on the present depression, and 
would run directly counter to present and pending negotiations 
between the United States and foreign countries, de igned to 
work out measures which will reduce the flow of gold to the 
United States and get it out in the rest of the world where it is 
needed. 
If orne foreign countries permitted gold to be hipped out 
for the purchase of goods in the United States, some stimulation 
of our export commodity prices would re 11lt. If all foreign coun-
trie r efused to let gold be shipped out, we would not get any 
additional foreign buying of our commoditie , and we would not 
get any upward stimulus to our price from that source. 
It seems likely that most foreign countries would refu e to let 
gold be hipped out. We would therefore have to depend chiefly 
upon the reactions of our own producers and con umers. Let 
us tudy what reactions we might expect from our own people. 
Domestic Reactions 
To the extent that people in the United States looked at their 
five-dollar bills and other currency and aid, ''Well! Thi money 
i worth one-third le s gold than it was yesterday. I had better 
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spend it before it depreciates any further,'' a rise in prices would 
result. The increased velocity or turnover of money, i. e., the 
increa ed purchasing o·f goods, would increase the demand for 
goods and rai e prices generally. 
Perhaps, ho,vever, people would not act so hastily. They might 
reason to themselves, ''After all, the p1trcltasing power of 111y 
dollar has not changed. They have lrnocked a third of the gold 
out of it, but my dollar will buy the same amollnt of goods today 
as it would yesterday. The English pound will buy as much 
good in England today as it would when England went off the 
gold tandard entirely in September, 1931. I think I'll wait and 
see vthat prices are going to do before I do any extra buying.'' 
If this became the prevailing attitude, there would be no reason 
for price to rise. We already have a great urplus of gold in 
thi cou11try, and economizing in the use of gold by reducing the 
gold value of the dollar would not directly and of it elf make 
• • pr1ce rise. 
A final alternati-ve should be given consideration. People might 
reason still further, ''I realize that the goods value or purchasing 
po,ver of my dollar has not changed. But whether or not the 
quantity theory of the value of money holds in the short run, I 
believe that the commodity theory holds in the long run. I be-
lieve that sooner or later prices will rise, because, regarding gold 
simply as one important com1nodity, the decrea ed gold value of 
the dollar will e··ventually develop into a decreased value or pur-
chasing power of the dollar for all commodities. That mean 
higher price eventually. I shall therefore go out and buy no,v, 
before prices begin to rise,'' and this increased buying would 
cause prices to rise. Therefore, to the extent that people believed 
that money i valuable fundamentally becall e of tl1e intrinsic 
value of the gold behind it, they would expect a reduction of the 
gold content of the dollar to lead sooner or later to a reduction of 
the general purchasing power of the dollar, i. e., a rise in prices. 
Nobody can say -vvith a ·urance -vvhich of these three alterna-
tives would result an immediate rise in prices, a slow rise in 
prices, or no rise at all. Some people ''"ould probably react one 
\Vay, orne ''rould react another way. There is no re~ on to sup-
pose that a ri e in prices equi·valent to the r eduction in the gold 
content of the dollar would immediately and automatically result, 
• 
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but it seems probable that some general rise in prices w~mld 
develop. 
Furthermore, no one can say with assurance how far the gen-
eral ri e in prices would go. A few weeks ago New Zealand re-
duced the exchange value of her currency 25 percent, and the 
prices of her speculative commodities wheat, etc. ro e at 
once, almost by the full amount of the reduction in the value of 
the currency. 9 But that rise in prices came through the effect of 
increased foreign buying of New Zealand goods. The volume of 
New Zealand products if; comparatively small, and other coun-
tries did not take steps to prevent their purchases of New Zea-
land goods from expanding. But a we have seen, they would 
probably take steps against a large country like the United 
States. 
Furthermore, New Zealand went off the sterling standard for 
much the same reason that England went off the gold standard in 
1931 lack of sufficient gold and other mean of payment to meet 
her foreiO'n obligations. New Zealand's going off sterling, like 
England's going off gold, relieved the financial pressure on 
price . But the United States is in the opposite situation; we are 
not suffering from a shortage of gold or other money. 
Accordingly, the ri e in our prices would depend chiefly upon 
our domestic reaction , and it might be less, or more, than an 
amount equivalent to the reduction of the gold value of the dol-
lar. The amount of the rise in prices would depend upon the ex-
tent to which the ri e fed on itself; it would depend upon the 
extent to which rising prices stimulated more buying, and the in-
creased buying caused a further ri e in prices, and so on up. 
It is po sible that the rise in prices might get out of hand. It 
is unlikely, however, that this would happen. The country is now 
awake to the danger of uncontrolled inflation and deflation, and 
public opinion would support measures for keeping the inflation 
under control. It is easier to curb inflation than it is to stop 
deflation. The Federal Reserve Board had difficulty in checking 
inflation in 1929, not becau e it powers were inadequate, but 
becau e the public did not want inflation to stop. 
IF PRICES ROSE, WOULD THE RISE ENDURE? 
The que tion may be asked whether a rise in prices induced by 
monetary mea ures would be likely to endure, or whether it 
• 
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would be only temporary. The answer to this question depends 
chiefly upon whether other meas11res were put through, designed 
to correct or offset the fundamental causes of our present low 
• prices. 
The world-wide decline in prices since 1929 was not brought on 
by a shortage of currency nor by a scarcity of gold in the 
United State , and it i not likely to be permanently cured by ex-
panding currency or economizing the use of gold in the United 
States. If the decline in prices in the United States had been 
caused by a shortage of currency or scarcity of gold in this 
country, measures on our part to expand currency or economize 
gold might be effective and lasting remedies. But the decline in 
our price was not brougl1t on by either of these monetary fac-
tors, and it is not lilrely to be cured by the measures proposed.10 
Our disease is part of a world disease; what we and the re t 
of the world are suffering from is clogged circulation. It was 
caused ·by the cessation of the great war-time expenditures, bJ'" 
the outbreak of nationalism after the war, and by the change in 
the position of the United States from the world's greatest debtor 
to one of the world' greatest creditor , which conflicts with her 
role as a l1igh tarirr nation and great exporter of goods. Other 
nations O\Ve us heavy debt and interest payments, but we make 
it difficult for them to mal{e payments in good . Accordingly the 
other nations have had to pay us in gold. For several years 
after the \var we loaned them the money to pay u , but this only 
partially mitigated the heavy flow of gold to this country. For-
eign nations raised their tariffs, not only to protect their pro-
ducers but to cut down the outflow of gold. When vve cea ed 
loaning abroad from 1929 on, that support to foreign purchasing 
power gave way, and the international economic machinery has 
been working badly ever since. 
Monetary Me,asures Are Only Eme~rgency Measures 
As an emergency mea ure monetary inflation may help. But 
it would be only an emergency effort. It vvould not go to the 
roots of the trouble. 
The evidence seems to be that a reduction in the gold content 
of the dollar would probably not benefit u for very long, unless 
it were accompanied by other measures to cure the fundamental 
• 
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cau e of the present depression. These measure would include, 
for instance, a gradual reduction of tariffs all over the world, 
particularly in the United States because tariff conflict with our 
new world-creditor role; some reduction of the debts owed to us 
by other nations; temporary reductions in United State agri-
cultural production, perhaps by some such measure as the domes-
tic allotment plan. These are remedies for the fundamental 
troubles, and they cannot be in tituted overnight. But full re-
covery i not likely to take place until they are put into effect. 
Numerous other inflationrury proposals are engaging 
public attention at the present time. In the appendixes 
on the following pages we are merely drawing attention to 
some of them, without attempting any detailed analysi . 
APPENDIX I 
Would a Rise in the General Price Level Help Agriculture·? 
When the general level of prices at wholesale declines, the 
prices of agricultural products usually fall faster than the gen-
eral price level, because the co ts of di tribution from producer 
to consumer remain relatively constant. Since 1929, for example, 
the general price level has fallen 48 point , but agricultural 
prices have fallen 87 points.U 
If the general price level were to rise now, would agricultural 
price ri e more rapidly and perhaps return to their 1929 rela-
tion to other prices ~ Or would they ri e only sluggishly, so that 
agriculture would not be greatly benefited 1 
The answer appears to depend upon how the rise in the general 
price level were brought about. If the rise were the result of 
world-wide recovery, then agricultural prices could be expected 
to ri e more rapidly than the general price level. 
If the rise in the general price level were brought about by 
reducing the gold content of the United State dollar, and if 
foreign nation permitted gold to flow to the United tate for 
the purcha e of good , then the prices of export agricultural 
product wheat, cotton, etc. would lead in the ri e. We have 
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seen, however, that foreign countries would not be likely to let 
this happen. 
If the rise in the general price level resulted from currency 
or credit inflation in the United States and was not accompanied 
by a imilar rise abroad, and no reductions were made in foreign 
tariff abroad, then the prices of our agricultural export commod-
itie , which are largely world prices, would probably not rise 
very much. They would be held down by low world prices and 
low foreign demand, and their ri. e would probably be less than 
the rise in the United States general price level. 
Any ri e in agricultural prices, however, would render it easier 
for agriculture to mE:et her fixed charges, and these are one of the 
most troublesome elements in the cost of operating a farm today. 
APPENDIX II 
Velocity O·f Circulation 
The di cu sion in the main body of the bulletin has made very 
little reference to one important element, the i11fluence of changes 
in tl1e velocity of circulation of money. 
Thi element is probably a important as changes in the quan-
tity of money. It has not been stre sed in the general di cus-
. ion, for three reasons. First, most of the propo. als for price 
inflation have aimed mainly at increasing the quantity of money 
rather than the velocity. Second, changes in tl1e velocity of 
money generally are as ociated with change in the qllantity of 
money, so that the analy i ba ed on quantity alone is substan-
tially accurate. And finally, if velocity i left out, the pre en-
tation i simplified, and e·very measure of simplification is needed 
in dealing with as complicated and technical a ubject a mone-
tary inflation. 
APPENDIX III 
Bimetallism 
Propo als have been made for the federal government to 
broaden the currency base by remonetizing ilver and adopting 
a bimetallic standard. 
The e proposals call for the purchase of several billions of 
• 
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dollars of silver by the federal government, which would the,n 
i sue ilver certificates based on the metal purchased. 
This method of currency expansion is open to the same diffi-
culties that beset other form of currency expan ion. It has the 
further di advantage that the money expended by the govern-
ment would not result in an addition to the capital equipment of 
the country. Money spent on roads or other engineering projects 
would leave the country better equipped than it was before; 
money spent in the purchase of silver would leave only an empty 
silver mine in its wake. And finally, bimetalli m involves the 
difficulty of keeping the mint value ratio between the two metals 
in line with the continually shifting market value ratio. In 
Bryan's time the market ratio was about 16 to 1; at the present 
time, the ratio is about 80 to 1. 
APPENDIX IV 
Symmetalism 
Symmetali~m is a simpler method of remonetizing silver than 
bimetalli m. When a country is on the gold standard, the stand-
ard of value is gold. When a country is on a symmetallic stand-
ard, the standard of value is a fixed combination of gold and 
silver, for instance 80 percent gold and 20 percent silver. Under 
symmetalism, we would have lying in our bank vaults, not bars 
of gold, but bars of 80 percent gold and 20 percent silver. 
Adopting symmetali m is not very different from reducing the 
gold value of the dollar. It simply allows a given amount of 
gold to go further. It has the disadvantage that it involves the 
purcha e of additional monetary metal, but it has the advantage 
that it would, at lea t in some sense, provide a full metallic back-
ing for the currency. Probably reducing the gold value would 
be the better plan for any one nation to adopt, but symmetalism 
would be the better if world action were being considered. 
APPENDIX V 
Reducing Gold Reserve Requirements 
The twelve Federal Reserve Banks are required by law to 
carry a minimum re erve of 40 percent gold against their note 
• 
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issues, the other 60 percent being commercial paper (or, since 
the passage of the Glass-Steagall act, government bond ) . They 
are also required to carry a minimum reserve of 35 percent gold 
against their deposit liabilities. 
The e minimum reserve ratios were originally worked out 
and adopted \vhen gold coins circulated as hand-to-hand cur-
rency. The banlring sy tem then needed to carry a re erve of 
gold to meet the demand for gold coins from its own citizens, a 
well as from the citizens of other countries. It needed to carry 
a reser-v"e of gold to meet a domestic or internal drain as well 
as an external drain. 
Since the war, however, this situation has changed. Gold 
coins have largely di appeared from circulation; we use bank 
notes or checks, instea.d of coin. Hardly anyone sees gold any 
more. The need for a reserve of gold to meet an internal drain 
is much less than it used to be (except under panic conditions 
when people might start hoarding gold). Our pre ent reserve 
requirement of 40 percent may therefore be higher than neces-
sary. Some re ponsible authorities believe that our existing 
reserve requirements should be lowered. 
The Gold Delegation of the League of Nations, for example, 
after studying this questio11, summarizes it opinions as follows: 
''In our opinion, this whole system of defined ratios has proved itself in 
the light of the sperial circumstances of post-war years to be too rigid and 
inadaptable. Now that gold coin is in circulation only in very few countries 
and an internal drai11 cannot take place (except in moments of violent panic 
or hoarding as bullion ): the r eserves are primarily required to meet po sible 
deficits in the bala.nce of international payments. Each country in determin-
ing the gold reserve required should therefore consider in the :first instance 
what the range of movement in its balance of payments is likely to be. 
• • • • • • 
"We are of opinion that it would be advantageous, as we argued in our 
first Interjm Report, to r educe the reserve ratios from their present high 
levels. If this were done, the jmmediate effects would be to free the hands 
of the Central Banks by enlarging the free margin of their gold r eserves 
which they can use for international payments without endangering the legal 
minimum ratio."12 
What effect would a reduction in these legal minimum re erve 
ratios have upon price ? 
If our stoclrs of gold were getting low, it would have a very 
beneficial effect, for "\Vhen re erves of gold fall close to their 
minimum legal limit, banlrers put up their discount rate . This 
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attracts gold and builds up their reserves, but it also contracts 
credit, depres es business activity and lowers prices. 
If pre ent low prices in the United States could be attributed 
to in ufficient stocks of gold in the United States, then lowering 
the minimum gold reserve requirements would help. It would 
relieve bankers of the neces ity of raising their discount rates 
and thus contracting credit. When England suspended gold 
payments altogether in September, 1931, that action removed 
the downward pres ure which a foreign drain of gold was ex-
erting on English prices. 
At the pre ent time, however, gold reserves in the United 
States are not down close to the legal limit of 40 percent. Our 
gold reserves at present are 63 percent, and they are still grow-
ing. Lowering the legal reserve ratios now would not neces-
sarily have any anti-deflationary effect. It would simply increase 
our already large surplu reserve . It 'vould permit a sub tantial 
inflation, it would raise the ''ceiling'' toward which prices could 
rise, but it would not ca'ltse any inflation. It would permit prices 
to rise, but it would not give them any upward push. 
The word of caution that was spoken in the part of this chap-
ter that deals with the effect of reducing the gold content of the 
dollar applies here also. Lowering minimum gold re erves, like 
reducing the gold content of the dollar, would allow an inflation 
of price to go to greater lengths than it could go under present 
regulations, before being checked by limitations of the gold 
upply. The danger of too much inflation seems remote at the 
pre ent time, but it might become a real danger 5, 10, or 15 years 
hence. 
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How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices 
BY THEODORE W. SCHULTZ 
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THE NA·TURE OF TARIFFS 
A tariff is a tax collected on a commodity as it crosses a na-
tional botlndary. The payment is made to the State by the person 
who brings the commodity in. 
The term ''tariff'' wa. first used to refer to a table that listed 
tho e articles, V\Tith their corresponding taxes, that were not 
permitted free entrance. At pre~ent the e tables are usually 
called chedules. They are extremely complicated affairs. The 
Tariff Act of 1930, for in~ tance, is a document of 283 pages. In 
it the dutiable commodities are divided into 16 schedules with 
a total of 1,814 paragraphs, many of which in turn list duties on 
a large number of articles. In addition to the dutiable list there 
are 353 sections, nearly 100 pages, of special provisions. 
Tariff systems are based upon either ad valorem or specific 
duties, or upon a combination of the two. Ad \Talorem duties are 
usually a fixed percentage of the ' ralue of the goods and when the 
value changes, the duty al o changes. Specific duties are based 
upon a unit of weight, measure, or count so many cents a 
pound, so many cents a dozen, or so, many dollars a ton, and so 
on. Specific duties are much simpler to admini ter than are ad 
valorem dt1ties. 
PURPOSE OF TARIFFS 
Tariffs like other taxe ha,re two main purposes, (1) to raise 
revenue, and (2) to discourage the activity that is being taxed. 
In the modern State the chief purpose of taxes, other than tar-
iffs, is to raise revenue, while tariffs are used largely to check im-
ports. 
Before the war all countries rai ed most of their revenues with 
tariffs. At the present time most advanced countries depend 
largely upon income taxes. 
The revenue aspect of tariffs is today of secondary importance; 
their protective feature are being increasingly stre sed. But 
even o, a substantial part of the revenue of our federal budget 
[145] 
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1s rai ed by tariffs. They contributed an average of $548,000,000 
yearly to the receipts of our federal government from 1927 to 
1931, which was 14 percent of the total. Before the war, how-
ever, they provided over half the national revenue. "Free-trade" 
Great Britain, in 1930, raised $588,000,000, or 15 percent of her 
budget, by tariffs. 
The United States has no strictly revenue tariffs. The duties 
that are enforced were enacted to protect domestic producers. 
They were not planned primarily for thir revenue-raising abil-
ity. Obviously, a duty that keeps foreign produce from coming 
in fails as a revenue measure. Duties on tea and coffee, since 
they cannot be produced here, would be examples of revenue 
tariffs. Since domestic tomatoes do not ripen during the winter 
months, unless grown in hothouses, the duty of 3 cents a pound 
on them is, in effect, a revenue measure during December and 
January. The tariff on sugar produces one-fourth of our cus-
toms receipts. But, to make the tariff, for instance on sugar, a 
purely revenue duty, it would be necessary to le·vy an equiva-
lent exci.se tax on all domestic production. This would cancel its 
protective feature. 
But why should a country discourage imports ~ No per on 
thinks of making everything for himself. Are there some special 
reasons why a nation should do so? Before taking up the spe-
cific arguments for tariffs and the protection that they afford, it 
is necessary to understand some first principles that underly 
all trade. 
In simplest terms international trade rests upon two funda-
mental propositionr: (1) The law of comparative advantage , 
which determines the kind and quantity of goods and service 
exchanged, and (2) the fact that imports pay for exports. Both 
of the e will be examined in turn, after which their bearing on 
tariffs should be considered. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES 
Why Men Trade 
Why do men trade? The answer is that men trade to gain 
the advantages of pecialization. Every man has a variety of 
needs. He wants food, helter, clothing a.nd recreation. He 
could provide him elf all of these by being a farmer, carpenter, 
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tailor and actor in turn. But experience teaches that it pays 
each man to spend his time in doing that which he can do best. 
By specialization and exchange, with the farmer growing corn 
and feeding hogs and the carpenter building home , both are 
enriched. 
The implest form of trade is the exchange of goods and serv-
ice ~ produced in the same locality. 
1\io t trade, however, involves the exchange of goods between 
different localities. This is called regional specialization a.nd it 
has economic advantages as clearly as individual specialization. 
Ju t as some persons are better fitted to do certain things, so some 
localitie , because of oil, climate or nearness to po,ver, raw mate-
rial and marl{ets are especially adapted to produce certain goods. 
No one qt1estions whether or not farmers of Io,va are better situ-
ated to grow corn than tho e in North Dalrota and Mississippi 
or that North Dal~ota excels in wheat and lVIississippi in cotton. 
Climate, topography and soil cause the farmers of New York, 
Wi con 1 in and lVIinnesota to specialize in dairying. Since New 
York i near to large cities it produces mostly fluid milk; Wis-
con in and l\finne ota, being more remote from large markets, 
find it advantageous to use much of their millr to make butter 
and chee e. 
Our oranges, grapefruit and lemons come from California, 
Florida and Texas; our iron ore is talren mostly from upper Min-
ne ota. We associate automobiles with Detroit, tires with Akron, 
steel with Pittsburgh and motion pictures with Hollywood. 
Gain from International Trade 
But regional specialization doe not stop at national bound-
aries. Nor are the gains le s when the exchange involves inter-
national tra.de. 
Brazil is especially well suited to grow coffee. Cuba, with her 
rich soil and favorable climate, can produce cane sugar more 
cheaply than the United State . India and Java excel in tea, 
Japan and China in ilk, and l\falaya in rubber. But these coun-
trie are not favorably located to grow corn, cotton and wheat. 
Trading their coffee, ugar, tea and sillr for our pork and lard, 
cotton textile and flour is as clear a gain as the regional ex-
change of goods within a country. 
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It would be absurd for the United States to u e her resources 
to grow, for example, bananas. Likewise, for Jamaica, Co ta 
Rica, Hondura and Panama to shift from tropical fruits to 
wheat production would be equally foolhardy. Trade between 
the United States and these Central American countries makes it 
possible for each to continue to produce that for which it i best 
adapted, and as a result all enjoy a greater variety and abund-
ance of goods. 
With unrestricted trade among nations different parts of the 
earth's surface are put to those uses for which they are best 
suited. 
The benefits of international trade are not limited to agri-
culture where climate, soil and topography are all important. 
Similar advantages are found in the exchange of manufactured 
goods. 
The United States can make many mass-produced industrial 
products for the rest of the world more cheaply than they can 
produce them for themselves. The large scale production meth-
ods used in making automobiles, tires ,typewTiters, sewing ma-
chines, afety razors and similar goods, give our manufacturers 
a distinct advantage in their production. On the other hand, 
Europe can produce handicraft articles much more cheaply than 
we can. The skill and time that are needed to make fine lace, 
fancy embroidery, toys, artistic pottery, silverware, hand deco-
rated leather articles, optical instruments and numerous other 
specialties, are not ours . 
In the aggregate the people of the United States are richer by 
trading agricultural staples and certain mass-produced manu-
factured goods for the handmade articles of Europe. We gain 
by getting a thousand and one specialties which, because of the 
amount of labor and kill they require, we cannot afford to make 
for ourselves. They in turn benefit by paying less for their 
bread and meat and automobiles than it costs to produce them in 
Europe. 
It is important not to conclude from the preceding argument 
that trade between individual , region and countries i profit-
able only when a commodit can be made more cheaply by one 
than by the other. Trade involves many commodities and the 
gain of pecializati.on and exchange depend not upon absolute, 
but upon relative advantage and disadvantage . 
How T ARI.FFS AFFECT FARM PRICES 149 
A good doctor may be able to operate a typewriter better than 
his typi t. But it will nevertheless pay him to specialize in medi-
cine and to hire the stenographic help he needs. Talce another 
illustration. The arne field in a farm may be best both for grow-
inoa corn and for the site of farm buildings, but obviously it can-
not be u ed for both. All things mu t be considered together. 
It is the relative, and not the absolute difference in advantages 
that is important. Even though the United States were superior 
in e':rery field of production, trade betvveen it and other countries 
still would be profitable. A country gains most when it speciial-
izes in those thi11gs in which its comparative advantage is 
greatest. 
The ri e and expan ion of foreign trade among western coun-
trie is closely related to their advance to higher standard of 
living. International specialization is the very foundation of 
the consuming habits to which we have become accustomed. Each 
day sees us draw upon the sl{ill and resources of men and lands 
of many cou11tries. 
Tariffs Restrict Trade 
Tariffs are the principal means by which pecialization among 
nations is restricted. Tariffs not only stop regional divi ion of 
labor but also limit the size of business enterprise, the use of 
machinery and the specialization of labor. Large plants require 
large markets. In this the producers, especially manufacturers, 
of tl1e United States have had a distinct advantage over Euro-
pean producers. In spite of tariffs the United tates is a large 
marlcet. One can travel ea t and \Vest four days and north and 
outh t'vo days without eros ing a tariff barrier. In contrast, 
Europe with nearly the same area, is divided into 27 areas each 
i olated from the other by tariff walls. A General l\Iotors or 
U. S. Steel corporation would be as great a misfit in any one of 
the 27 ''walled in'' areas of Europe as a 70-ton dinosaur in an 
Iowa cornfield. 
Note, ho,vever, that the corn-hog farmer is an international 
peciali t; he is even larger than U. S. Steel; the United States 
i too small a marl{et for hi lard; he is today dependent upon a 
world marlret. Can he continue to specialize in corn and hogs 
in view of the present international warfare in tariffs~ 
150 THEODORE W. ScHULTZ 
IMPORTS PAY FOR EXPORTS 
An Individual's Income and Outgo· 
The second basic principle that runs through all international 
trade i that over a period of years imports pay for exports. The 
international accounts of a nation must balance. Commodities 
and services bought from foreigners pay for those sold to them 
and vice versa. If one is stopped sooner or later the other also 
disappears. 
The international ca h book of a country is known as the bal-
ance of international payments. In it all the transactions with 
other countries appear, and credits equal debits. It is not unlike· 
the balance sheet which an individual uses when he studies hi 
income and outgo. 
Nor are the essential principles underlying the international 
balance of payments different from those that apply to the tran -
actions of an individual. When a farmer buys a plow he pays 
for it in one of three ways; with cash, vv'ith credit, or with com-
modities that he produces. But for him to use either cash or 
credit to pay for all purchases over a period of years is impos-
sible. A farmer's cash and credit would soon be exhau ted. In 
the end he must pay for the goods he buys with the goods he sells. 
His incoming payments must balance his outgoing. And it fol-
lows that the less he sells the less he can buy. This is all too 
drastically evident today with 10 cent corn and $2.50 hogs. 
Likened to International Payments 
In the e particular the international payments of a country 
are like those of an individual. The items that appear in the bal-
ance sheet of a nation are, of course, more complex and intricate 
and yet the important features are the same. For instance, 
when Germans buy cotton, wheat and lard they can pay with 
gold since no other money is acceptable among nations with 
funds borrowed from abroad, or with goods. But they too, in the 
end, must exchange good for goods or stop buying. 
The total available monetary gold in the world is only about 
12 billion dollars and two-fifth of thi ha now been for years 
in the United Srtates. rrhe total gold holdings of all of the 
countries outside of the United States would have paid for a 
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little O\rer one-half of the gross payments due our citizen for 
good and service sold abroad in the one year, 1928. Obviou ly 
-international credit al o is limited. The only 'vay, then, in which 
exporters can receive pay for their wares o\rer a period of yea.rs 
is through imports. It is important to keep in mind that in the 
1a t analysis international trade is essentially barter. 
Our ·Trade Balances 
The following section shows what is meant by the phrase ''bal-
ance of payments.'' Since it is best illustrated by example, let 
us consider the relevant figures for this country for 1928. The 
year 1928 is taken because the payments are fairl~y· typical of the 
po t-war period. 
The balances compiled by Ray Hall of the Department of 
Commerce are given in tables XXXVI and XXXVII. Although 
these estimates are admittedly subject to considerable error, they 
are the best available. All items in columns 3 and 4 in the follow-
ing table are net incoming payments in every case have been 
canceled against corresponding outgoing payments. Observe that 
therefore each item appears but once, either as a credit or a a 
debit. 
Table XXXVI summarizes the financial transactions of all in-
ternational activity in 'vhich Americans had part during 1928. 
The incoming and outgoing payments are the pans of the balance. 
·The weights that tip it in favor of this country are called credit 
item and those that act in the opposite direction are debits. 
·The total value of all the weights in the two pans measures the 
''international turnover'' between the United States and all 
other countries. 
Tl1e incoming and outgoing payments appearing in table 
XXXVI give the gigantic total of 20,994 million dollars. The 
tremendous role that international transactions have in the busi-
ness acti,rity of the United States is self-evident. By 1931, how-
ever, our international turnover had declined to 13,000 million 
dollar , and it is e timated tl1at in 1932 it again "Yvas harply 
lower. 
Trade 
The largest and most important items on the international 
cash books are exports and imports of commodities. Our prin-
I 
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TABLE XXXVI. ESTIMATED BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS Ol!, 
THE UNITED STATES F OR CALENDAR YEAR 1928, GIVING ALL INCOMING 
PAYMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OUTGOING PAYMENTS FROM 
THE UNITED STATES TO OTHER COUNTRIES 
( Millions of Dollars) 
(1) 
Classes of International Transactions 
Incoming Payments to the United States (Cr edits) 
Exports (all com modi ties) ......................... ... 
Capital imports (foreign investments her e) ... . 
Earnings on investments abroad ................... . 
Touri st expenditures of foreign er s her e ......... . 
War debt r eceipts (n et) ................................. . 
Miscellaneous invisible items ......................... . 
Ctol<l ····----------------- -- -------------------------------- --- --- -----Error ......... _______ .............. _ --------- __ ............... _ .... . . 
To tal ............... ___ .. . ________ . _. __ ...... ____ . _____ . _ ... ______ .. 
Outgoing Payments fr om the United States 
(Debits 
Imports (all commoditi es) ............................ .. 
Capital exports (new investmen ts abroad, etc.) 
Earning to for eigner s on investments in 
America ... __ . ___ ....... -.- ..... __ ___ ............................. . 
Touri st expenditures of Americans abroad .... 
Immigrant remi ttances (n et) ................... . 
Mi scell aneou s invi sible items ········----··········--· 
Short term credit to for eigner s ....................... . 
<i<>l<l ------------------------------------------------------------------
Total ___ ...... _. _ ............ ----- .......... _ ....... .. _. ____ .. ___ __ .. 
(2) 
Total 
value 
5,333 
2, 795 
896 
163 
207 
460 
629 
14 
10,497 
4 ,46 8 
3,513 
359 
824 
218 
532 
226 
357 
10,497 
Grand total (all items) .... ................... ...... . 20 ,9 94 
Balance 
(3) 
Net incoming 
payments 
865 
537 
207 
272 
14 
1,895 
( 4) 
Net outgoing 
payments 
718 
661 
21 8 
72 
226 
1,895 
• 
Source: Based on the excellent work done by Ray Hall, formerly assistant chief of 
the Finance and Investment Division, United States D epartment of Commerce, 
as r eported in Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1931. 
Trade Information Bulletin No. 803. pp. 76·77. 
cipal exports include lard, cotton and tobacco; wheat, rye and 
barley; apples and oranges; salmon and sardines; automobile 
tires, cigarettes and hosiery; gasoline and kerosene; tin plates, 
copper, lumber, rosin and turpentine; locomotives, sewing ma-
chines, cash registers, typewriters and printing machinery; auto-
mobiles, motorcycles and pianos. These give rise to incoming 
payments. 
The important commodities in our import list are raw silk, 
• 
rubber, paper and wood pulp; cane sugar and coffee; wool, some 
chemicals, furs and hides ; fertilizers, oilseeds and vegetable oils; 
burlap, diamonds, tin and tea. These represent outgoing pay-
ments. 
Since the value of the goods that we sold to foreigners exceeded 
tho e that we bought from them, the "balance of trade" gave 
rise to net incoming payments. The difference, $865,000,000, is 
, 
Commodity 
export~ 
Capitol 
import~ 
Eorninqs on in-} 
\lestments obrood 
Tourist~· } 
e.x pet nd itu re~ 
War debt rec.ei pt~ 
Mi~c.. lf"'vi~ibfe l 
item~ 
Cold 
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Fig. 18. Balance of international payments of the United States for 1928. (Based 
on table XXXVI. 
therefore credited to the United States. How did foreign buyers 
in the aggregate pay us this trade balance? To answer this ques-
tion it is necessar~r to consider the other items on the balance 
sheet. These will be taken up in the following order: Loans, in-
terest, tourits expenditures, immigrant remittances, miscellane-
ous invisible items, and all others. 
Loans 
Two items in table XXXVI give capital movements. One of 
these covers investment transactions of Americans abroad and 
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the other investments of foreigners in America. It is the differ-
ence between these two items that is of interest. In 1928 there was 
a net capital export of $718,000,000. This :figure represent 
chiefly new investments of our citizens abroad. This made it 
possible for foreigners to buy more from us than they sold to us. 
A word of explanation, however, is necessary since the gross fig-
ures of which this is the difference are so extremely large. The 
reason i that most of the transactions appearing in these items 
represent trading in bonds and stocks. The buying and selling 
of these securities, not unlike the trading in the stock market, 
tend. to cancel out. 
The events of the World War changed the United States from 
a debtor to a creditor nation. Nor did the change in our :financial 
position stop there. Since then foreigners have become more 
and more indebted to us. Americans have invested increasing 
amounts in foreign securities. The economic consequences of 
this capital movement of the past two decades are both far-
reaching and profound. America is fast becoming a mature 
creditor country. It is the significance of this new role of the 
United States that so vitally affects the export farmer. It bears 
directly upon our tariff policy. Foreigners today must :find dol-
lars to pay interest to us before they can buy our commodities. 
Interest 
The item giving the net earnings that Americans receive on 
their foreign investments is very important. For 1928 interest 
and dividend payments to our citizens from abroad netted the 
United States $537,000,000. The item not only is large but is 
increasing in size. As interest and sinking fund payments are 
made each year upon old and new loans to foreigners this item 
increases. It is these payments that are of paramount signifi-
cance to the American farmer. 
Our earnings on investments abroad definitely compete with 
our export of lard, wheat and cotton for dollar exchange. When 
dollars are virtually unobtainable abroad, as they are at pre ent, 
interest and principal payments come :first and the produce of 
the export farmer goes begging for a market. 
Tourists and Immigrants 
So great was the annual migration of Americans in 1928 that 
it is e timated that $824,000,000 was spent by them abroad. This 
TABLE XXXVII. BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1922-1931 
192 2 
CoiR~~~~~ e~-- · ~ ~ !. ·· · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · ··· · · · :::::::::::: I t ~ i ~ 
Imports ······ ·· ·· ····· ·· ···· ·· ······· 
Incoming Payments (n et credits ) 
Commodity t r ade ba lance .......... .... . . 
Retur n on for eign investments .... . . 
R eturn on \va r d ebt .. ................. ... . . 
All other items (d ) ·-·--·-· ·····--- -· -·· ··-
Gold (exports) .... .. ... _ .... ...... .... ... . --
Outgoing Payments ( n et debits ) 
702 
411 
158 
4 34 
0 
1,70 5 
Capital export s ··· -·· ·· ····· ····-·· ·· -- -- -- --·· . 753 
T ourist expendit ures ··--·--·-- ·· --··· ···· · 370 
Immigr ant r emittances ..... ... .......... 247 
Miscellaneou s invisible item s .. ...... 10 1 
All other items ( d ) . _ . .. . . .. .... . ..... ____ . 0 
Gold ( imports) ··- ·· ····· ·----· -·· ··· -····· -· 234 
1 , 70 5 
(a) Adjusted for differen ce in year end lag. 
(b ) Preliminnr y . 
' 
1923 
4 ,368 
4 ,162 
206 
414 
2 5 9 
91 
0 
97 0 
0 
355 
2 18 
102 
0 
295 
97 0 
(Millions of Dollars) 
1924 
4 ,83 4 
3 ,952 
88 2 
443 
1 8 3 
151 
0 
1,659 
73 3 
440 
219 
51 
0 
216 
1,659 
1925 
5.177 
4 ,544 
633 
460 
1 8 6 
0 
0 
1 ,3 81 
560 
487 
227 
58 
49 
0 
1,3 81 
1926 
5 ,044 
4 . 766 
~ 78 
472 
19 5 
4 13 
0 
1,358 
5 4 0 
489 
2 1 0 
47 
0 
72 
1,358 
192 7 
5 09 1 
4 .5 08 
58:1 
519 
20 6 
0 
154 
1 ,462 
695 
548 
198 
0 
21 
0 
1 ,4 62 
1928 
5 33 3 
4 4 68 
86fi 
537 
2 0 7 
0 
2 72 
1,881 
718 
661 
2 18 
72 
212 
0 
1,881 
1929 
5 ,447 
4, 799 
648 
5 65 
20 7 
62 
0 
1,482 
319 
6 8 5 
2 2 3 
135 
0 
120 
1 ,4 82 
1930 
4 ,095 
3,294 
80 1 
616 
241 
0 
0 
1,65 8 
2 95 
654 
1 66 
125 
142 
276 
1 ,658 
193 1 
2,424 
2,090 
3 34 
7 54 ( c) 
43 
0 
176 
1 ,3 77 
0 
456 
163 
49 
7 0 9 
0 
1,377 
1932 (b) 
1,612 
1,323 
2 89 
610 (c) 
99 
0 
0 
99 8 
0 
375 
132 . 
109 
3 71 
11 
998 
(c) Includes for 1931 $218,000 ,0 0 0 and for 1932 $217,00 0, 000 of net inflow of funds into the United States as a r esult of intei1 national security 
transaction s. 
( d ) Largely changes in the inflow or outflow of sh ort term credit. 
Source: B ased on the studies of R a y Hall, formerly a ssistant chief of the Finance and Investment Division, Department of Commerce, and of Amos 
E . T aylor , pr esent a ssist ant chief , as r eported in The Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1932, Trade Information Bul-
letin No. 8 14, a nd in earlier publications. 
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includes the money spent by our citizens living abroad who derive 
their income from this country. After subtracting the expendi-
tures of foreigners in America there remained $661,000,000. This 
item is an invisible import; it is principally a payment for serv-
ices rather than for goods. 
Immigrant remittance i also an outgoing payment made up 
largely of gifts and of debt payments from recently arrived 
immigrants to relatives and friends in the old country. Time, 
however, slowly loosens the tie that obligates the immigrant to 
his kin who remained behind; each year sees a smaller number of 
dollars sent back to them. 
Miscellaneous Invisible Trade 
Under the heading of miscellaneous invisible items are in-
cluded numerous invisible exports and imports. Freight pay-
ments and receipts, ocean-borne passenger traffic, United States 
government receipts and disbursements abroad, foreign repre-
sentations here, missionary a.nd charitable contributions, motion 
picture royalties, Canadian electric power used in the United 
States, foreign subscriptions to American publications, patents, 
copyrights, royalties, legal fees, advertising, cablegrams, radio-
grams and international telephone calls all of these contrib-
ute to this catch-all item. In the aggregate the services in this 
group tend to cancel each other. The net figure that remains is 
small and is in favor of foreigners, therefore, a debit. 
Other Items 
The returns on war debts are about as large as immigirant re-
mittances. The annual payments are scheduled over the next 60 
years. They gradually increase until 1984 when $423,000,000 is 
scheduled. This item, although comparativeyl small, also com-
petes for the dollars that foreigners are able to get, hence it defi-
nitely tends to reduce our trade balance. 
Of all commodities, gold has a special privilege in foreign 
trade. It i exported and imported without any tariff restriction. 
For instance, when the pre sure of international payments i in 
our favor it is quickly and readily imported to balance the ac-
counts. It usually is a small item in the total international turn-
over of a country. Yet from the beginning of the World vVar 
How TARIFFS AFFECT FARM PRICES 157 
until about 1925, there was an extraordinary movement of gold 
into the United States. It was the one way, outside of borrowing, 
that foreigners had of paying for their purchases. This move-
ment, of necessity, had to stop because the amount of gold in the 
world is after all limited. 
Short term credits to foreigners are debts of foreigners to 
American banks. They are in the main t emporary credit ac-
counts bills that have not been paid. 
The post-war international accounts of Uncle Sam show three 
important classes of credit transactions, namely, ( 1) exports in 
excess of imports,* (2) earnings on investments abroad, and 
( 3) returns on war debts. The cash book was balanced by three 
large items on the debt side; they were, ( 1) loans to foreigners, 
(2) tourist expenditures, and (3) immigrant remittances. 
Observe that American tourists and our immigrants tra.ns-
ferred about enough dollars out of the United States to cover 
interest due us on investments abroad and the scheduled pay-
ments on the war debt. From 1922 to 1930 the e four items prac-
ticall~r canceled each other. 
An important characteristic of the interest and principal pay-
ments due American citizens is the fact that they are fixed by 
contract. Foreign individuals, corporations, municipalities and 
governments using American capital have contracted to pay each 
year a specified number of dollars to their bondholders. Except 
as there is default and repudiation the interest and amortization 
on the debts that foreigners owe us are fixed for years into the 
future regardless of how hard or how easy it is to obtain Ameri-
can dollars abroad. Observe also that the size of the net payments 
covering earnings on our investments abroad is gradually in-
creasing. Nor is its trend likely to change in the immediate 
future. 
Debtor-Creditor Position of the United States 
In 1914 investments of foreigners in United State securities 
stood at about 3,000 million dollars greater tha.n similar in-
vestments of Americans in foreign securities. We know that 
*In most of the literat.ure when exports exceed imports a "favorable balance of 
trade" is said to exist. This is often misleading to the lay r eader, 'vho is likely to 
interpret the word "favorable" as implying a desirable state of affairs whereas the 
term has no such implication . 
• 
• 
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many of our early railroads were largely built by European 
capital. This net debt of the United States gave Europe an 
annual ]ncome of around 200 million dollars. The payment of 
this interest produced dollars abroad, hence a good market for 
our exports. In spite of restrictions upon imports into this coun-
try we enjoyed before the war a profitable foreign market. 
But all this has changed. By 1931 we held long term invest-
ments abroad including the war debt and German obligations to 
the United States Government totaling 23,337 million dollars. 
On the other hand, foreign investments in the United States were 
estimated at 2,422 million dollars. Insead of being in a debtor 
position to the extent of 3,000 million dollars, the United States 
is today a creditor by around 20,915 million dollars or a net 
change of nearly 24,000 million dollars. 
The Great War along with subsequent events changed the 
United States from a position of the world's greatest debtor to 
that of one of her two greatest creditors. 
It was pointed out above that at the outbreak of hostility the 
net income from long term investments was around 200 million 
dollars in favor of foreigners holding American securities. In 
contrast, in 1930, Americans received a net balance of 616 million 
dollars on long term investments abroad. 
The complete reversal of our country from a debtor to a credi-
tor nation; the payment of more than a half billion dollars net, 
principally interest, annually to us as creditors; a payment that 
is largely fixed by contract and one that is increasing each year 
in size these are facts of supreme significance to the American 
exporters, foremost among whom are the hog, wheat and cotton 
farmers. 
It is clearly evident that for the next 10 years and longer, more 
and more of the limited supply of dollars available to the outside 
world will be needed to pay back interest and principal of capital 
now invested abroad. With property rights as they are, the obli-
gations of the creditor come first. How, then, are foreign buyers 
to get dollars with which to purchase our farm produce, that 
urplus which in the past we sold to them at a satisfactory price~ 
Obviou ly our invisible exports tourist expenditures, immigrant 
remittances and other invisible items cannot be expanded read-
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ily to mal{e available to foreigners ufficient dollar exchange with 
'vhich to pay us a large trade balance. 
Overnight, as it were, the events of the World War changed 
this country from a debtor to a creditor nation. But our policies 
are as of old. W e still expect to export without permitting equiv-
alent imports. 
How Uncle Sam Has Been Trading • 
Since the war Europe borrowed and we exported. They sent 
us long term bond and we sent them bread and meat. Thus until 
recently 'Ve maintained our export trade in spite of the bald fact 
that foreigners were not able to earn enough dollars to pay for 
the commodities they bought from us. Up to 1930 net capital 
investments abroad practically covered our trade balance. 
TABLE XXXVIII . CHAN GE IN THE LONG-TE RM D E BTOR-CREDITOR POS I · 
TION OF THE U NITED STATES FROM 19 14 TO 1931 
(Million s of D ollar s) 
Amer ican 
inve tmen ts 
abr oad 
For eign in vest -
ments in the 
Uni ted ta tes 
Net cr editor 
position of the 
U n ited t ates 
1914 --- -- -------- ------- -- ----- -- ---- ------- -- 2 ,350 (a) 
23,33 7 (c ) 
5,350 (b) 
2, 422 ( d ) 
- 3,0 00 
20,915 193 1 -- --··········--- -----·-··· ······-·------· 
Net ch a n ge in cr ed itor posi-
tion of the United States .. 
----- -- --- .. ····· ·· ·---- -------
23,915 
Source : 
• 
a. Mid-point of est imate m ade by R ay Hall which appear s in Amer ica W eigh s 
H er Gold, by J am es Har vey R ogers, 1931. p. 46. 
b. Adj us ted to estima te of Nation al I n dustr ial Conference Board, The I nter -
n ation al F inan cia l P o ition of the Uni ted States, 1929. p. 3 . 
c . I ncludes 3 items: ( 1 ) Amer ican in vestments in foreign countries at the 
end of 19 31 ($15,635 ,000,000) given in The Balance of Inter national P a} -
men ts of the Un ited States in 1931, Dept. of Con1mer ce, T rade I n f . Bul. 
No. 8 0 3 . T ab 1 e 15, p. 4 4 ; ( 2 ) V a 1 u e of "'\V a r Debts, at 4 14 % , J une 3 0, 
1930 ($ 7 ,39 0,000 ,000). Roger s, op. ctt. T able II, p. 47 ; and (3) Value 
of Germ an Obligations to the U n ited States Gover nment , at 4 %, o/o, Mar ch 
30, 1931 ($ 312,000,000). Roger s, op. cit. T able I I , p. 47 . 
d . Includes 2 items: ( 1) Ame·rican investments h eld by for eigners . The 
B alance of Interna tion al Paymen ts of th e United States in 193 1. $2,250. -
000,00 0) op. cit., p . 48; and (2) Obligation s to foreign~rs froll?- a'va rds 
by Alien Proper ty Custodian , D ec. 31, 1930, and War Cla1ms Arbtter J une 
30, 1 93 1 . ($172,000,000). R oger s, op . cit. T able I I , p . 47 . 
But this merely postpones the day of r eckoning. Lilre rolling 
a sno,vball, next }'ear's bill has always been greater by accumu-
lated interest ancl amortization of the previous borro,vings. Btlt 
now loans to foreign nat ions have cea ed and exports have de-
clined to a third of the 1925-1929 level. Observe the figures in 
table XXXIX. 
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Let us translate this state of affairs into private transactions. 
Imagine a shoemaker heavily in debt who for over a decade is 
not permitted to sell his wares, but who is forced to pay his living 
expenses, the interest on his mortgage, and in addition certain 
scheduled payments on a debt that he inherited, in the following 
ways: (1) by borrowing more and more money from his cred-
itors, (2) by turning his shop into a summer resort and (3) by 
using the few dollars his relatives in the country see fit to send 
him. What manner of business is this! Certainly it cannot go 
on indefinitely. Nor has it. Table XXXIX shows what drastic 
-
changes had occurred in our international balance of payments 
by 1932. 
The depression has stopped the outwrard flow of new American 
capital; in fact, the capital movement has for the time being re-
versed itself. In 1932 some foreigners were buying back some 
of their bonds while others were liquidated, and as a result there 
was a net capital flow of $217,000,000 into the United States. 
Exports and imports dropped precipitously. In 1932 they 
TABLE XXXIX. COMPARISON OF THE BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PAY-
MENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 1931 WITH THE 1925-1929 AVERAGE 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Commodities (a) 
E xpor'ts . .. _ .......... _ ... .. _ .. ____ .. .. ....... ...... _ ......... .. 
Imports ......................... .. ...... ........... ___ ... ... .. ...... . 
Incoming Payments (net credits) 
Commodity trade bala nce ......... ...... . 
Return on foreign investments ....... . 
R eturn on war debts ..................... . 
All other credits ....... .............. ....... . . 
Outgoing Payments (n et debits) 
Capital exports ................ .. ...... ... ... . . 
T ouri s t expenditures . ... .......... .. .... .. . . 
Immigrant remittances .. .. ........ . .... .. . 
All other d ebits . ......... ................... . 
1925-1929 
Average 
5,218 
4 ,617 
601 
511 
200 
200 
566 
574 
215 
157 
(a) Adjusted for differ ence in year end lag. 
(b ) Prelimina r y . 
1931 
2 ,424 
2,090 
334 
754 (c) 
113 
176 
0 
456 
163 
758 (d) 
1932 (b) 
1,612 
1,323 
289 
610 (c) 
99 
0 
0 
375 
132 
491 ( d) 
( c ) Includ e~ for 1931 _$218 ,0 0 0, 000 a_nd for 1932 $217,000,000 of n et inflow of 
fu nds m to the U m ted States durmg 1931 as result of international security 
tran saction s. 
( d ) Of these figures, $709 ,0 00,0 00 for 1931 and $371,000,000 for 1932 represent a 
n et outflow of ~hort te~m capi_ta l _from the U~ited States. It r efl ects especially 
the sh arp drop m dep_os1ts earned m the Amencan market by foreigner s . 
Source: B ased on the studies of Ray H all , form erly assi stant chi ef of the Finance and 
Inv:estment pivision, Depart~ent of Commerce, and of Amos E . Taylor, present 
ass ~ sta nt ch1ef ,_ a s r eported 10 The Balan ce of International Payments of the 
U mted States 10 1931. Trade Information Bulletin No . 814 and earli er studies. 
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were le s than one-third of the 1925-1929 average. Fewer tour-
ists went abroad; their expenditures were $200,000,000 less in 
1932 than for the 5-year average. The remittances made by im-
migrants also declined sharply. 
The important changes which the depression has brought to 
our balance of international payments are: ( 1) a cessation of 
new American investments abroad, (2) a drastic decline in our 
trade balance, ( 3) increased earnings and collections on invest-
ments made to foreigners and ( 4) a sharp increase in short time 
credit extended to foreigners. The other items all declined. The 
rett1rns on the w:ar debt reflect the effect of the Hoover morator-
ium dclared in June, 1931. 
The international accounts do balance. But tourist expendi-
tures, immigrant remittances and miscellaneous invisible im-
ports are not enough to cover the returns due the United States 
on foreign investments and war debts and at the same time leave 
foreigners 'vith sufficient balance of dollars with which to buy 
the usual quantity of American commodities. For some years 
this deficit has been cov·ered by loans to foreigners and by the 
importation of gold. Neither of these offers promise for the im-
mediate future. 
If foreigners are to buy American produce they must find it 
possible to sell their specialties in this COlJntry. If they cannot 
sell in our market they may borrow dollars with which to buy 
from us. Because they were able to borrow, foreign trade did 
appear to go on satisfactorily from 1924 to 1929. Borrowing, 
however, has stopped. How now are foreign countries to buy 
lard, wheat and cotton ~ They must first pay annually, in dollars, 
interest and dividends due Americans. This, too, can in the long 
run be done only in imports, visible and invisible. In substa.nce, 
they must sell to us before they are able to buy from us. Again, 
we are back to the second principle underlying all international 
trade, namely, imports are the d emand for our exports because 
imports pay for exports. The two go hand in hand. 
To see how tariffs work one has to stand above individual 
schedule and look at the picture as a whole. It is not easy for a 
farmer or businessman to do this. For one reason, he is likely to 
con ider only those tariffs on the things he produces thus mis ing 
their national and international effects. Then, too, international 
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trade, including the tariff problem, is always very complex. 
The interrelations of one group of farmers to another, of agri-
culture to industry, and of the United States to the rest of the 
world are intricate questions; yet, they all have to be taken into 
account. 
Economic Co,nseq uences 
The general picture of foreign trade has been stressed in this 
chapter. We have looked into the international records and 
accounts of Uncle Sam and we have analyzed the yearly state-
ments of incoming and outgoing payments. The most important 
single fact that has come to our attention is our complete change 
from a debtor to a creditor country. Moreover, we found that 
our creditor position has expanded amazingly in the last decade. 
The economic consequences of this change in the financial posi-
tion of the United States are not generally understood. It is a 
new experience for America. As a nation we are still debtor-
minded. We think and act like debtors; our policies are those 
that suited the pre-war period; we do not know what it means to 
be creditors. It has taken a crisis to awaken us. 
The export farmer is, of course, vitally interested. His very 
existence is at stake. But he is not alone. The interdependence 
between hog and dairy farmers and between farm and city 
people is fairly evident today. They are all tied together. When 
one falls the others follow or absorb the shock and rescue the 
victim. 
When foreign markets for cotton, wheat, lard and tobacco dis-
appear it is only a matter of time until the prices of butter, beef, 
mutton and eggs are dragged do-wn. American farming is still 
dominated by the export group. They set the tempo o.f our agri-
cultural well-being. Nor is the city outside the pale of its influ-
ence. Witness the consequences of the lack of purchasing power 
among farm people; it has seriously affected the rest of our busi-
ness community. The fact that farmers are unable to buy is 
being keenly felt in our industrial centers. Factories are forced 
to clo e and the ranks of the unemployed are increasing because 
of the inability of farmers to buy their products. The loss of the 
foreign markets has destroyed the fundamental balance of ou.r 
national economic life. 
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The present cri is in international trade has brought wide-
spread disaster to the export farmer. Figure 19 hows how much 
harder he is hit than the farmer not directly dependent upon for-
eign outlets. The export group is today r eceiving prices only 
about one-half as high as the non-export group, who, too, are 
definitely depressed. The \veighted a·verage farm price in De-
cember of the commodities on an export basis was 43 percent of 
pre-war; whereas, the non-export group stood at 80 percent of 
the 1910-1914 price level. This looks like an excellent argument 
for getting all of our agriculture on a domestic basis. Certainly, 
the home marlret i more certain and dependable in periods such 
• 
as we are now 1n. 
But the American farmers, especially those of the Mississippi 
Valley, are inescapably dependent upon foreign buying. The 
home marlret, in spite of the pheno1nenal growth of our cities, 
cannot absorb anywhere near all of the food and raw materials 
of our farms. Moreover, there is not even a r emote probability 
that any possible increase in our industrial population will pro-
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vide during the next decade or two a home market sufficiently 
large. Facts force us to accept the conclusion, whether we wish 
it or not, that farmers must continue to sell abroad or face whole-
sale liquidation. 'remporarily, production may, of course, be 
checked and even reduced to something approaching a domestic 
TABLE XL. CROP LAND REQUIRED TO PRODUCE AGRICULTURAL EX· 
PORTS AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS THAT COULD BE PRODUCED IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Crop Land Required to Produce: 
Agricultural exports (a) ................................... .... . 
Agricultural imports that could be produced in 
the United States (b) ...............•........................ 
Total crop land ....................................................... . 
Acres 
65,000,000 
15,000,000 
350,000,000 
Percent 
of total 
18.6 
4.3 
100. 
(a) This is the area used for the production of crop and animal products exported as 
estimated for 1922-1928 (55,000,000 acres) plus the area required to produce 
feed for the work stock used in producing our exported product .· 
(b) Obviously it is not advantaegous to undertake the commercial production of all 
the agricultural commodities imported, fo · instance, such tropical products as 
bananas, pineapples, coffee and rubber. This figure is the area of land that would 
be required to produce those commodities that are capable of being produced in 
this country at costs that are not excessive. 
Source: L. C. Gray and 0. E. Baker. Land Utilization and the Farm Problem. Misc. 
Publication No. 97, Department of Agriculture, 1930. 
basis. But as a :five or ten-year policy it is problematical whether 
or not this can be done. Observe the following :figures. The crop 
and animal products of nearly one-fifth of our crop land were 
annually exported from 1922 to 1928. How low must prices fall 
and how long must they stay down before this 20 percent of our 
farm land is shifted or taken out of farm use ~ 
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
The foregoing analysis of our balance of international pay-
ments points to several alternative courses of action. In simplest 
terms they are : 
1. Resume loaning capital funds to foreigners. 
2. Decrease export . 
3. Increa e imports. 
Without attempting, at this point, to weigh the advantages 
and di advantages of a tariff policy, these three po sibilities, or 
a combination thereof, are open to u . At present, knowingly 
• 
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or otherwise, the United States is carrying out a policy the con-
sequences of which can be none other than to decrease exports. 
Throughout this study no mention has been made of the 
adverse effects of foreign tariffs, import quotas, milling restric-
tions, import monopolies and exchange control upon our foreign 
trade. All of these are bearing heavily on the export farmer, 
particularly since most of the trade restrictions enacted in the 
last three years have been on agricultural commodities. The 
removal of these se·vere restrictions would certainly ease the pres-
sure against our wheat and lard and other farm products. But 
the fact remain , even though every foreign country were to 
remove all of its trade barriers, o1ur export trade would still be 
doomed, unless foreign cot1ntrie can sell in our marl{et. Cotton, 
for example, has no tariffs against it abro·ad, and yet it, too, finds 
the foreign marl{et without dollars with which to buy cotton. 
For the next fe'v year there is little likelihood that much 
money will be loaned to fo·reigners. The revival of our commod-
ity exports by resuming our policy of loaning money is not very 
promising. Too many of our citizens, who hold foreign bonds, 
have taken unexpected losses. This is going to malre it hard for 
some time to float foreign securities in America. In fact, as was 
indicated earlier, the capital movement, for the time being, has 
reversed itself. Some American investors a.re trying to return 
their capital to the United States. Instead of promoting our 
export trade, this action further stifles it. 
The scaling down of foreign loans now in force, both private 
and public, would tend to relieve the pressure on dollars now 
required for incoming payments for interest a.nd sinking funds. 
Such a creditor-debtor adjustment 'iVould help commodity sales 
abroad. It is not amiss to point out that the war debt is but a 
small part of our total creditor holdings. The outlook for relief 
to the export farmers from more loans to foreigners and from a 
scaling down of present investments of Americans abroad is cer-
tainly doubtful. 
Another alternative is to decrease exports. This means adjust-
ing production more nearly to a domestic basis. It involves 
shrinking the export indu tries to the point where imports, vis-
ible and invisible, will pay for our earnings on foreign invest-
ments, return on the war debt and, if a balance remains, for ex-
I 
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ports. Presumably, the shrinking process is automatic. Because-
foreign buyers are unable to get dollars to buy our commodities, 
the price of the e commodities therefore falls to a point so low 
that a sufficient number of producers are forced out of these 
fields. Thus a new equilibrium would be created. It is needles to 
say that an adjustment of this kind in agriculture is extremely 
slow and socially very painful. Dislocations in agriculture re-
quire years to mend themselves. 
The third alternative involves increasing imports. The im-
portant factor in such a policy would be the scaling down of our 
tariff wall. This does not necessarily mean free trade or an 
abandonment of protection. Such a policy calls for ''enough of 
an increase in imports of diversified manufacturers to malce it 
unnecessary for us to base our export trade on foreign loans.'' 
Lowering the tariff wall would force some tariff protected in-
dustries to shift to those business activities that can compete 
without prohibitive tariffs. 
The choice is unmistakably between the second and third of 
these alternatives. As a nation we must either decrease our ex-
ports or increase our imports. One represents the demand for 
the other. The two must balance. 
Thus far it has not been our expressed purpose to how which 
of these two alternatives is the better national policy. Our task 
has been to consider the consequences of our past policy. Their 
effects upon the export farmer have been pointed out. We have 
not, however, appraised the advantages of tariffs from a national 
viewpoint. That job remains. 
Tariffs are intended to check imports. It is the protective 
aspect and not the revenue-raising feature of tariffs that is com-
monly stressed in Congre s. What rea ons are there for a nation 
to check, in fact, often prohibit, imports~ There are many argu-
ment advanced for tariffs. The more important of these will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
167 
SELECTED READINGS 
Beveridge, Sir William (by a committee of economists under tl1e cha.irman-
ship of Beveridge). Tariffs: The Case Continued. Longmans Green 
& Co. New York. 1932. 
Boggs, Theodore II. The International Trade Balance in Theory and Prac-
tice. MacMillan Co. 1922. 
Hibbard, Benjamin H.; Commons, John R.; P erlman, Selig. Agricultural 
Tariffs. Statement of investigations made at the University of Wis-
consin. Published by W. T. Rawleigh. Freeport, Ill. 1929. 
Rogers, James Harvey. America Weighs Her Gold. Yale University Press. 
New Haven. 1931. 
Slichter, Sumner H. Modern Economic Society. Chap. VI, XXIX, and 
XXX. Henry Holt and Co. New York. 1931. 
Taussig, F. W. Some Aspects of the T'ariff Question. 3rd enlarged ed. con-
tinued to 1930 with the cooperation of H. D'. White. Harvard Univer-
sity press. Ca.mbridge. 1931. 
U. S. Devartment of Commerce. The Balance of International Payments 
of the United States in 1932. Trade Information Bul. No. 814, by 
Amos E. Taylor. Earlier annual reports by Ray Hall. 1933. 
U . S. Department of Com.merce. Foreign Trade of the United States in the 
Calendar Year 1931. Trade Information BuJ. No. 808. 1932. 
U. S. Tariff Commission. Comparison of Rates of Duty in the Tariff Act of 
1930 and in the Tariff Act of 1922. 1930. 

CHAPTER TEN MARCH, 1933 
Shrink Agriculture or Shift Tariff Protected 
Industries 
BY THEODORE W. ScHULTZ 
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the United 
States has, due to the circumstances of the World War and the 
post-war period, graduated from the position of the world's 
greatest debtor to a position as one of the two greatest creditor 
nations. It is an inescapable fact in international trade that a 
mature* creditor nation cannot sell as much to other COllntries 
as it is obliged to take from them. 
Less Exports or More Imports 
There are essentially two ways by which this adjustment in 
our foreign trade can be made. We may either decrease our 
exports or increase imports. Naturally, a combination of the 
two is also possible. 
For a long time we have looked upon ourselves as an export-
ing country, and rightly so. Since 1874 American trade has 
been marked by an export trade balance. The value of exports 
exceeded imports; we sold more goods to foreigners than we 
took from them. 
Up until the World War our trade balance reflected our 
debtor po ition. We were a mature debtor country. We had 
borrowed more capital from abroad than any other country. 
In order to make interest and sinl\:ing fund payments to for-
eign citizens it was necessary for us to export more than we 
imported. It is estimated that at the time of the outbreak 
of the World War Americans were paying about $200,000,000 
a year to Europeans for the use of capital. In contrast, the 
principal creditor countries, such as the United Kingdom, pre-
'var Germany and France, imported more than they exported. 
This, too, ~as only natural. These ti .. ade bala.nces merely re-
flected the financial positions of the respective countries. 
*A mature creditor nation is said to exi t when n e'v loan s to foreigners do n ot 
cover interest and amortization due it on previous investments abr oad, and a mature 
debtor nation exists when funds borrowed currently from other countries are n ot as 
large as interest and sinking fund payments due other countries on all previous 
foreign loans. 
[169] 
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A mature debtor country must export more than it imports 
to balance its international payments. Germany, India, Argen-
tina and :Mexico are in this position at the present time. Simi-
larly, a mature creditor country is obliged to import more than 
it exports. The United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands 
are examples of such countries. 
Relation of Prosperity to Trade Balances 
It i a common belief that a country gains from international 
trade only when it sells more than it buys. There is no ade-
quate foundation for this belief. In fact, it i contrary to one 
of the basic principles underlying all trade among countries. 
In the last analysis, imports pay for exports. They are a na-
tion's receipts for the commodities that it sells to· foreigners. 
To refuse to· accept jmports is to refuse payme·nts for go()ds sold 
and awaiting to· be sold. 
The trade balance in itself is therefore not a key to the 
pro perity of a country. For instance, the prosperity of the 
United States during the years preceding the war is no more 
to be attributed to the excess of exports that characterized 
our tracl.e balance, than is the British prosperity of the arne 
period to be accounted for on the grounds of an excess of im-
ports. The economic well-being of a nation depends upon other 
considerations, principally on the effectiveness of its workers, 
the state of the arts, and the abundance of natural resources. 
From a national viewpoint large exports and small import 
are in themselves neither de irable nor undesirable. Foreign 
trade i clo ely related to the int rnational flow and ebb of 
capital. A trade balance reflects the debtor or creditor posi-
tion of a country and not the prosperity of the people. Al-
though the time ha come when the United States mu t change 
from an exporting to an importing country, this transition 
hould occa ion no alarm. 
Two alternatives have been tre sed, namely: (1 ) shrinking 
the export industrie , i!lcluding mid-we tern agriculture, to 
more nearly a dome tic ba i , thu cutting down exports, or (2) 
caling down our tariff wall o as to permit enough import , 
which would probably be chiefly diversified manufacture , to 
make it po ible for farmers and manufacturers to ell a part 
of their produce in foreign markets. 
TABLE XLI. BALANCES OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES SHOWING NET INCOMING PAY1fENTS AND NET OUTGOING PAY-
MENTS OF THIS COUNTRY FOR 1922-1930 AND FOR 1931 AND THE PROS· 
PECTIVE LONG-TREND OUTLOOK OF EACH CLASS OF TRANSACTIONS 
(mill ions of dollars) 
Class of international 
tran actinns 
Commoditiesa: 
Export -·- ----·----------······ 
I 1n p or t ....................... . 
Net incoming pnyn1ents to 
the United States: 
1 . Commodity trade 
balance -·-····-----------
2 . Earnings en foreign 
inv tments ........ ... . 
3 . R eturns on 'var debt 
4. All other items ........ 
5 . Gold (exports) 
------
Net outgoing r ayments 
from the United States: 
1. Capital exports ..... . 
2. Touri st expenditures 
3. Immigr an i r e1ni t-
tance .. ........... ·····-· 
4 . All other items ..... . 
5. Gold ( hnpo1 ts) -----· 
1922-1930 
yearly 
a vera O'e 0 
4 ,83 4 
4 ,212 
622 
493 
205 
4 
0 
513 
521 
214 
0 
7 6 
1931 
2.424 
2 ,090 
3 3 4 
754 
113d 
0 
176 
0 
456 
1 63 
7 58e 
0 
a Adjusted for differ en ce in year end lag. 
bPreliminary. 
I 
1932b 
1 ,612 
1,323 
289 
610 C 
99d 
0 
0 
0 
375 
1 32 
4 80C 
11 
' 
Prospective 
long-trend outlook 
Decrease, relative to imports. 
Inc rease, r elative to exports. 
A complete rever sal is pro b-
able, imports exceeding ex 
ports. 
Likely t o incr~n 3e in size and 
• in importance. Con s ider· 
able defaul t at, present. 
Further scaling down • 111 
prospect. 
Cancels out against item (4) 
below. No significant 
change probable . 
Flows out • the or Ill upon 
slightest pressure. Long-
run direction of flo'v un -
d eterminable. 
Few loans likely to be made 
to foreigners for some 
years. After in tern a tional 
stability is r eached . thr.~? 
are likely again to become 
important. 
Subject to many nnforecast-
able factor s . T his item 
will p r obably 1 emain lar ge. 
Definitely declining and '\\"i ll 
gradually disappear. 
The 1 93 1 figure repr esents 
short term credi t changes, 
a danger signal of pending 
11ncertainty. Normally l ike-
ly to cancel out again~t 
item (4) • net incoming In 
pr1y1nents. 
See (5) above. 
cJncludes $218,000,000 for 193 1 and $217,000,000 for 1932 of n et infio'v of funds 
into the tinited States as a r esult of international securities t ransactions. 
dl9 3 1 and 1932 reflect the Hoover Moratorium and also the default and postpone-
ment of some countries in 1932. 
eof these figur es $709,000,000 for 1931 and $371,000,000 for 1 932 r epr esent a 
n et outflow of short term capital from the United States. It r eflects especially the 
sharp drop in deposits carried in the American market by foreign er s. 
Source : Based on the s tudies of Ray H all, formerly assistant chief of the Finance 
and Investment Division, D epartmen t of Commerce, and of Amos E. Taylor, present 
assi~tant chief, as r eported in "Balance of International Payments of the United 
States in 1931, ' ' Trade Information Bulletin No. 803 . 
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Whether it is better national policy to shrink the export group 
or allow more merchandise to be imported depends principally 
upon the advantages or disadvantages o.f tariff protection. Be-
fore examining the arguments commonly advanced for tariff , 
however, it will be necessary to consider how foreign trade ad-
justs itself to tariff barriers when, for in tance, other countries 
are obligated to make large dollar-payments to the United States. 
ADJUSTMENTS NOW TAKING PLACE IN OUR BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS 
Even though the United States does not change its tariff 
policy, are there not some well defined long time adjustments 
in process that will eventually correct the acute scarcity of 
American dollars abroad? After all, are not the painful rup-
tures in our foreign trade healing themselves~ Let us consider 
some of the forces that are at work which if left alone should in 
time relieve the pressure on incoming payments trends that 
give promise to correct the vicious state of affairs now existing 
in our balance of payments. 
It is easier to see how these adjustments take place when one 
studies the case of the foreign country meeting the pressure of 
outward payments to the United States. Keep in mind that we 
are protected by a high tariff wall. 
Briefly, many .foreign countri es each year must make im-
mense payments to us. These payments must be made in dollars. 
1 p untH 1930, in most of these countries no apparent scarcity 
of dollars developed. There had been a rapid increase in for-
eign loans obtained from us which made dollar exchange plen-
tiful. When foreign loans stopped, as they did during 1930, 
pressure soon developed. 
Premium on Gold 
Foreign countrie mu t continue to make large payments to 
the Unjted States. To obtain American dollars, now that credit 
is no longer available, they mu t ell their goods to u . At pres-
ent we tand ready to receive gold and certain raw materials 
without the penalty of a tariff. Most manufactured articles are 
allowed to enter only after paying a heavy cu toms duty. 
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Gold, moreover, has special privileges. Not only is it per-
mitted free entrance, but it is acceptable in unlimited amounts 
and at a fixed price. All other duty-free articles if imported 
in exce s of usual requirements are acceptable only at a much 
reduced price. This places gold in a favored position. As a 
result, in all countries making heavy payments to the United 
States there arises a premium on gold. 
Under normal conditions premiums on gold of this nature are 
the very forces that correct the pressures that may develop in 
the international balance of payments. Since the monetary 
structures of these countries are based on gold a premium on it 
tends to press internal prices down. Their price levels in terms 
of gold would therefore separate downward from ours. 
Since the outflo,v of gold from a country reduces the price 
level and the inflow raises it, the movement of gold to the United 
States to discharge foreign obligations should set forces into 
operation that would relieve the scarcity of dollars abroad. In 
barest outlines the process is as follows. Gold imports would 
inflate our price structure. The loss of gold by the outside world 
would deflate their price structures. Thus our prices would 
separate from those of other countries. This would act as a 
check on our exports a.nd as a stimulant to imports. Foreign 
goods would come in over the tariff wall in large enough amounts 
to reestablish a balance between outgoing and incoming pay-
ments. 
But why did this corrective not take place during the la t 
dec.ade ~ Certainly, all of the countries that made heavy pay-
ments to us have experienced a scarcity of gold. Furthermore, 
gold has flowed in extraordinary amounts into the United 
States.* 
Sterilized Gold 
In the first place much of the gold that was sent to us was 
ab orbed by the Fiederal Reserve Banks. The system acted 
*The United States, which in 1913 held only 23 percent of the gold in the world, 
in 1931 had 43 percent of the total supply. England and Germany had 10 percent 
and 11 percent, respectively, of the world's gold in 1913; by 1931 their share had 
fallen to slightly less than 7 and 3 percent. During this period France had increased 
her holdings from 15 to 19 percent, while Russia's share had dropped from 11 to 3 
percent. T'\vo countries in 1931 h ad come to pos.sess over 60 percent of total gold 
stock s . On the other hand, two great trading and financial countries England and 
Germany 'ver e forced to operate on less than half of their former gold reserves. 
Rogers, James Harvey. "America Weighs Her Gold.'' p. 211. Yale University 
Press. 1931. 
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partly as a sponge soaking up the incoming metal. Consequently 
it did not lead to a proportional enlargement of the credit struc-
ture. Hence prices did not rise to the full extent that available 
gold stock would have allowed. t The policy of the Federal 
Reserve Banks in not letting dome tic prices inflate more than 
they did prior to 1929 may have been commendable. But whereas 
a table price level was a good national objective, it threw an 
undue strain upon the price structure of the rest of the world. 
By attempting to keep domestic prices in hand, that is, avoiding 
undue inflation prior to 1929, the Federal Reserve Banks coun-
teracted the effects of much of the incoming gold. Thus they 
le ened the curative powers of the incoming gold in reestablish-
ing a normal balance in our international payments. 
Tariff Warfare 
In the second place, we followed a policy of trade restriction. 
Whenever a stream of goods showed signs of coming in over our 
tariff wall we quickly raised additional barriers. The Tariff 
Act of 1922 practically closed the American market to foreign 
goods, except for certain raw materials. The Tariff Act of 1930 
followed with its all but prohibitive duties. To the extent that 
the loss of gold abroad lowered their price levels it should have 
aided foreign manufacturer in selling in our market. But re-
lief in this direction proved impossible. Any separation of our 
price level from that of other countries was more than offset by 
new and higher tariffs. 
Thus the rupture in our balance of international payments has 
not been mended. The healing process that might and should 
have taken place through increa ed merchandise imports was 
pvrposefully fru trated. Two things have happened chiefly as 
a re ult of our foreign trade policy: (1) It has snapped the 
bond that in the past tied the various price structures of the 
world together. Nearly all of the rest of the world has been 
tObserve the following figu res. Roughly the Federal Reserve Banks are required 
by law t.o keep a "reserve r atio" of 4 0 percent. At the end of 1920 they had 4 3 
percent; 1921, 70 percent; 1922, 73 p er cent; 1923, 75 p er cent; 1924, 73 p er cent; 
19 25, 69 per cent; 192 6, 71 percent; 1927, 66 percent; 192 , 63 p ercent; 1929, 70 
percent; 1930, 74 percent; 1931, 67 percent; 1932, 63 percent. Statistical Abstract 
of the nit.ed tates 1931 and Federal R eserve Bulletin, January, 1933. 
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forced to abandon the gold standard.* Premiums on gold be-
came too high for them to support. (2) It has brought about 
widespread restrictions on trade, some of which have been re-
taliatory and some defensive in character. 1\Iany countries have 
been forced to use tariffs to protect the stability of their cur-
rency. Nationalism, too, has played an important part. Conse-
quently, innumerable trade barriers have been raised against 
our commodity exports. Such is the impas e in vvhich w'e find 
international trade at present. 
Althot1gh inflo",.ing gold was in part sterilized and merchan-
di es were not accepted 'vithout a heavy tariff penalty, other 
important corrective influence appear to be at work. Given 
time they promise to relieve, in some measure, the acute scarc-
ity of American dollars abroad. The more important ones are: 
1. l\1igration of American industries to foreign countries. 
2. An abrupt downward separation in terms of gold of the 
internal prices of other countries and ours due to depreciating 
currencies abroad. 
3. The probability of tourist travel, an invisible import, in-
• 
crea 1ng. 
4. Foreign tariffs, import quotas, milling restrictions, and 
excha11ge controls which forcefully reduce our commodity ex-
ports. Each of these will be briefly examined. 
Migration of American Industry to Foreign Co·untries 
The American manufacturer who is depe11dent upon foreign 
outlet has one escape. If the goods that he makes cannot be 
sold abroad because of tariff barriers and the unavailability of 
American dollars in foreign countrie , he can export his factory. 
l\Iany of the most aggressive and efficiently managed indu tries 
have done exactly this; they have established factories abroad. 
Observe two characteristics of this migration of our industries 
to other countries: (1) The indu tries opening plants abroad are 
among the leaders in paying high wages, in using efficient meth-
ods of production and in having outstanding ma.nagerial per-
onnel ; ( 2) " rhile this e cape i open to the resourceful business-
man, it is not open to the farmer. Obviously, it is impo sible 
----
*The United States, too, has departed from the gold standard. One cannot foresee, 
now, what measures the United States Government will adopt upon monetary policy. 
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for Iowa farmers to establi h branch farms in Germany and 
England to produce the lard that they formerly sold to those 
countries. 
The Department of Cemmerce estimates that there were 524 
American manufacturing establishments in Canada at the end 
of 1929 compared with 186 in 1918. Of the 453 American plants 
r eported in Europe for 1929, only 82 were established before 
1918. No branch factories were established in South America 
before 1920. Nine years later Latin America had 49 American 
branch factories and a total of 153 manufacturing plants. Our 
manufacturers had also established 64 plants in Africa and Asia 
and 42 in Australia and New Zealand. It is estimated that the 
total number of American plants abroad at present is over 2,000 
and that they employ between 400,000 and 500,000 workers. By 
expor ting the factory the need for exporting manufactured goods 
is decreased. Thus the demand for American dollars required 
to make payments to the United Stat~s is being lessened in for-
eign countries. 
Tariffs are not the only factor that has motivated American 
industries to migrate. Those who invest in oil, mining and 
agricultural activities abroad are only taking advantage of pro-
ductive natural resources. American-owned Mexican oil wells, 
Cuban sugar plantations and Canadian pulp and newsprint fac-
tories are of this nature. Costs of transportation, patent serv-
ices and national sentiment have induced some to migrate. But 
it is safe to say that the ever growing tariff w.alls have unques-
tionably been the most influential factor.* 
Our Tariff Act of 1930 went into effect in June; by September 
the Canadians had raised their tariffs. Observe what has hap-
pened as a re ult. During the period from September, 1930, 
to June, 1931, 7 4 additional American branch manufacturing 
companies were established in Canada; nor has the movement 
stopped. Canada has preferential tariffs with 29 countries un-
der the British flag and favorable trade agreements with 43 
other . The e markets are, therefore, open to the American 
*" . . . the tariff is in the majority of cases the fir~t obstacle that the American 
exporter is likely to consider in connection with his export trade plans. It is safe 
to state tha t in the case of Canada, where probably the great st number of American 
branch plants are located, the tariff is the most influential fa ctor. . . ." enate 
Document, o. 258. American Branch Factories Abroad. 1 931. 
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branch factories that move to Canada. But the payrolls also 
have been transferred across the line; Canada undoubtedly has 
profited thereby. 
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It is of special interest to note what industries are leaving the 
TJ nited States. At the end of 1929 the mant1facturers of agri-
cultural and indu trial machinery had 147 such plants; phar-
maceutical products, 102; electric and telephone supplies, 98; 
automotive industry, 87; paints and varnishes, 32; and so on 
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down the line. The aritcles, according to the Department of 
Commerce, range from type,:vriters to mining machinery and 
from cough drops to automobiles. AB is shown below these in-
du tries have been among the most effective in using American 
labor. This group has been directly responsible for forcing up 
our wage scale. Because they were among the most efficient they 
W'.er e able to pay high wages and at the same time sell cheaply 
enough to attract foreign buyers. But, the present, in order to 
maintain these foreign outlets, they find it neces ary to export 
their factories. 
Depreciated Currency 
Outside of France, practically the whole world has departed 
from gold.* Because gold increased in value r elative to all other 
commodities, it came to command too high a premium. As a re-
sult country after country found it impossible to pay the price 
necessary to stay on gold. The immediate causes for abandon-
ing the gold standard are both numerous and complex. They 
are differ ent for each country. But since they are not germane 
to our analysis, they may be omitted. The que tion arises: What 
determines the value of the money of those countrie no longer 
r edeemable in gold ? The answer is simple. Take the English 
pound. Since its price is no longer fixed in t erms of gold, the 
free play of supply and demand forces now determine its market 
value. The thing that happened to sterling was similar to what 
took place in wheat during and after the operations of the 
F arm Board. The Farm Board had fixed the domestic price of 
wheat and stood r eady to buy or sell any amount at a fixed 
pr ice. World economi c events soon showed that the Farm 
Board's wheat price was too high. When it abandoned wheat 
the price of wheat quickly f ound a new level, determined prin-
cipally by supply and demand forces. As in wheat, the foreign 
exchange markets at pr e ent establi h the price of currencies no 
longer ba ed on gold. Let u briefly examine the supply and de-
mand factor , fo r in tanc~, of Briti h sterling. 
*The United tates is at present off the international gold standar d. The r easons 
for this action on the par t of the Federal Government h ave not been exter nal but 
chiefly internal. The collapse of the banking str ucture within the nited tates 
rather than the pressur e of outward payments of d ollar s to for eign countr ies w as 
responsible for the suspension of gold payments. 
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On the supply side of sterling are British importers and all 
other persons who want to part with sterling in order to get 
foreign currencies. This includes the British government and 
citizens 'vho have borrowed American funds and who want dol-
lars to pay interest and inlring funds. On the demand side are 
all bu3rer of British exports and all other people who want to 
exchange foreign currency for sterling. The market for British 
money today is lilte the marlcet for ~,.heat and corn. The price 
from day to day is no longer fixed but it fluctuates according 
to the dictates of supply and demand. What is true of sterling 
applies to every currency inconvertible into gold. 
Note what happens. Since there i a pres ~ure on outward 
payment in these countries, they are anxious to exchange their 
currency for dollars. But dollars are scarce. So they are obliged 
to bid up the price of dollar , that is, they must offer more· of 
their money to induce tho 1e persons who have dollars to sell. 
Thus their currency depreciates relative to dollars. But this 
action corrects the balance of payments. It does this in two 
wa)rs: (1) by checlting the consumption of those goods that are 
imported, a.nd (2) by stimulating exports. 
A book publi hed in Engla.nd before England abandoned gold 
cost, we will say, $4.86. In France, or countries still on the gold 
standard, it can now be bought for a much reduced price, about 
$3.40. Before the United States went off the gold standard this 
trade advantage was trtle for our importers. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, however, "\Ve did not import more, relatively, than 
we did before the 'vhole ale depreciation of foreign currencies. 
The chief reason " 'hy depreciated currencies did not have any 
noticeable influence on 011r imports ,,~a becall e our tariffs are 
specific dutie 1 or a combination of specific and ad valorem duties, 
with cu~ toms collected on the ba is o·f which proves to be the 
higher of the t"ro. \Vl1en price decline a specific duty increases 
relative to the value of the commodity. Take sugar. When raw 
sugar sold for 4 cents a pound at the point of importation, the 
duty of 2 cents per pound vva 50 percent of the price of ugar. 
But ''rith uban sugar selling at 1.3 cents per pound at New 
Yorl{, a~ it did in 1931, the tariff penalty became 150 percent 
of the import price. This increa e in tariffs tended to off et the 
advantage to importers created by the depreciation of currencies 
in exporting nations. 
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In the same way depreciated currencies tend to reduce the im-
ports to that country or the exports from a country with a 
stable currency. An American automobile that sold for $750 in 
England could be bought for 150 pounds sterling before England 
went off gold. When the sterling depreciated an Englishman 
had to pay many more pounds sterling for the same automobile 
-about 215 in February, 1933. Wages, salaries and other forms 
of income in England did not change materially so that it was 
much harder for the English to buy our goods. 
This, of course, does not hold for imports coming from coun-
tries that also have had their currencies decline in value. The 
Danish krone is quoted at 58 percent of its par exchange value, 
while the pound is selling for 70 percent of its former gold 
value.* Accordingly1 English consumers are not checked in buy-
ing Danish goods, instead it is slightly to their advantage to 
use commodities produced in Denmark. In all of the preceding 
analyses it has been assumed that internal prices wages, sal-
aries, taxes, contractual obligations involving capital investments 
and those commodities produced and consumed within the coun-
try are more or less rigid in character. 
Travel A broad t 
The downward separation of many foreign price levels away 
from our own may be expected, in normal times, to encourage 
Americans to travel abroad. Although the depression has sharply 
reduced tourist travel, it would seem that the cheaper costs in 
Europe and elsewhere are likely to act as a strong inducement 
for Americans to spend, when incomes again permit, their vaca-
tions abroad. As living costs become progres ively cheaper in 
foreign countries, foreign travel may be expected to become in-
creasingly popular. Services and goods bought by our tourists 
have the same influence as imports of merchandise; in fact, they 
are considered an invisible import. They help to correct our 
balance of payments. Tourist expenditures are already an im-
portant source of dollars to Europeans. "Thus, in true lordly 
*February, 1933. 
tWhen this was written the dollar had not depreciated materially in the foreign 
exchanges. 
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fashion, may we eat and drink at the tables of our debtors 
much of what our system of trade restrictions make impossible 
for us to receive in more direct ways.''* 
Trade Barriers A broad 
It is not necessary to stress the adverse effects of the many 
forms of trade restrictions enacted by those countries that here-
tofore have been our best customers. There are all manner of 
tariff , quotas and milling restrictionse The most drastic has 
been the control of foreign exchanges. Viewed from the stand-
point of the countries required to make heavy outward payments, 
import restrictions are for them rational correctives. In large 
measure, they have been forced to use them in self-defense. 
Becau e of the demand for outward payments, they must export 
more than they import. To accomplish this they have curtailed 
imports, the one factor within their control. 
One example will suffice. Take Cuba, heavily in debt to us, a 
producer of one crop, sugar. Americans are among the heaviest 
consumers of sugar in the world; the Cubans normally use more 
lard per capita than any other people. We need their sugar 
and they want our lard. But what has happened? 
Sugar is selling for less than 1 cent a po1Jnd in Cuba. Our 
tariff is 2 cents a pound. The Cuban government has retaliated 
by increasing the duty on lard to 7Y2 cents a pound, and as a 
result the selling price of lard in Cuba is three times the Chicago 
price. Observe the results. Cuba, "\vhich in the past has been 
our third largest consumer of lard, exceeded only by Great 
Britain and Germany, has reduced her lard purchases to less 
than one-third of normal. Cuba, which usually tool{ around 80 
million pounds, in 1932 bought from us only about 25 million 
pounds of lard. 
Adjustments of this lrind, although they tend to correct our 
balance of payment , that is, they bring the supply and demand 
of dollars in the outside world into an equilibrillm, chiefly by 
decrea ing our exports, fall, of course, heavily upon the Ameri-
can exporter, who is the mo t efficient of all domestic producers. 
The correctives now taking place bear with ruthle s severity 
*Rogers, James Harvey. America Weighs Her Gold. p. 155. 
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upon those industries, agricultural and non-agricultural, that 
are dependent upon foreign outlets. As all of the preceding 
study show , at present, knowingly or otherwi e, the United 
States is carrying out a policy the con equences of which can 
be none other than to decrea e exports. 
SOME CONSE QUENCES OF LOWERING TARIFFS 
In the preceding analysi we noted that the burden of the 
adjustments now taking place in our balance of payments fall 
chiefly upon the .American producer dependent upon foreign 
outlets. The movement of exporting American factorie , the 
effect of depreciated currencie and the influence of trade bar-
riers abroad all bear adversely on the exporter. Since downward 
tariff adjustments are the principal alternative, the remainder 
of this study is devoted to an examination of the consequences 
that probably would arise from a scaling down o,f tariffs. 
Tariffs are intended to check imports. It is the protective 
aspect and not the revenue-raising feature of tariffs that is com-
monly stressed in Congr What reasons are there fo-r a na-
tion to check, in fact, often prohibit, imports? Is it better 
national policy gradually to reduce the tariff protection which is 
at pre ent supporting certain industries and thus increa e im-
ports, or let the correctives now• taking place contract the 
export industries to somewhat mo-re nearly a domestic produc-
tion basis? 
Many arguments are advanced in favor of tariffs. The more 
important of these are as follows. Tariffs, it is claimed: 
1. Help maintain the standard of living of a high-wage coun-
try against the competition of a lo-w-wage country. 
2. Provide a home market for the American farmers. 
3. Protect labor and if used in an emergency reduce unem-
ployment. 
4. Protect the dome tic producer again t foreign dumping. 
5. Aid in building up indu tries that are nece ary for the 
national defense of a country. 
6. Fo ter infant industry. 
• 
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7. l\Iay be employed to facilitate internal economic adjtl~ t-
ment. 
Each of the e argt1ments 'vill be examined in turn. Althot1gh 
~pace doe~ not pern1it a full di Ctl ion of all a pect of the tariff 
qtle tion, an endeavor i made to shaw in broad o·utlines hov-v 
tariffs apply under pre ent condition to thi country. The treat-
ment, of neces ity, is in general terms. Yet an attempt i made 
to distingui h bet-v·veen tariffs a emergency meast1re and tariffs 
a part of a long-time policy. 
High Wages 
It is evident that many factories could 110t pay the V\7ages 
that they are no-yv paying if the tariff o·n their products V\ ere 
Rhar1)ly reduced. Thi fact leads many people to conclude that 
our high wage are to be attributed to tariff~. Stated in another 
way, they believe that inasmuch as the American scale of wage~ 
i higher than in foreign countrie , cheap foreign goods mu~ t 
be lrept out or else under competition wage vvill be forced down. 
To vvhat exte11t i thi a sun1ption valid for o~ur wage cale a , a 
whole ~ 
It i commonly recognized that the automobile industry ha 
been one of the leader in bring·ing about higher vvages. Btlt 
automobiles are not tariff-protected; they are exported. Otlr 
motor industry has captured markets the \Vorld over in direct 
competition with automobiles made with much cheaper labor 
in France, England and Germany. The explanation is simple. 
The American worker i more effective than the Et1ropean. The 
reasons are several. l\Ia s production, pecialization of labor, 
~uperior managerial per onnel and an abundance of resource 
all play a part. Take, for example, the experience of America11 
branch factories abroad, many of which find the efficiency of 
European \VOrlrer lower than that of the American. ''An 
..... .....,.merican auto·mobile plant a emble a cettain model in abot1t 
34 hour . . . . It European ·ub idiary a semble tl1e 1an1 
model i11 60 hour . . . . '' ~  
*Parker, Graham "'., · "A.n1erican Branch Plants in Europe,' ' Fa ctory and Indus-
trial Management. October, 193 2. 
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Take an illustration in agriculture. The rice farmers of 
Loui iana, Arkansa and especially of Texas until recently were 
among the mo t prosperous in the entire South. They, too, are 
on an export basis. Their rice i old to Europe, Canada, Lati1 
America and even to the Orient. The chief exporting countries 
are India, Siam and Indo-China. At first thought it would seem 
impo sible for u to compete with these countrie for world mar-
kets in view of their unlimited supply of cheap labor and low 
. tandards of living. But, again, the explanation is not difficult. 
The average rice farmer in Texas harvest 10,000 bushels a year. 
He use the mo t modern large scale machinery. t The Chinese 
farmer depends at be t upon a water buffalo, a crude plow, a 
hoe, a sickle and a flail. Buckt found that it takes a Chinese 
farmer 945 man-hours to produce an acre of rice. Compare this 
with the 20 to 30 hours of man-labo·r that the American spends 
per acre. In reality, it will become increasingly difficult for the 
Chine e to hold his home market in the face of our low cost of 
production. 
There is no doubt that wages are higher in the United States 
than in Europe. This is true not only for money wages but also 
for what wages buy, namely, real wages. This means that the 
American worker can buy more food, shelter and clothing for 
a day's work than can Europeans. 
It is clear, however, that higher real wages cannot be handed 
over to workmen by the employers unless the workmen turn out 
a larger vo-lume of products. If all Americans gainfully em-
ployed were no more effective in production than European , 
wages could be no higher in the United States than in Europe. 
All of the income of a country ha its origin in the output of 
it ind ie , agricultural and non-agricultural. High wages 
tit is of interest to note th a t Prof. Seaman A. Knapp, who left Iowa State College 
in 1 5 to develop the rice indu try of low er Louisiana, was the principal pioneer 
in br in ging abo ut the r em arkable techni cal adva n cements which domesti c ri ce gr ow· 
ing ha u nder gone . H e introduced modern machine m ethods, thus r evolutionizing ri ce 
p r oduct ion. H e induced farmer s from th e n or th central s tates, esp ecially from Iowa , 
who wer e fa miliar with large-scale m achinery, to come to southwe tern Loui iana 
and take up ri ce growing. These farm er s lost n o time in turn ing to machinery. A s 
ll Ye ult, wher ea w e form erly im'[..or ted u p to 5,0 00,000 bu shels of rice a year over 
a tariff w all of 114 cents a pound, w e n ow export as much a s 2 5,000,000 bushels 
ann ually_ ee H ow ard W . Odum, " outhern P ion ers, " for an account of the im-
porta n t r ole p layed by eaman A . Knapp. T he Un iver sity of orth Carolina Pre . 
pp. 9-115. 1925. 
~ Buck, Joh n Lo . ing. " h in a's lhrm Economy." n iver ily of ' h icago Pre . ~ 
1930. 
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cannot be paid t1nle~ s the chi f indt1 trje. of a cot1ntry are l1ighl)~ 
productive . 
The high real wages, hence the high ~ tandard of living of 
the United States re t fundamentally upon the greater procltlc-
tivity of the American farmer and worker. 
Unprotected Industries 
Bt1t not all industries are eqt1ally effective in converting worlt 
into articles that people want. rrhe rice farnlers and the work-
er in the automobile industry are e pecailly o. Labor is mo~ ~t 
productive in tho e industries that can ell cheaply enough to 
capttire foreign markets and it is least productive in those fielcl,' 
that require prohibitive tariffs in order to operate. For example, 
labor u ed in producing wheat in Kansa~ 'vith combines, tractor· 
and other large- cale machinery is extremely effective, while 
labor used in growing sugar beets, at present, i comparatively 
ineffective. One is suited to the economy of the United State 
'vhile the other apparently is not. The Kansas farmer who pay 
high Arnerican wages ells his wheat at world prices. He wa~_, , 
tlntil recently, \vhen policie beyond his control closed hi for-
eign markets, producing at a profit. On the other hand, the 
ugar beet grower using cheap foreign labor, u ually Mexican, 
has needed a high tariff so a to enable him to operate at all. 
Shoulcl the sugar beet industry be able to mechanize and thereby 
increase its labor productivity several fold, it, too, may become 
effectiv·e, be able to employ American worker~~, and hence b -
come adapted to our economy. 
'l'he general effectivene of tl1e worker in the dominant in-
du trie of a co·untry tend to establi h the general wage scale. 
ln ag'riclllture the tempo i set by such farmer a the hog 
\Yheat, cotton, apple, orange and rice growers ar1d in manufac-
tllring by the automobile, tire and the machine-making indu ;-
tr.ie ·. 'fhe fact that product ~uch as lard, wheat and cotto11; 
opper, tin plate and lu1nber; locomotive , ca h register , e\v-
ing machine .. , type,vriter and printing machinery; tire 1 ' cig-
arettes and hosiery; and automobiles all product of l1.ig .. l1l~y 
1)aid labor are exported and are old chea IJly i proof il1·t t 
\..1nerican ha,Te in tl1e1n a comparative aclv·antaO' .* 
* ~ fl€1 p recedin g ch apter. 
• 
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There i a larg·e cla . of indu tries that for unary rea ons 
do not come within the range of international trade. Bulky 
product like brick, tile and cement are nece arily made near 
the pot where they ar used. Hay and coar e feed grains fall 
into thi clas . Then, too, peri hable commodities like 'eO'etable." 
and mille are usually produced near their market. Hou e , office 
buildings, manufacturing plant and roads are all made by 
dome tic labor. Worker in these and similar occupations may 
or may not be more effective than foreign labor. It is estimated 
that of the 48,833,000 gainfully employed worker reported in 
the 1930 census about three-fourths were employed in unpro-
tected industries. Not all of the remaining one-fourth of the 
workers benefit from the tariff. :Many tariff are clearly nomi-
nal. For example, mo t of the duties on agricultural commodi-
ties to mention only a few, take barley, oats, corn, apples and 
potatoe are practically meaningless. The same is true of 
many tariffs on manufactured articles. :Most American worker 
and farmers are engaged in unprotected enterpri es. 
Protected Indus tries 
Finally, there is another class of indu tries unable to produce 
unle s they have the support of a tariff. Certain wool, cotton 
and ilk textiles, fine lace, fancy embroidery, toy , dyestuffs and 
many other chemicals, artistic pottery, silverware, fancy leather 
good , tin plate, steel rails and sugar these are some of the 
articles in this group . After years of protection they are often 
no more in a po ition to meet foreign competition than when the 
protection wa first given. Import would quickly enter should 
tariff be removed even though there is no obvious ob tacle to 
their dome tic production from the viewpoint of oil, climate, 
kill and of the organiztaion ability required. It i thi group 
that find high wage an in uperable barrier. They do not meas-
ure up to the average productivity et by the dominant indus-
trie . While uch industrie may appear to be suited to a countr·y, 
they do not have the comparative advantage. Their difficulty 
often i not phy ical but conomic. They cannot hold their own 
ao-ain t the mo t effective and dominant indu tri . 
High wage are more charistic of the unprotected than of 
the indu tri that are upported by tariff . Ob. erve the follow-
ing tabl . 
• 
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Of the 21 manufacturing industries that are listed in table 
XLII, 11 are always in the van when tariffs are being considered 
by Congres~, while 10 of these are either indifferent or are ac-
tively opposed to tariffs. The average weekly wages for 1925-1929 
of the employees on the payrolls of these plants were $27.69. 
They ranged from $39.03 for news and magazine publishing to 
$19.96 for cotton manufacturing plants located in the northern 
states. 
It is significant to observe that of the first 10 paying highest 
wages, 8 are unprotected industries. Only two protected indus-
tries iron and steel and chemicals held a place among the high 
wage industries. The monopoly position of iron and steel in 
certain important products made possible by tariffs is worthy 
of notice. At the bottom of the list, with wages below $23 a 
week, all but one have high tariff protection. Observe that al-
though they are given tariff support, they still are unable to pay 
as high wages as the more effective industries. 
It is true that tariffs make it possible for some factories to 
employ more workers than "\Vould otherwise be possible. But 
their effect is to lower rather tha.n to increase real wages. Cus-
tom duties help certain domestic producers. They make it pos-
sible for those domestic enterprises in which labor and capital 
are relatively ineffective to take man and funds from those 
fields in which labor and capital are more effective. In substance 
they therefore subsidize the less efficient producers of a country 
at the expense of the more capable, alert and efficient. 
Tariffs protect the textile industry against the high wages 
which the efficient motor industry is able to pay. They make 
it possible for sugar beet growers to hire workers in the same 
area where the more effective corn and wheat farmers operate. 
Even so, up until now, the beet growers have been unable to pay 
high American wages. 
The high standard of living of the United States abundance 
of wholesome food, modern homes, time for education, auto-
mobiles and so on rests fundamentally upon the effectiveness 
of the workers in the dominant industries. The effectiveness 
of workers in the dominant industries, in turn, depends upon 
the following factors. The first of these is land, commonly 
thought of as our natural resource. Deep black soil, favorable 
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TABLE 
21 MA 
XLII. AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS OF ALL WAGE-EARNERS IN 
UFACTURING INDUSTRIES AND THE APPROXIMATE TRIFF PRO-
TECTION THESE INDUSTRIES RECEIVE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Class of 
manufacturing industry 
Prin t ing. news and 
• 
magazme ............... . 
Iron and steel ........... . 
Printing, book and job 
Automobile ................. . 
Agri cultural implement 
Foun d ries a nd machine 
shops ..................... . 
Rubber manufacturing 
Paint and varnish ..... . 
Chemical 
·····-·----- --------
1 0 E lectrical manufactur-
11 
1 2 
1 3 
14 
15 
1 6 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
• mg 
Paper and pulp ----------
Furniture --------------------
Meat p acking -----·--------
Lumber 
Paper products ----------
Leather t anning and 
fi - h ' DIS Ing ......•••......•.. 
S ilk manufacturing ___ __ _ 
Wool manufacturing ___ _ 
Boot and shoe ------------
Hosiery an d k ni t goods 
Cotton manufacturing r 
All industrie 
Wages 
per 
week ,• 
1925-1929 
average 
(dollars) 
39.03 
34.71 
32 .02 
31.80 
30 .32 
29 .66 
29 .58 
28.51 
28 .22 
28 .17 
27.46 
25 .93 
25.64 
25 .62 
24.78 
24.46 
22 .67 
22 .00 
21.92 
21.0 7 
19 .96 
27.69 
Relation 
of 
tariff to 
value of 
importsb 
(per 
cent) 
nil 
40 
nil to 20 
nil to 10 
nil 
nil 
nil to 25 
nil to 25 
30 
nil to 35 
10 to 25 
38 
nil 
15 
25 to 35 
15 to 30 
60 
73 
20 
60 
48 
Comment 
A domestic industry, practically 
unprotected by tariffs. 
Monopoly prices are made possible 
in tin plate and in steel rails 
because of tariffs. Industry also 
protected in pig iron at and 
n ear seaboard. c 
Chiefly a domestic indu try not 
supported by tariffs. 
Strictly on an export basis, un-
protected. 
No tariffs, hence unprotected. 
On export basis, unprotected. 
Rubber tires, footwear, gloves. 
caps, and numerous similar ar-
ticles are exported. A few spe-
cialties are protected. 
Industry on an export basis in 
nearly all pigments, paints and 
varnishes. Protected only in 
some specialties. 
Highly protected in most products. 
Some like odium compounds 
on export basis. 
Heavy exporters of electrical ma-
chinery and apparatus. Light 
bulbs protected. 
Large imports of paper base stock. 
Imported and exported. Not 
enough information to deter-
mine extent of protection. 
A domestic industry, chiefly un-
protected. 
Both exported and imported. Pro-
tected in some woods. 
Information not available. 
Protected by tariffs chiefly in 
those leather goods requiring 
con siderable hand work. Leath-
er footwear, belting, harness 
and suitcases are exported. 
Fancy broad silk highly protected. 
Ordinary broad silk less de-
pendent upon tariff support. 
Full fashion silk hosiery are 
exported in quantity.d 
Definitely dependent upon tariff 
protection. Industry in a posi-
tion of comparative di sadvan-
tage. • 
Protection limited to those shoes 
and boots requiring much hand 
work. 
Protected except for machine-
made hosiery. 
Fine goods dependent upon tariff 
support. This part of industry 
ineffective compared with for · 
eign cotton mills.g 
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a"Wages in the United States, 1914-1930." National Industrial Conference Board. 
New York. 1931. Based on reports of 1,444 manufacturing industries employing 
about 840,000 worker s. 
bEstimates based upon the ad valorem equivalent for 1930-31 as reported by the 
U. S. Tariff Commission in ''Relation of Duties to Value of Imports." Misc. Series, 
1932; and in "Comparison of Rates of Duties in the Tariff Act of 1930 and in the 
Tariff Act of 1922." 1930. 
cTaussig, F. W. "Some Aspects of the Tariff Question." 3rd enlarged edition 
continued to 1930 with the cooperation of H. D. White. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. Chap. XXIII. 1931. 
dTaussig. Op. cit. p. 418. 
eTaussig. Op. cit. Chap. XXVIII. 
!Includes only the northern cotton manufacturing plants, 29 in all. 
gTaussig. Op. cit. p. 463. 
climate, minerals and water power these are aspects of land, 
the final source of all materials and energy. The second includes 
the economic technique of a people. It is made up of the ac-
cumulated material equipment. Here are included tools, trac-
CLAS.S OF 
INDUST~fES 
l Prin+ ing - ne2ws 
. 
oz. me 
Z. Iron St<Z<: I 
3. Printing-
book. ·ob 
4. Automobile 
5. Agricv1tvro1 
lm 1<tment 
Fovndr-i~s 
Machin~ Sho 
8 . Point 4 Varni~h 
9 . Cha.mico I 
10. E: 1 ¢ct r-ico 1 • 
11. Pa ¢r 4, Pul 
IZ. Fvrni+vre 
13. M~o+ Pock.i 
14. Lumb~r 
15. Po er Prodvc+s 
1~. L<Zaiher Tanning 
ond finishi 
le. Woof Mf . 
19. Boot «t Shoe 
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21. Cotton Mf . 
0 
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FOI?, 19Z5- Z.9 (in Dollars) 
10 zo 30 
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Fig. 21. A comparison of the average weekly wages of workers in the principal 
classes of manufacturing industries \vith the approximate extent of tariff protection 
each class of manufacturing industry receives. 
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tor , combines all machines railways and industrial plants. 
Then there is the scientific knowledge and technical efficiency of 
the people. This final factor, perhaps the most important of all, 
also takes in the qualities of the workers themselves. These in-
volve the industry, thrift, stability and health of the workers. 
To these qualities mu t be added the size of the population rela-
tive to natural resources. With a favorable combination of all 
these factors no power on earth can keep a people from enjo,ying 
a high standard of living. 
Home Market 
Henry Clay in his famous speech of 1824 declared that pro-
tective tariffs for manufacturers would benefit agriculture. He 
held that such tariffs would create a home market for farm prod-
ucts. Just what advantages the domestic market had over the 
foreign market were not set forth. 
In times such as the present it can readily be shown that the 
home market is the surer outlet. A foreign market is more likely 
to be closed by sudden changes in foreign tariffs and by war. The 
producer who is on a domestic basis does not face these uncer-
tainties. The present tariff crisis in international trade has 
brought widespread disaster to the hog, cotton, wheat, tobacco 
and rice growers. The average farm price of these commodities 
is now only 43 percent of pre-war, whereas the prices of tho e 
farm commodities that are not produced in excess of domestic 
requirements stands at 80 percent of their 1910-1914 level.* 
Tariffs for the purpose of giving the farmer a home market 
involve giving protection to industry in order to bring about 
a working population in our cities large enough to consume 
all of the farm products grown in this country. Thus it is rea-
soned that if the manufactured goods which are imported were 
made at home the additional number of people employed would 
consume most, if not all, of the 1.5 to 2 billion dollars of farm 
commodities normally exported. 
A policy of this k1nd in all probability cannot be successful 
from the farmer's viewpoint for three reasons: (1) It is appar-
ently impo ible to expand our indu trial population anywhere 
*See fig. 19 in preced ing ch apter. 
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near· enough to absorb all of the food and raw materials pro-
duced on our farms; (2) industrial tariffs always tend to in-
crease the cost of living to farm people, hence are a direct bur-
den on agriculture, and ( 3) the protected goods absorb, because 
of their higher price, a greater share of the consumer's income, 
thus leaving him less with which to buy bread and meat. 
Historically, the policy enunciated by Henry Clay more than 
a century ago has proved for American agriculture, especially 
for the 1\iississippi Valley, a direct burden rather than an in-
direct benefit. 
The American farmer continues to be inescapably dependent 
upon foreign buying. The home market is, in spite of the phe-
nomenal growth of our cities, too small to absorb the farmer's 
food and raw materials. Nor is there even a remote probability 
that our industrial population will furnish during the next 
decade or two a home market sufficiently large. The farmer must 
continue to export or face ruinously low prices that result from 
glutted domestic mctrkets. The crop and animal products of 
nearly one-fifth of our total crop land were exported from 1922 
to 1928. Since then these exports have been piling up until we 
are confronted '\vith unprecedented carryovers. Under the ex-
isting price system, facts force us to accept the conclusion, 
whether we wish it or not, that farmers must continue to sell 
abroad or face wholesale liquidation. Temporarily, with gov-
ernmental aid, production may, of course, be checked or even 
curtailed to something approaching a domestic basis. But as a 
long-time policy, it is very problematical. 
Protection did hasten the industrialization of America, but 
the home market for agriculture did not materialize. The pros-
perity or poverty of American agriculture continues to depend 
chiefly upon world prices. 
But protection did one thing frequently o·verlooked. It set 
certain forces into motion that have slowly and silently lowered 
the relative buying power of the commodities that the farmer 
sells. Not onl~r have the e forces practically closed his foreign 
markets, but they have, in addition, increased the cost of many 
of the goods that he buys. Thus gradually there has occurred an 
ever widening discrepancy between the things the farmer sold 
and the articles he bought. 
• 
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We placed a high tariff on dyestuffs and textiles. This kept 
the German and English supplies out and enabled domestic 
manufacturers to produce these goods. This gave rise to a work-
ing population which in turn furnished a demand for farm pro-
duce. Ob erve, however, what happened on the other side of the 
account. 
Prior to the enactment of these tariffs, imported dyestuffs and 
textiles gave rise to purchasing power abroad; hence, they pro-
vided payments for food tuffs that were exported. By shutting 
out these commodities we, therefore, reduced our ability to ex-
port. At this point it would appear that the home market that 
arose, at best, simply replaced the foreign market that was lost. 
In fact, it can be shown that in this replacement of markets the 
total demand for farm produce was actually decreased. Society 
was made poorer. In the United States both dyestuffs and tex-
tiles* are manufactured at a greater co t than in Germany and 
England, and in Europe they are now growing wheat on sandy 
and infertile soil and producing pork and lard at cost much 
higher than in the Corn Belt. Equally important is the fact that 
the price of" clothing made from domestically manufactured dye-
stuffs and textiles was raised to the farmer. Protection is always 
a double-edged sword cutting simultaneously in two directions. 
It raises the farmer's cost of living and it reduces his income. 
But usually it acts so slowly that the effects are not obvious until 
serious consequences have occurred. 
To employ tariffs to force consumers to "Buy American" 
only shifts the burden of the depression even more upon 
the producers dependent upon foreign markets. Long before 
it is pos ible for dollars spent for American linens, assuming 
that a tariff has shut out Irish linen , to find their way to 
American workers in new factories or increased employment, 
the price of farm products will be further depressed. For-
eign buyers quickly reduce their purchases of raw material . 
Cables work faster than payroll . Raw material are more 
sensitive to change in demand than wages. To thi must be 
*Most textiles can be man ufactured mor e cheaply abroad than in the United States . 
Rayon and certain mach ine-ma de hos:ier y a re notable exceptions. Observe the com-
m ents given in table XLII. 
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added the lilrelihood of retaliation. It \Vould simply be 
another battle in the international warfare of tariffs with 
the producers of lard, cotton and wheat in ''no man's land.'' 
Unemployment 
• 
It is said that tariffs are a factor in keeping worl{ at home and 
thereby reducing unemployment. This argument has strong 
popular appeal. Tl1ere is no doubt that a country can reduce 
the volume of its imports and thereby create employment at 
home. Goods that are not imported, if they are to be had at all, 
must be made domestically. This obviously is a demand for 
labor. 
But is the demand thus created an additional demand for 
labor~ On the surface it may appear that .there actually is more 
income. The same error is involved, however, that was pointed 
out in the home-marl{et argument. 
Thus, if we kept out rubber boots that Czechoslovakia is able 
to lay down in our marlret at less cost than our own manufac-
turers, more American workers would be put to work making 
rubber boots. This action would thro~w out of work Czechoslo-
vakian laborer who in turn would bt1y le s wheat, bread and 
meat. Potatoes and black bread is the diet to which they then 
are forced. As before, by excluding imports we reduce exports 
of equal value. By giving the rubber boot market to some 
domestic manufacturer we have deprived some domestic ex-
porter, that is, some American farmer, of his lard and wheat 
market abroad. No additional employment is created. The 
farmer, one of our most efficient producers, lost his job while 
the bootmaker, less suited to the economy of the United States, 
wa given a job. 
No person would deny that a sudden downward adjustment 
of tariffs would throw many wage earners out of employment. 
Once a country has embarked upon a protective policy it cannot 
by one stroke remove tariffs without causing serious dislocations. 
Labor and capital cannot shift readily. Likewise, it is equally 
true that if all imports were uddenly stopped the aim of the 
''Buy American'' sponsors it would cause dislocations even 
more serious than tho e already existing within the export 
industries. 
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J. M. Keynes, noted English economist, wrote in 1923, ''The 
one thing that protection cannot do is to cure unemployment. 
If Protectionists merely mean that under their system men 
will have to sweat and labor more, I grant their case. By cut-
ting off imports we might increase the aggregate of work; but 
we should be diminishing the aggregate of wages. . . . Imports 
are receipts and exports are payments. Ho·w, as a nation, can we 
expect to better ourselves by diminishing our receipts? Is there 
anything that a tariff could do, which an earthquake could not 
do better ? '' 
Dumping 
A tariff against dumping is nothing more than an attempt 
to enforce fair competition. It prevents short time cut-throat 
and unfair competition carried on to crush a competitor after 
Which prices are raised to a higher level than formerly. Al-
though tariffs are a clumsy device, until better remedies are 
available, it appears wise to use them to protect the import trade 
from the demoralizing practices of dumping. 
The principal forms of dumping may be described as sporadic 
dumping of occasional overstocks, predatory dumping, monopoly 
dumping, and state-aided dumping. To these may be added 
''exchange dumping.'' Undue imports caused by depreciated 
currency come under this class. 
To deal with these by tariffs is far from simple and is exposed 
to many risks. It is altogether too easy for an inefficient, high 
cost group of producers to convince their congressmen that they 
are facing dumping from abroad. 
Military Necessity 
No nation can afford to become wholly dependent upon for-
eign countries for its supply of war materials. But to carry on 
a modern war the list of essential materials is indeed long. 
Self-sufficiency, it i._, a serted by the most nationalistic, is there-
fore de irable. Defense, they declare, is more important than 
opulence. 
Enough diversification of industry to prevent paralysis and to 
a ure the neces ities of life in time of war is undoubtedly de-
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sirable. The argument is not economic but wholly political. 
The price of tariffs to attain these ends should be clearly recog-
nized as a cost of preparedness. They are a tax on the standard 
of living of a nation similar to any other tax the revenue of 
which is to build battle hips, bombs and machine guns. Ho·w 
much a country should pay for military preparedness is chiefly 
a socio-political problem. It is seldom, if ever, considered on its 
• 
economic merits. 
Infant Industries 
If a nation has infant industries that are suitable to the 
economy of the country they may very properly be accorded 
protection until they reach maturity. Children should be pro-
tected and cared for llntil they reach maturity before they are 
forced to compete with mature people. Economists have gener-
ally admitted that the analogy holds for infant industries. Many 
of the early tariffs of this country may be justified on the 
grounds that they encouraged and hastened the industrialization 
of America. 
Sight, however, should not be lost of the fact that most of 
our older industries can no longer, by any flight of imagination, 
be classified as infants. There is a real basis for the fear that the 
usual relationship between parent and child are reversed and 
that by lobbying and logrolling the child to·day dictates his own 
tariff terms to the parental authority. 
Facilitate Economic Adjustments 
When new technique, the development of new resources in 
foreign countries or improved transport facilities subject a do-
mestic industry to sudden and violent dislocations, tariffs may 
be used to break the fall of prices and render the movement of 
capital and labor to other enterprises easier. For instance, the 
rapid exploitation of the American prairies following the Civil 
War flooded Europe with cheap wheat. The English farmer 
could not meet this competition and for fully a quarter of a 
century England experienced a severe agricultural depres ion. 
Since England was a wheat importing country a judicious ap-
plication of protection would have rendered the farmer's plight 
• 
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in England less severe. In adjustments of this character tariffs 
may well be employed to mitigate disaster and alleviate distress. 
DESIRABILITY OF TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the burden of the 
adjustments now taking place in international trade falls chiefly 
on the producers dependent upon foreign outlets. The correc-
tives that are mending the fabric of foreign trade bear with ruth-
less severity upon American agriculture. Farm prices show the 
consequences. 
The American manufacturer has one escape. He can export 
his factory. The more efficient and resourceful businessmen, 
moreover, are availing themselves of this escape. About 2,000 
American plants have been established abroad. Obviously, this 
alternative is not open to hog, cotton and wheat farmers. 
Another corrective is the influence of the depreciated cur-
rencies of other countries. They have resulted in a sharp down-
ward separation of their internal prices away from ours in terms 
of gold. Such a separation of price levels tends to check our 
exports and stimulate imports. But the corrective influence of 
depreciated currencies, too, has fallen chiefly on the exporter. 
It has become harder for him to sell abroad as a consequence. 
Imports have been less affected because most tariffs are specific 
duties, the protection of which increases relative to the value 
of the article imported when prices decline. 
As the cost of living abroad declines, more Americans are 
likely to spend their vacations in Europe. The expenditures 
of our tourists is an invisible import and tend to relieve the 
scarcity of dollars abroad. Although this item may remain 
large and even expand when better times prevail, for the im-
mediate future tourist expenditures may be expected to decrease. 
Ob erve, however, that of the several important adjustments 
taking place this one alone does not burden the American pro-
ducer dependent upon foreign outlets. In fact, an increase in 
touri t expenditures has the same effect as increasing imports. 
The influences of trade barriers abroad are self-evident. Im-
port quota , milling restrictions, import monopolies, exchange 
controls and all manner of tariffs,-all of these are designed, pri-
marily, to do one thing, namely, decrea e our exports. To the 
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extent that they are successful in reducing our exports they tend 
to correct our balance of payments. 
The movement of American industries to foreign countries, 
depreciated currencies, tourist expenditures and trade barriers 
abroad are adjustments, if left to take their course, that will in 
due time reduce the exports of commodities from the United 
States enough to balance our .international payments to fit our 
creditor position. Meanwhile, ruinously low prices are forced 
upon agriculture and banlrruptcy becomes well-nigh universal. 
At the same time our debtors abroad foreign governments, 
municipalities, corporations and citizens using American capi-
tal are forced to default. Is such a cure desirable? 
But there is an alternative increase imports. To bring this 
about involves a gradual, yet definite, scaling down of our tariff 
wall. A downward adjustment of tariffs would tend to throw 
some of the burden of reestablishing foreign trade upon pro-
tected industries. Some business dislocations would result. Man-
ufacturers at present supported by high and often prohibitive 
tariffs would have to meet foreign competition or shift into fields 
better suited to the economy of the United States. 
From a long trend national viewpoint this would be a desir-
able adjustment. Lowering tariffs to permit enough of an in-
crease in imports of diversified manufactures to make it possible 
for our farmers and export manufacturers to hold their foreign 
markets would do two things: (1) Maintain those industries that 
have in their production the greatest comparative advantage and 
(2) reduce those least effective in using American workers and 
resources. The ultimate result would be to raise the standard 
of living of the people of the Unitd States. 
Prompt reduction of tariffs and the moderation of other trade 
barriers is highly desirable. This action is basic to the reestab-
li hment of our export trade, which, in turn, is basic to the 
restoration of the fundamental balance in our national eco-
nomic life. Farmel--s and other producers of raw materials must 
first receive an adequate price for their products before they 
are able to buy the products of our factories in adequate volume 
to restore business activity and employment in the cities. 
But desirable as it may be to lower tariffs it should be realized 
that this cannot be done in 1 or 2 years. Even under the most 
• 
• 
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favorable circumstances it will probably take from 5 to 10 years 
to effect a substantial reduction of prevailing domestic and for-
eign trade barriers. Then, too, serious dislocations would result 
if all tariffs were suddenly removed or even sharply reduced. 
There are many reasons why the process should be carried out 
gradually, the chief one being that it would give the tariff sup-
ported industries an opportunity to shift to more productive 
enterprises. Meanwhile, what will happen to the American pro-
ducer who has lost his foreign market? Until our foreign trade 
is reestablished, that is, until imports are increased, exports must 
be reduced. Therefore, temporarily at least, some plan to facili-
tate the orderly retreat* of our cotton, wheat, hog and tobacco 
producers is not only desirable but in all probability essential. 
While our national trade poilcies are being adjusted to fit our 
creditor position, sight should not be lost of the fact that the 
American farmer is carrying most of the burden of the ad-
justments now taking place; hence, they are entitled to :first 
consideration in any relief program. 
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